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This thesis suggests that Marxist-Leninist ideology
continues to play a significant role in the conduct of
Soviet foreign relations in that it demands a continuous,
underlying hostility toward the capitalist west. Evidence
of the continuing commitment to the ideology by the Soviet
leadership is examined in three areas: the efforts of
the Communist Party to impart the doctrine to the Soviet
people; the bureaucratic stakes associated with the ideol-
ogy in the Soviet domestic bureaucratic politics process;
and evidence that the hostility toward capitalism demanded
by the ideology has been present throughout the history of
the Soviet Union tempered only by the relative power of the
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In a lecture given at the Naval Postgraduate School in
Monterey, California, Doctor Vernon Aspaturian, of Penn State
University spoke of a bilateral exchange of papers between
academicians of the United States and the Soviet Union
addressing the topic of "perceptions of detente and deter-
rence" with each group describing their respective govern-
ment's views. The Soviet response was prepared by IMEMO and
the USA/Canada Institute of Soviet Academy of Sciences (no
author specified). American political scientists, hopeful of
getting 'real' answers, were disappointed and disturbed upon
finding that the Soviet effort contained the typical ideolog-
ical interpretation of these concepts commonly found in
official Soviet publications. This represents a common
attitude among American academicians and policy makers — the
belief that the ideological verbiage accompanying Soviet
policy decisions is merely an icing covering the decision to
make it more palatable to the Soviet populace, various domestic
interest groups, or to promote a particular image abroad; that
the real reasons for the selection of a given policy are to
be found elsewhere in the Soviet policy process. Though a
survey of literature dealing with the Soviet Union will reveal
that most authors feel compelled to address ideology and con-
cede that it must be considered to understand Soviet society

(at least to one degree or another) , the current vogue is to
assign to it a relatively minor role when evaluating Soviet
foreign policy. It is the thesis of this paper that vogue is
in error, that to understand Soviet foreign policy requires
an understanding of its philosophical foundations. Put simply,
ideology is a significant factor necessary for consideration
when evaluating Soviet foreign policy.
This is not to suggest that ideology is the only deter-
minant of Soviet foreign policy. James Rosenau suggests that
to properly address the foreign policy of any country five
sets of factors generally must be considered which impact on
the policy process: the idiosyncracies of decision makers,
the external behavior of officials generated by the roles
they occupy, aspects of a government's structure that limit
or enhance the foreign policy choices of decision makers,
non-governmental aspects of a society which influence its
external behavior (including the major value orientations of
the society) , and systemic variables or the non-human aspects
2
of a society's external environment. Vernon Aspaturian
supports this view by suggesting a multi-level, multi-
dimensional approach to the study of Soviet foreign policy
3behavior. Thus it is not the thesis of this paper to suggest
that Soviet foreign policy can be understood without reference
to variables other than ideology. It does suggest, however,
that if there are certain aspects of the Soviet foreign policy
process which are significantly more important than others,
7

ideology is among them. It further suggests that Soviet
foreign policy cannot be understood satisfactorily without
consideration of this factor.
Any study of Soviet foreign policy is confounded by the
nature of that society which limits access to hard data and,
unless one understands the Russian language, is limited to
those sources which others have seen fit to translate into
English. Thus academic integrity requires that the major
sources for such a study be clearly identified. This study
has relied exclusively on English works essentially in the
form of translations of the Soviet press, the works and
memoirs of various Soviet leaders and dissidents, and works
by western authors dealing particularly with those aspects
of ideology which are discussed in the following chapters.
Chapter one introduces the concept of ideology as a
theory in practice. The term 'ideology' as used in this
thesis refers to the philosophical foundation on which the
legitimacy of the political institutions of a state rests,
which serves as the rationale that justifies public policy,
and which forms the 'world view' on which rests the prepara-
tion of foreign policy. ('World view' is the conscious and
unconscious framework within which data about the world is
organized and analyzed. ) It is a two dimensional concept
which contains sets of factual and moral presuppositions
which serve to explain or justify the ends and means of
organized social action. The first dimension of ideology is
8

the 'fundamental dimension 1 which refers to the principles
or philosophic foundations which determine the goals or
direction of movement of a political or social movement in-
cluding broadly conceived ways and means by which the goals
are to be attained. The second dimension is the 'operational
dimension' and refers to those principles of the movement
which reflect more than do other principles a concern with
practical and pressing exigencies — political leaders
generally try to relate the operational dimension to the
fundamental dimension. In the Soviet Union the fundamental
dimension of Soviet ideology is Marxism supplemented or modi-
fied by Lenin's theories of imperialism and the vanguard of
the proletariat. The operational dimension is represented
by much of the remainder of Leninist thought and other prin-
ciples developed by his successors based more on the reality
of the moment than on close adherence to fundamental principles
As Zbigniew Brezezinski observes "Confusing these two, or
failing to distinguish between Marxist theory /his term for
what this paper refers to as the fundamental dimension/ and
the ideology /the operational impact of reality on theory/,
can lead to the simplistic conclusion that Soviet ideology is
merely a cynical sham, consciously manipulated by the Soviet
leaders . . . the Soviet Communist ideology must be viewed as
combining certain doctrinal assumptions with principles de-
rived from the theory but closely reflecting the specific
reality of those who subscribe to the ideology." The
,9

fundamental dimension is essentially a social science
paradigm which serves to organize and priortize data, and
which suggests dependent/causal relationships between vari-
ables. On an operational level, the paradigm developed with-
in the fundamental dimension serves to simplify complex, real
world situations and suggests frameworks for evaluating
alternatives in decision making.
Chapter two attempts to analyze Soviet ideology from the
perspective of both the fundamental and operational dimensions
to determine if the ideology itself has a direct conceptual
impact on foreign policy formulation. Avoiding the tedious
arguments of Marxist-Leninist philosophy, the study will
suggest and examine the following arguments. From the Marxist
foundation of the philosophy develops a moral criticism of the
capitalist system on two counts: first, that it represents
the most exploitive — and thus misery generating — system
of social organization which has ever existed; and second, it
struggles to prevent the revolution which would bring on the
next stage of human development. Lenin adds to this the theory
of imperialism which suggests that the capitalists have tem-
porarily averted the inevitable revolution by coopting the
proletariat into the exploiting class by allowing them to
participate, to some degree, in the exploitation of the
imperial territories. The capitalist system is thus indicted
morally on a third count of spreading its exploitation to
world wide proportions and, in addition, corrupting the
10

proletariat class with notions of nationalism. Chapter two
goes on to review the ascendancy of the security of the
Soviet Union as the dominant foreign policy tenet which arose
within the operational dimension.
Having established that the ideology does contain doc-
trines which have a direct impact on foreign policy formula-
tion, chapter three turns to the question of whether or not
there is evidence that the Soviet leadership is actually
committed to or affected by the ideology, or if it is merely
a sham which covers over cynical, pragmatic decision making.
Evidence for this was sought in two primary areas. First,
the extensiveness of the effort expended by the Soviet govern-
ment to inculcate the Soviet populace with Marxist-Leninist
ideology was considered. Second, the effort expended by the
party through its selection process, internal education system,
periodic elimination of non-productive members, and the con-
tinued and intensified organizational socialization process
which rewards compliance and disciplines deviation within the
party itself was studied.
The fourth chapter will utilize the bureaucratic politics
paradigm to demonstrate the practical implications of ideology
in the Soviet foreign policy process. Essentially, it will be
argued that ideology plays a role in the policy process in
several ways : first in shaping the shared values of those who
participate in the policy process; second as one of the 'rules
of the game 1 ; third as a source of power in the policy process;
.11

and finally as a factor which enhances or detracts from or-
ganizational perceptions and interests.
The fifth chapter will explore the impact of ideology on
the Soviet foreign policy process as an historical phenomenon
seeking evidence that the Soviets have carried out a foreign
policy which is consistent with the ideological tenets dis-
cussed in chapter two. Three particular areas of foreign
policy will be considered in the attempt to discern such
evidence: first, Soviet rhetoric (i.e., what they say);
second, what actions have been taken short of overt military
action to achieve ideological goals; and finally, what mili-
tary actions have been taken. Foreign policy as used in this
thesis refers to the method by which states seek to resolve
differences between themselves and others. Military, economic
and political policies flow naturally from this concept. As
a generalization, the more centrally controlled an aspect of
the society , the more easily it can be used as a tool
7
of foreign policy.
The final chapter will review the findings of the previous
chapters and suggest whether or not the general thesis of this
paper has been supported or denied. However, prior to entering
into the specifics of chapters two through five it would be
appropriate to review the past consideration of ideology as a
determinant in the Soviet foreign policy process.
The ideological factor, as an approach, developed almost
immediately following the Russian revolution in 1917 and,
12

combined with the Bolshevik refusal to repay the war debts of
the Tsarist and the Kerensky governments, provided the justi-
fication for the refusal of the United States government to
recognize the government of the Soviet Union until 19 34. The
ideological differences between the Soviets and the U.S. (real
or imagined) were covered over during the negotiations which
surrounded the surrender of Germany and the establishment of
a new world order. Mistakes in understanding and negotiation
by both the Soviets and the United States led to a sharp con-
flict between the two. Ideology reemerged as an explanation
of the motivations for Soviet actions. The views of U.S.
policy makers crystalized around the position expressed by
gGeorge Kennan in his article "The Sources of Soviet Conduct."
This view was later translated into policy with the publica-
tion of NSC 68 which in effect officially adopted the ideo-
logical interpretation of Soviet behavior and formulated the
9
containment doctrine.
The decline of this interpretation of Soviet motivations
lies, not in the errancy of the evaluation, but in the nature
of the United States political system. The logical response
to the threat posed to the world in general by a powerful,
ideologically motivated adversary was (as specified by Kennan
and NSC 6 8) to respond to every effort at Soviet expansion.
Given the relative weakness of the rest of the allies following
the war, the burden of this response fell on the United States.
This logic, coupled with a struggle within the government
13

bureaucracy as to what would be the role of the U.S. Military
following the war, and with a significant lack of sophistica-
tion in U.S. dealings with the world, led to an interpretation
that the best method to counter Soviet expansion was the
maintenance of a strong military establishment. (This was
supported by the fear that the large conventional military
presence of the Soviets in Eastern Europe posed an immediate
threat to Western Europe.) However, strong military establish-
ments are expensive and in a government such as that of the
United States support for this expense had to be generated in
Congress and ultimately in the general population. The effort
to generate this support led to an overreaction used by some
politicians (Joe McCarthy for one, Richard Nixon for another)
as a springboard to public attention. The Soviets and other
Communist nations fueled this reaction of the American public
by their actions in Berlin, East Germany, Iran, China, Korea
and Hungary. The gradually increasing knowledge of the ex-
tensiveness of Stalin's purges and manipulations both in the
Soviet Union and in Eastern Europe added to the western per-
ception of the Communist totalitarian monolith.
This reaction to the aggressive, totalitarian perception
of the Soviet Union became so extensive that it led to an
inability on the part of the American public and many political
leaders to distinguish between the forces of 'nationalism* and
'communism', critical in an era in which the colonies of Africa
and Asia were beginning to demand independence. It led to a
14

blind opposition to any third world leader, no matter how
popular locally, that had links to or support from the Soviet
Union (regardless of how limited) or who espoused Marxist-
Leninist doctrines. It led to U.S. support for any regime
which claimed to oppose communism no matter how unpopular
that regime or how much in violation of U.S. ideals its poli-
cies were.
The policy came into question by the general public during
the Vietnam war (although it had been questioned by academics
earlier — even George Kennan questioned the way the policy
had been implemented) during which the social and economic
costs became unacceptable. This questioning of the policy
generated a reevaluation of the perceptions and ideas on which
the policy was based.
With this questioning came a number of revisionist his-
torians who suggested that the foundations of the cold war
lay with misperceptions by U.S. policy makers of Soviet
intentions and motivations at least partially caused by
12
the ideological interpretation of Soviet actions.
During the same period of time (World War II to the
present) a change was occurring in the academic field of
political science. The study of politics was acquiring,
under impetus of the behavioralist school, an increasing
sophistication which rejected single factor analyses in
favor of the study of multiple variables impacting on
political systems. In addition there was a growing
15

emphasis on developing 'theories' of political science which
required precise definition of terms, conceptual frameworks
and measurement (at least these were the hopes of those in-
volved in the behavioral is t movement) . Finding the term
ideology, like 'power', difficult to define precisely and
thus to measure, those generalizations associated with it
were relagated to positions of unimportance or at least
placed in abeyance until a future time. Interest shifted
to those areas which seemed, intuitively, more likely to
yield to rigorous methodology. It should be noted that
these attitudes were not universally held but that they
reinforced in an indirect manner the positions of revision-
ist historians. At the moment at which the ideological
interpretation of Soviet actions was being called into
question by historians, it was placed on the back burner
by political scientists.
The combination of these two developments, the reval-
uation of the foundations of the cold war and the assump-
tions of U.S. post world war II policy, and the relegation
of ideology to (at least momentarily) a minor role in the
understanding of political phenomena resulted in a near
reversal in the perception of ideology as a factor in Soviet
foreign policy. From being the most important factor it now
became only one of many determinants in Soviet foreign policy




These rather academic reasons for lessening the impor-
tance of ideology as a determinant in Soviet foreign policy
based on the reanalysis of data by historians and the dif-
ficulty in conceptualizing ideology as a term, are reinforced
by another relatively complicated factor related to the
weakness of the Western philosophical position vis a vis
the Marxist-Leninist foundations of the Soviet Union.
Marxist-Leninist doctrine attacks Western philosophy at its
weakest point — the confluence of capitalistic economic
theory and the Judaeo-Christian ethic. By suggesting that
capitalism generates greed and that greed is the basis of
repression in the world, Marxism poses a criticism which
the west cannot easily refute. As observed by "Nobel prize
winning economist Milton Friedman: '(For many) socialism
implies egalitarianism and that people are living for
society, while capitalism has been given the connotation
of materialism, 'greedy 1 , 'selfish', 'self-serving', and
14
so on'". Capitalistic economic theory is founded on the
concept of self-interest stating that the single most im-
portant factor of economics is the law of supply and demand.
The motivator for the consumer is the satisfaction of his
desires or the meeting of his demands. The motivator for
the producer is the satisfaction of his desire for profit.
Yet this 'law' of economics directly contradicts the common
ground of western moral thought, the Judaeo-Christian ethic
of self-denial and concern for others. The West has yet to
3,7

produce a coherent, well received, philosophical response to
this Marxist criticism. That this is a valid criticism is
evidenced by the large number of the third world leaders in
the 1950 's who, educated in the west, rejected western
philosophies in favor of socialism at least partially because
of the hypocrisy between western religion which taught
brotherly love and the western capitalistic economic system
which exploited peoples.
The manner in which the United States, as a society has
dealt with this philosophical contradiction has been to
develop a pragmatic approach to problems in which as
Henry Kissinger observes, "problems are segmented into
constituent elements, each of which is dealt with by experts
in the special difficulty it involves. There is little
emphasis or concern for their interrelationship. .
.
Though the importance of intangibles is affirmed in theory,
it is difficult to obtain a consensus on which factors are
significant and even harder to find a meaningful mode for
dealing with them. Things are done better because one knows
how to do them and not because one ought to do them. .
.
Pragmatism. . .seeks to reduce judgement to methodology and
value to knowledge." Since the major bases of western
philosophical thought are contradictory they are separated
from reality. Decisions are made on the basis of practi-
cality not philosophical consistency. It is commonly argued
that because there is such a sizeable, demonstrable
L8

discrepancy between the quality of life between the West and
the socialist states, because the West is technically far
superior, the argument is then assumed that the West is far
advanced beyond the socialist in all areas — to include
philosophy (or at least that Soviet philosophy is not mean-
ingful) . Time magazine used just such an argument in March
of 1978 when observing "in comparing neighboring countries
where one is socialist and the other is not (North Korea vs.
South Korea, Tanzania vs. Kenya) the statistical evidence
16
almost always favors the non-socialist nations." Thus
the assumption of errancy of the logic of the official
state ideology is based on a statistical comparison. This
tendency to emphasize the errancy of Socialism has been
further complicated by a tendency to be overcritical of the
socialist view. Though the U.S. has found it necessary to
adapt a pragmatic approach to the application of its own
philosophical beliefs, the Soviets were found wanting if they
deviated from western perceptions of what consistent Marxist-
Leninist foreign policy should be (i.e., ideological commit-
ment was associated with blind faith) . The Soviet leadership
was not allowed a combination of commitment to an ideological
conception of the world and a degree of common sense. As will
be noted in the following chapters, the Soviets are fully
aware that reality has had a very direct impact on their
ability to implement doctrinal tenets. As Zbigniew Brezinski
observes concerning the early years of the Soviet state
IS

"given the weakness of the new Soviet state, ideology could
not exercise a wide latitude in action. The number of policy
alternatives open to the Soviet Union was relatively limited,
if one excludes political suicide as an alternative; and
Communist ideology. .. lays the greatest emphasis on self
17preservation.
Furthering the tendency to reject ideology as a basis
for action is a combination of two other factors. First,
those individuals representing the United States dealing
with the Soviet Union in the international arena are always
tied to a president who will remain in office for a maximum
of two terms and who thus tend to project the impact of
policy only a short period into the future knowing full
well that a following president may reverse current policies.
Thus incremental changes in the international system are not
perceived as significant. Further (and the second factor
involved) the implications of Soviet ideological goals are
so ominous as to be rejected out of hand as impossible to
achieve (i.e., the demise of the capitalist system).
Because of the shortsightedness of western leaders (not
limited to the U.S.) incremental changes which signify
Soviet gains in what they refer to as the 'correlation of
forces' are disregarded as unimportant. A given administra-
tion may view the expansion of Soviet influence into a new
territory as a relatively minor shift in the balance of
power between east and west even if the shift is clearly to
2.0

the detriment of the west, but such events attain signifi-
cance when considering cumulative growth of Soviet power and
influence between 1918 and the present.
This tendency to denigrate the importance of ideological
differences between the two political systems has led to
'wishful thinking 1 on the part of those who choose to ignore
the differences. This wishful thinking is quickly demon-
strated by a visit by twelve U.S. senators to the Soviet
Union. "The senators, led by Abraham Ribicoff (D) of
Connecticut and Henry Bellmon (R) of Oklahoma left with the
hope that at the very least they had managed to educate the
top layer of leaders Brezhnev and Kosygin. . . Yet in inter-
views just before they left, several senators agreed they
could point to few positive signs that the Soviets were
willing either to understand the U.S. position or to compro-
mise with it... The most hopeful signs, they felt, were the
18
red carpet treatment they received at every step." Hugh
Seton-Watson suggests that this tendency toward wishful
thinking, exacerbated by western academicians who, having
participated in a technical or cultural exchange with the
Soviet Union involving an informal exchange of ideas with
Soviet citizens not necessarily associated with the policy
process, came to the conclusion that:
What 200,000 Communist party officials, from
Brezhnev down to the secretaries of party branches
in factories or collective farms, tell their subjects
is all camouflage: The real views of the Soviet
leaders are what some nice guy from the Soviet dele-
gation at the U.S. said over a quiet drink, or what
2,1

an itinerant Midwestern scientist heard from some
friendly academician in Novosibirsk. ^
These criticisms of the rejection of the ideological
approach are not to infer that all criticism of the approach
were unjustified. Any single factor approach is overly
simplistic and as the field of political science has become
more sophisticated so has the understanding of those factors
which impact on the soviet foreign policy making process.
As noted earlier, numerous other determinants of Soviet
foreign policy have been identified. This has been facili-
tated by a greater interaction with Soviet leadership,
academic, technical and cultural exchanges, interviews with
exiled dissidents, defectors and Jewish immigrants, and
increasing sophistication in the analysis of the Soviet
press. Some determinants have appeared so powerful initi-
ally that they reached, momentarily, the proportions of
single factor analyses themselves. Particularly, following
the death of Stalin, the personality of the leader as a
determinant in the foreign policy process was considered
of paramount importance. Others have suggested that there
have been no significant chages in Soviet foreign policy
goals since the times of the Tsars and have looked for clues
to the understanding of Soviet foreign policy in traditional
Russian foreign policy goals, thus reasserting the impor-
tance of the historical approach to understanding Soviet
policy. The study of the domestic impacts on the foreign
22

policy process has led to a particularly fascinating
approach to the Soviet foreign policy process stressing the
impact of bureaucratic politics on the Soviet decision-
20
making process. Many now point to the interrelationship
between Soviet Communism and Russian nationalism as a
significant factor. Each of these ideas and others as well
contribute valuable information to the understanding of the
Soviet foreign policy process and must be examined in re-
lation to the other factors. x However, it is the position
of this paper that, with the increasing sophistication of
the study of political science and the understanding of the
factors which impinge on the foreign policy process, with
the discrediting of the ideological approach by revisionist
historians, and with the inability or unwillingness of
western philosophical thought to respond to the criticisms
Soviet ideology in a coherent rational manner, ideology as
a determinant in the Soviet foreign political process has been
relegated to a role of relative unimportance. Thus the goal
of this paper is not to exaggerate the role of ideology as a
determinant in the Soviet foreign policy process but to re-
assert that it is a significant factor which cannot be ig-
nored and must be considered fully as much as other factors
in order to understand that process.
The importance of addressing ideology is that it answers
to some degree the questions of 'why* the Soviets take certain
actions. Though such concepts as cost/benefit analysis,
2<3

opportunism and risk taking suggest why particular actions
are taken in the short run, each of these assume that risk
taking is probable, that advantage will be taken of oppor-
tunity, that benefits will be weighed against costs when
considering taking particular actions. Each of these con-
cepts assumes the danger of conflict, none explains why the
Soviet leadership would be motivated to risk current gains,
why they should desire to take advantage of opportunity (at
the expense of the west) or why benefits should be sought
(again at the expense of the west) whether the risks are
high or low. The answers to these questions are found in the
motivations of those who determine the content of Soviet
foreign policy. This paper suggests that ideology is one of
the significant factors which motivate those individuals
participating in the Soviet foreign policy process. The
following chapters will address, successively, a series of





FOREIGN POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF MARXIST-LENINIST IDEOLOGY
Ideology, as it will be used throughout this chapter, must
be considered as a social theory in practice. It is a two
dimensional concept which contains sets of factual and moral
presuppositions which serve to explain or justify the ends and
means of organized social action. The first dimension of ide-
ology is the 'fundamental dimension 1 which refers to the prin-
ciples or philosophic foundations which determine the goals or
direction of a political or social movement including broadly
conceived ways and means by which the goals are to be atained.
The second dimension is the 'operational dimension' and refers
to those principles of the movement which reflect more than do
other principles a concern with practical and pressing exigen-
cies — political leaders generally try to relate the oper-
22tional dimension to the fundamental dimension. In the
Soviet Union the fundamental dimension of Soviet ideology is
Marxism supplemented or modified by Lenin's theory of
'imperialism' and the 'vanguard of the proletariat'. The
operational dimension is represented by much of the remain-
der of Leninist thought and other principles developed by
his successors based more on the reality of the moment than
on close adherence to fundamental principles. The funda-
mental dimension is essentially a social science paradigm
which serves to organize and priortize data, and which
2.5

suggests dependent/causal relationships between variables.
On an operational level, the paradigm developed within the
fundamental dimension serves to simplify complex, real
world situations and suggests frameworks for evaluating
alternative's in decision making.
Although not purporting to conduct a comprehensive review
of Marxist-Leninist philosophy, those aspects of the doctrine
which are fundamental to its cohesiveness and which cannot be
altered without undermining its very nature will be considered
as they impact, in a conceptual sense, on Soviet foreign
policy. In addition, one important principle which has de-
veloped within the operational dimension but which has been
related to the fundamental dimension (and thus fully legiti-
mated) and elevated to the plane of ideological doctrine will
be considered as it impacts on the foreign policy process.
A. THE FUNDAMENTAL DIMENSION
The most basic claim of the Marxist-Leninist doctrine is
its elevation of the study of society to a science, not in
the sense used in the west when referring to the 'social
sciences', but science in a physical science sense based on
a fundamental understanding of the nature of change and the
observation of empirical data. This claim is summed up in
the concept of 'dialectial materialism*, the concept upon
which all other generalizations are founded.
The Hegelian concept of the 'dialectic' rejects the
Aristotelian notion that what is, is, suggesting instead
2.6

that everything in nature contains within itself both those
elements which define its nature and elements which contra-
dict its nature. Thus within every observable phenomena can
be detected contradiction and the seeds of change. Every-
thing is in a constant state of flux, change is self generated
23because of inherent conflict. However, the resolution of
inherent conflict results in the elimination of immediate con-
flict and elevates the phenomena of conflict to a higher plane.
Thus the phenomenon of the world are not viewed as static but
as in a constant state of conflict which results in progressive
change
.
The concept of 'materialism* suggests that all that exists
can be reduced to matter. Man is defined, not as a reasoning
being, but as a creature which has material needs. Man's
consciousness is defined as man's awareness of himself within
his environment. The drive to satisfy material needs gives
purpose to man. The application of consciousness and purpose
by man is defined by Marx as 'labor*. The struggle of man
with his environment is a struggle for the appropriation of
nature or 'production'. Thus man differs from the animal
not because he thinks but because he produces. Production
is always a social activity. Society is viewed primarily as
a way of organizing production based on a need for a division
of labor to increase efficiency in production. The division
of labor is linked to the technical achievements of a society,
24
and class structure is a broad form of the division of labor.
27

The technological achievements or capabilities of a society
translate into the 'forces of production 1 which in essence
determine the nature of the society within which they exist.
"All morality, philosophy, religion and politics are the result
of the conditioning of men by their environment which is the
25
expression of the mode of production. Note that this entire
argument has so far proceeded from the concept of 'materialism'
The relations between men (and referred to in Marxist termin-
ology as the 'relations of production 1 ) or, more properly,
between classes of men, are based on the current 'forces of
production' and as such become the central phenomena of human
society or the base upon which the societal superstructure is
built. "When . . .we ask ourselves why a particular principle
was manifested in the eleventh or eighteenth century rather
than any other, we are necessarily forced to examine minutely
what men were like in the eleventh century, what they were
like in the eighteenth, what were their respective needs,
their productive forces, their mode of production, the raw
materials of their production — in short what were the re-
lations between man and man which resulted from all these
2 6
conditions of existence."
Returning to the concept of the dialectic and applying
it to what Marx considers to be the central phenomena of
society, the forces of production, he suggests that "neither
force nor law can for long periods maintain social relation-
27
ships that do not correspond to the mode of production."
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Thus as man's technology changes it literally forces observ-
able change in the society which utilizes it. Usually this
change is radical and revolutionary. It is always progressive.
Marx and Engles present as evidence of this progress an inter-
pretation of history based on technological change suggesting
the stages of progress as primitive communal living, slavery,
feudalism and (at the time of their writing) capitalism. They
argue that each stage represented a significant increase in
man's ability to control his environment and produce to meet
his physical needs. Capitalism represented the ultimate stage
in man's technological capacity to dominate the environment.
Within each of the stages of historical progress were con-
tained the dialectical contradictions which lead to the next
stage of development. This is also true of capitalism. In
each stage of development contradiction was most apparent in
the realm of the 'relations of production' or the relation be-
tween classes. Though in each stage man had improved his ability
to extract from the physical environment to meet his physical
needs, in each stage there existed two significant 'classes'
defined in terms of those who benefitted from or controlled
the production forces and those who were manipulated to create
the benefit for the privileged class. The exactitude of the
degree of exploitation to which one class subjected another is
bound up in the ' labor theory of value ' which becomes fundamen-
tal to much of Marxist philosophy and will be dealt with to a
limited degree shortly. The contradiction within capitalism
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is that, though man has attained the capability to pro-
duce to fulfill all men's needs most men are in misery be-
cause of the exploitive nature of class relations. Due to
the progressive nature of the dialectic this contradiction
must be resolved in a higher form of social development. A
review of other aspects of Marxist philosophy would explain
why the proletariat class holds the seeds of the synthesis
which will resolve the conflict and the nature of the new
order will be a socialist one in which the contradictions
found in the past societies will be resolved through the
reconciliation of man and society.
The purpose of this review of Marxist theory to this
point has not been to present all aspects and ramifications
of Marxist philosophy but merely to support the fact that it
claims to be a scientific understanding of history and social
science flowing from an understanding of the cause of change
in the world and from observable material reality. There are
two points which flow from this claim to scientific reli-
ability and accuracy which, as will be demonstrated later,
have an impact on the legitimacy of the state and Soviet
foreign policy. First, if the philosophy is scientifically
reliable then it must describe phenomena which is universally
observable and applicable. This point is particularly im-
portant to the legitimacy of the party as will be discussed
in chapter four. Secondly, as a science, it allows pre-
diction — reliable prediction. This reliable prediction
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comes in the form of the historical and scientific inevita-
bility of the demise of the capitalist system and the rise
of a new social order — socialism. History is scientific
and progressive; it is understandable, predictable and
moving to a new and higher order of development. This leads
to a discussion of another (and for the future discussion
of foreign policy one of the most significant) of the basic
aspects of Marxism-Leninism as the fundamental dimension
of Soviet ideology and that is the scientific basis of
morality. "The notion that socialism has been made scientific,
which Engels propounded in the very title of one of his pam-
phlets, implies not only that the coming of socialism has been
proved, but also that a socialist program of action is the only
action program justified by scientific analysis Marxism says,
in short, that moral values, too, can and must be derived
scientifically. All action must be based on a scientific
recognition of reality, not on some eternally valid moral
2 8laws" (emphasis added)
.
This moral implication of the Marxist philosophy becomes
the 'cause celebre' of the Socialist movement and is rein-
forced by several implications of the doctrine. The basic
moral position of the Marxist-Leninist is that the demise
of capitalism and the triumph of socialism is a scientific
inevitability thus those who oppose history and progress are
out of step with science and truth. Morality, in essence,
becomes defined as that which supports the progressive,
3JL

scientific reality of history; that which opposes it is im-
moral. This by itself is a rather deterministic concept not
allowing for much input from man. However two corallary con-
cepts allow for the fervor of" moral indignation directed
against those who stand in the way of the inevitable develop-
ment of history: the theory of alienation and the labor
theory of value.
The theory of alienation stems from the Marxist concept
of the nature of man. Beginning with man as a physical being
and having physical needs, and defining man as a creature
which is distinguished from other animals only by the fact
that man produces to meet his physical needs, Engels suggests
that the original state of man was a condition of harmony
with other men in the primitive effort of extracting from
nature the minimum necessities of subsistence. As Engels
presents it, the most striking features of primitive society
were liberty and equality. Since there was no surplus pro-
duction, there was no inequity of distribution. "All products,
including the means of production, were communal property, so
that there was no property system at all. For this reason,
primitive society could know no leisure class , no exploiters
,
29indeed no classes whatsoever, not even slaves." In this
state, man was free and in harmony with other men but subject
to the forces of nature. Technological advances (the growth
of the 'forces of production 1 ), considered as a positive step
in the direction of man's mastery over those natural forces
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to which he was subject, included some negative aspects which
became increasingly more negative as society progressed.
These negative aspects have taken two forms.
First, man has become alienated from his environment.
Man's natural relationship with the environment is a direct
one of using for himself that which has been extracted from
nature. Man, by the use of tools, machines and the processes
of the division of labor, has become separated from his
natural relationship with his environment. This was and is
scientifically inevitable. "The very moment civilization
begins
,
production begins to be founded on the antagonism
of orders, estates, classes and finally on the antagonism
of accumulated labor and actual labor. No antagonism, no
progress. This is the law that civilization has followed
up to our own days." Thus, referring back to the concept
of the dialectic, it is out of the contradiction introduced
to society by technological advancement that the antagonism
arises which drives progress. As Marx says, "No antagonism,
no progress.
"
A second feature of alienation is that in primitive
society, societal relationships were natural and non-
exploitive. Exploitive relationships are the "by-products
of the growth of civilization."
Labor... is separated from its product, because a
special class that controls the means of production
appropriates the product of surplus labor, leaving
the laborer only the product of that necessary
labor which he must expend in order to produce the
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barest means for his continued existance. Thus the
growth of society's productive forces beyond the
most primitive level is seen as the indirect cause
of the domination of men by men, of class differences
and class subjugation. Furthermore, the Marxist
theory of alienation holds that all natural, spon-
taneous relationships between men have been corroded
and perverted by being cast into the rigid shells
of oppressive institutions .. .And instead of a
communal general will, a natural and spontaneous
unanimity of purpose and implementation, there is
the state. In short, the entire superstructure of
institutions and relationships that exist on top of
the division of labor and the class structure is
something which Marxism not only describes, but also
criticizes and condemns. 32
Thus man is no longer a natural being, he is stunted and
perverted into something less than a real human being by his
separation from nature and by having been 'cast into the
rigid shells of oppressive institutions'. Capitalism is por-
trayed by Marx and Engels as the climax of man's effort to
control nature representing the ultimate achievement of man's
ability to control his environment and to produce to meet,
in abundance, his physical needs. This provides man the
opportunity to free himself from the drudgery of a relation-
ship with tools and machinery which separates him from nature,
to acquire the leisure time and the physical abundance to
allow a rediscovery and reestablishment of man as man in
harmony with his environment. However, this same system,
capitalism, also contains within it the institutions which
enforce a rigid division of labor in the form of a class
structure defined simply in terms of those who own the
means of production and benefit excessively from the
3.4

technical ability to produce abundantly and those who must
sell their labor merely to attain a subsistence living. All
aspects of the system from philosophic foundations, religious
institutions, family organizations/ social stratification, to
political institutions (all of which Marx and Engels refer to
as the superstructure of society) mutually reinforce the
existing class structure and the system of exploitation which
they support.
Each and every one of the elements of the super-
structure (those elements of society which have been
mentioned) is a means unconsciously and spontaneously
devised by society, to keep itself integrated in its
present class structure. The superstructure, there-
fore, seemingly mitigates the struggle between the
classes because it aims to make the present class
structure more palatable to the exploited classes, to
turn their eyes away from the class struggle and to
obscure its very existence. ^
In each of the stages of historical development, those who
benefited most from the abundance produced through control
of the instruments of production were in the minority and those
who were exploited to create that abundance, the majority.
However, under capitalism that minority which benefits and
exploits the remainder of society is perceived to become
smaller and more oppressive (necessary to protect their
privileged position) while the majority becomes more and more
oppressed and lives in greater and greater misery. The state,
in particular, is the institution through which class relation-
ships are manifested as power relationships. The basic func-
tion of the state is to develop and enforce a set of rules and
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behavior which prevents antagonism between the exploited and
exploiting classes from consuming themselves and society in
wasteful struggle. Thus since the state becomes an instru-
ment which preserves society in its present form by formal-
izing and perpetuating the existing class structure it is
inherently beneficial to the exploiting or ruling classes.
The state becomes a tool of the exploiting class (the
capitalists) by which their privileged position is protected.
Thus, of all the stages of history, capitalism represents a
culmination of man's technical ability to produce to meet his
needs, and an apex of human misery caused by the separation
of man from his true nature and his exploitation by a minority
of society reinforced by a powerful state structure. It was
this argument which justified the violent overthrow of the
Tsarist government in 1917 and is the foundation of those
arguments which justify continued support by the Soviet
government for various revolutionary movements throughout
Soviet history. Within the Soviet Union itself, this
aspect of Marxist theory has been modified to justify the
continued existence of the Soviet government as a new and non-
oppressive form of government. 4 The new role of the state in
socialist society will be discussed in Chapter IV.
The second negative aspect of the current stage of his-
torical development represented by capitalism is found in the
labor theory of value. Classical political economy began with
the assertion that labor is the source of value, that the amount
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of labor embodied in a good is thus related to the amount of
value in the good. The accompanying presumption is that the
one who has created the value of the product by virtue of his
labor in its creation has the right to be its owner. This
applied most clearly in the most primitive forms of production.
However, with the beginnings of the need for land and tools
(and later machinery) belonging to others it was conceded that
the owners of these instruments of production (capital) had
35
the right to share in the product. The actual market value
of a product was not determined strictly by the amount of time
and effort required to produce it but also by the amount of
'demand' for it and its availability (supply). Marx suggested
that with the introduction of the concept of the private
ownership of capital came the fact of exploitation. Regard-
less of the stage of history, those who control or own the
means of production (capital) seek to pay the laborer only
that wage necessary to meet his requirements for subsistence
and reproduction. The worker's labor becomes a commodity for
which, since there is a considerable supply of labor available,
the wage paid is low. The capitalist produces for exchange in
order to make profits. His profits come from the sale of
products produced as "surplus value" by the laborer. The law
of the concentration of capital suggests that the competition
for markets and places to invest accumulating capital will force
more and more of the owners of the means of production out of
business and into the ranks of the exploited class thus the
a7

exploiting class will become smaller with capital being ac-
cumulated into the hands of fewer and fewer people. As this
happens, the exploited class (the proletariat) will become
swollen, with not all even able to hold subsistence paying
jobs. The misery of the proletariat will become greater and
greater until finally this contradiction between the classes
will explode into revolution bringing on the next stage of
historical development.
Thus the moral condemnation of capitalism is based on two
fundamental grounds. First, it stands in contradiction to
scientific, historical inevitability and, second, it repre-
sents the most oppressive, degrading form of exploitation
which has yet existed on earth. It is important to note this
before moving to the next point because Marx and Engels spent
more of their effort in explaining and attacking the capitalist
system than in describing the nature of that system which
would take its place. This tradition was continued by Lenin
in the theory of imperialism. With the failure of the revo-
lution of the proletariat to materialize in the late nineteenth
century and the growth of trade unions and their power within
the various representative forms of government in Western
Europe and the United States, some Marxists began to question
certain aspects of Marxist philosophy. They suggested that
possibly revolution was not necessary — that the contradictions
of capitalist society could be resolved working within the
existing political system. This was based particularly on the
3.8

very apparent fact that the working class was not only not more
36
miserable but in most instances improving its conditions.
Lenin rejected this notion and offered his own explanation of
why the revolution was not proceeding as expected. Essentially
he argued that capitalism (the political institutions of the
capitalist states primarily) had found a temporary solution
to achieving higher profits while increasing (temporarily)
the well being of the workers within their own countries.
This was done by turning to the underdeveloped portions of
the world for cheap raw materials, ready markets for products
and for the use of excess capital, and cheap, exploitable
labor — in short, imperialism. In order to control business
and thus preserve its own existence, the state entered into
the process of regulating business bringing some order to the
anarchy of capitalistic competition. With the concerted
effort of business and government, imperialism provides the
mechanism through which the capitalist states extort super-
profits from their colonies and protectoriates. Part of these
super-profits are used to bribe the proletariat masses (or at
least the union leaders) into acquiescence. In effect the
proletariat of the imperialist nations becomes temporarily a
part of the exploiting class. Another factor which blinds
the proletariat to its true consciousness is the struggle
which begins between the imperialist nations for control of
the resources and markets in the underdeveloped world. In
their attempts to maximize their share of the profits,
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the unions support their own government in opposition to
37
other nations. In moral terms, Lenin thus reinforces those
arguments which have been stressed earlier. Not only does
capitalism stand in the way of historical progress and not
only does it represent the worst form of human exploitation,
it has elevated this exploitation to an even more extreme
form (imperialism) and has corrupted the proletariat masses
while doing so.
The moral issue does not simply end with the condemnation
of the capitalist system. Marxism-Leninism is a philosophy of
hope. The hope of progress. The basic assumption is that at
one point though subject to the forces of nature, man was in
harmony with his fellow men. Marx argued that changes in the
means of production and the resulting contradictions in the
relations between man have led to a progressive improvement
in man's ability to control his environment. Capitalism
represents man's mastery over nature but the contradictions
within man's relations with other men remain. However, within
capitalism lie the seeds of the reconciliation of man's social
relations. This is found in the nature of the proletariat.
The proletariat class is the first class in the progressive
development of history since the primitive communal stage
which, although it was so bound up in the production process
as to be defined as a part of the process (the working class)
,
it was totally devoid of ownership of the instruments of pro-
duction. The laborer had in fact become a commodity in the
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production process. In effect it had lost its humanity and
"therefore it epitomized the entire inhumanity of the capital-
3 8ist system. " Marx felt that this would lead the proletariat
to a clear perception of the contradictions of a society
organized on the basis of private ownership. With the revo-
lution of the proletariat, the propertied class and private
ownership will be done away with. Since the increasing
mechanization of society will have reduced the need for the
division of labor (i.e., as Marx perceived it, everything
would eventually be reduced to the simplicity of pushing
buttons while machines did all the work) there would no longer
be a foundation for class distinctions. The productive
capacity of the capitalist system would be retained allowing
for an abundance of production to meet all mens 1 needs at a
work rate which would allow sufficient leisure for man to
rediscover and develop his true nature. Since private
property would be abolished, those institutions of oppression
which serve the sole purpose of supporting and protecting the
interests of those who control and own the forces of pro-
duction (the state, church, family, etc.) will cease to exist.
Thus, not only does capitalism stand in the way of progress,
it stands in the way of Utopia. Those who would assist
progress (hasten the demise of capitalism) are morally just




So far this thesis has attempted to demonstrate several
aspects of the fundamental dimension of Soviet ideology. It
claims to be a science based on an understanding of the nature
of change (the dialectic) and observable phenomena (material-
ism) . From this foundation flows a concept of history as
science postulating that it is directional and progressive.
It also addresses social science, tracing the alienation of
man from his true nature and the expression of this alienation
in existing social institutions. Combining all of these con-
cepts Soviet ideology posits a scientific foundation for
morality ultimately stressing that capitalism is an immoral
system because it stands in the way of inevitable historical
progress and because it represents the lowest form of human
degradation especially in the form of imperialism. The
socialist system represents a moral system because it is the
next step in the historical progress of man and represents
that stage of the development of man in which man's true
nature will be reestablished and reasserted.
In summary form, the following assumptions and
principles may be said to be part of the ideo-
logical framework within which the Soviet leaders
evaluate and organize their perception of the
outside world: Marxist doctrine is the basic
source of their commitment to economic and dialec-
tical determinism in history, and of their per-
sistent conviction that the vehicle of history,
is the class struggle. .. Closely related to this
"scientific" conception of history is the apoca-
lyptic image of the future and the belief in the
inevitable triumph for their form of social
organization. The basic organizational principles
that they apply to society are rooted in the con-
viction that most social evils are derived from
private ownership. .. *"
42

The ramifications of this moral conflict will be discussed
shortly.
Note that the fundamental dimension of Soviet ideology
or its philosophical base suggests principles on which the
current dominant system (capitalism) is criticized and the
40final goals toward which history is progressing. Though
the philosophy suggests more broadly conceived ways and means
in which the goals will be realized (i.e., revolution and
the establishment of a 'dictatorship of the proletariat')
the specifics of the new order are not clearly developed.
B. THE OPERATIONAL DIMENSION
The basic argument of this paper is that ideology plays
a significant role in the conduct of Soviet foreign policy.
However, certain aspects of the operational dimension must
be considered at this point to understand the confusion
which exists over the role of ideology in Soviet foreign
policy. This comes from the development of the doctrine
of the protection of 'socialism in one state' which occurred
in the operational dimension. As will be demonstrated
shortly, this doctrine has not altered the fundamental
anticipation of the inevitable demise of the capitalist
system nor modified the antagonistic stance of the socialist
system toward capitalism but has been devised and justified
in recognition of the realities of the operational dimension.
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The distinction between a purely philosophical concept
and an ideology lies in the effort to put into effect the
philosophical concepts. The resulting confrontation with
reality leads to a concern with practical and pressing
exigencies. Though attempting to relate decisions and poli-
cies to the fundamentals of the philosophy, political lead-
ers must take account of reality, particularly in the short
run, leading to modification of policies derived strictly
from philosophy. The political leadership thus acts in an
operational dimension in which reality is confronted,
decisions made, and planning conducted. Within this dimen-
sion, the conscious attempt is made to relate decisions and
planning to the philosophical tenets found in the funda-
41 ...
mental dimension. The practical reality which affects the
implementation of the doctrine is more than the problems
which face its adherents. It includes the personalities
of the leaders of the movement, the particular historical
setting in which it is implemented (to include the histor-
ical experience of those on whom it is imposed) , the level
of social and economic development, and the political envi-
ronment in which it emerges. The philosophy is prepared in
abstract based on a perception of the world by its authors.
The degree to which it appears to reflect accurately the
nature of reality determines its appeal. Marx and Engels,
two Germans writing in the mid to late nineteenth century,
based their thoughts on observations of nineteenth century
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Europe and the United States prior to the rise of trade
unionism. With the apparent failure of the proletariat
revolution to materialize, the increasing power of labor
unions in parliamentary systems, and a considerable increase
in the well-being of the working class of the capitalist
countries, the theory of Marx and Engels appeared to lose
42
relevance. However, revitalized by Lenin's theory of
imperialism, it encouraged the Bolshevik Party in Russia,
under the leadership of Lenin, to seize power. The theory
was confronted by several immediate realities not dealt with
within its context. First, the revolution occurred in a
state just emerging from feudalism, not a fully developed
capitalist state. Second, the expected revolution in
Europe failed to materialize. Third, while the theory was
detailed in its criticism of capitalism and its evils and
weaknesses, it was general in its description of the social-
ist stage of development and how Communist society was to be
achieved once capitalism was overthrown. Only general
references to the intermediate phase of the 'dictatorship
of the proletariat' , necessary to wipe out the vestiges of
capitalism and the need to do away with private ownership
of the means of production as the central contradiction of
capitalism, were given. Few specifics as to the nature of
the dictatorship of the proletariat were profferred. It is
this vagueness in stressing the specifics of the dictatorship
of the proletariat and its implementation in a near feudal
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state which allowed a significant degree of flexibility in
Soviet short run decision and policy making. However, it is
the argument of this thesis that though the conditions of the
moment may have, practically speaking, limited the options
available to the Soviet leadership to options not in keeping
with the fundamental dimension, decisions were not made with-
out reference to those considerations.
Lenin forever fought a dual war against two deviations
from what he considered the most expedient course to be
followed. One of these deviations is the path of oppor-
tunism; the other, that of ultraleftism, or ultra-
radicalism (no universally applicable term has been
coined to label this second deviation) . Opportunism may
be defined as the readiness to adapt the party's course
of action too much to ephemeral conditions of the moment.
The opportunist is a man who forgets or neglects the
goals toward which action should be oriented. He has
become a mere tactician, whose actions are adjusted to
momentary situations to such a degree that he becomes
the slave of events. His actions therefore bog down in
the mire of spontaneity. The ultraradical is a leader
so preoccupied with the final goal that he tends to
disregard the material obstacles separating him from it
and therefore becomes unrealistic in his actions.
Obsessed with the ideas of socialism, he cannot bear to
have his hands soiled by compromises or alliances of any
sort. Preserving his radicialism at all cost, he will
engage in a blind and futile struggle against the exist-
ing order, ending in defeat and frustration.^
Flexibility is possible precisely because of the fundamen-
tal doctrine of the scientific inevitability of the success
of socialism which in practice means that, while the efforts
of socialists can hasten the inevitable, mistakes or retreats
44have only momentary consequences.
In terms of Soviet foreign policy, certain of the deci-
sions made in the operational dimensions have in effect been
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cannonized and, although they remain on a secondary level of
theoretical cannonization they have assumed the proportion
of ideological doctrinal tenets. The most significant of
these decisions was made initially by Lenin and the Bolshevik
party leaders at the time of the Brest-Litovsk negotiations
and continued more formally as a state doctrine by Stalin
and his successors. This was the decision that the protec-
tion of the existence of the first socialist state should
take precedence over the attempt to trigger a world prole-
tariat revolution. This did not constitute a rejection of
the philosophical notions of the inevitability of the pro-
letariat revolution but a realization that the occurrence of
the revolution in Europe was not imminent and that the Soviet
state was too weak militarily, economically, and politically
45to confront the capitalist nations alone. The theory of
imperialism reinforced this concept suggesting that the
capitalist nations were still strong but would be weakened
later through continuous struggle between themselves.
Stalin strengthened this argument by stressing that the
Soviet Union would serve as a rallying point around which
the socialist movement would coalesce and as a base from
which it could expand. "In elaborating the socialism-in-
one-country doctrine for which he became famous, Stalin in
1924 noted that one country (the USSR) could be used as a
base for the coming world revolution, for the overthrow of
46imperialism in all countries." Lenin argued from a
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position of pragmatism based on a combination of a recognition
of the reality of the moment and a focus on fundamental goals:
The gist of this argument was the question: what things
are expendable in the fight for the success of the world
revolution, and what things are not expendable? Lenin's
opponents were ready to sacrifice the existence of the
Soviet state for the sake of maintaining socialist prin-
ciples and proletarian orthodoxy. Lenin, on the other
hand, thought that maintenance of the revolutionary
regime in Russia was imperative. Its continued existence,
he argued, was indispensable for the progress of humanity.
Principles could be violated; constructive tasks even
in Russia might have to be postponed. What mattered was
that the party preserve its stronghold in at least one
country. Once this stronghold was secure, the worldwide
revolution might run its course, rapidly or slowly, as
the dialectics of history would determine. The base
would be in firm hands, and nothing else was of equal
importance. 'When we shall, in the fullest measure,
have realized the dictatorship of the proletariat in our
own country, the greatest unification of its forces
through the vanguard, through its advanced party, then
we can wait for the world revolution.'^ 7
In effect, Lenin recognized the implications of the inter-
relationship of the two aspects of ideology, the fundamental
and operational dimensions. Commitment to philosophical
principles need not infer blind adherence in the face of
obvious adverse realities. Though political leaders may make
decisions which are not 'strictly' in accordance with their
principles, this does not mean that these principles have
been abandoned.
...it would appear that ideology is not incompatible
with rational behavior, once the basic assumptions are
granted. While these assumptions may or may not be
rational, they are at least so far removed from im-
mediate concerns that they do not produce a conflict
between the ideology and a rational approach to reality.
The goal of an ultimate world-wide Communist society,
allegedly determined by history, may be irrational, but
it does not necessarily impose irrational conduct. °
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This principle of the recognition of reality in decision
and policy making while remaining conscious of fundamental
principles is evident in other areas of Soviet decision
making but for the purposes of the consideration of the im-
pact of ideology on Soviet foreign policy, the concept of
the security of 'socialism-in-one-state 1 is the most
significant.
C. THE IMPLICATIONS OF IDEOLOGY IN SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY
As has been argued to this point Marxist-Leninist phil-
osophy is relatively specific in its critique of the capi-
talist system but relatively general in its description of
the nature of the socialist system. This leads to a con-
siderable degree of flexibility in the operational dimension
of Soviet domestic politics. Limited essentially only by
the fundamental requirement to eliminate the private owner-
ship of the means of production/ the basic contradiction of
capitalism which is the source of man's alienation from
himself and his environment and which is the catalyst for
exploitation and class struggle, Soviet domestic policy is
characterized by considerable flexibility. However, the
arena of foreign affairs is much more directly affected by
the fundamental dimension in two particular areas.
First of all, the relations between the Soviet Union and
the capitalist nations relate directly to the moral aspect of
'scientific' socialism. The capitalist states are not only
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characterized by internal and external exploitation of
peoples, unstable in their relations with each other and toward
the socialist states, and hostile toward the socialist system,
but also stand directly in the way (at least temporarily) of
historical progress. The capitalist states remain at odds
with the Soviet Union (at least theoretically) because of the
overwhelming effort that Marx placed on criticizing the nature
of the capitalist system and the added aspect of imperialism
suggested by Lenin which elevated the exploitation by the
capitalists to an international scale. The socialist claim
of being more in tune with the scientific understanding of
historical progress and with the attempt to elevate man to
a new level of humanity places the relations between the
socialist movement and the capitalists on a moral plane rather
than a strictly pragmatic state to state relationship. This
relationship is affected by the operational considerations
of reality which have led to the security of ' socialism-in-
one-state ' doctrine. The operational decision to place the
security of the Soviet Union above the fundamental conflict
between socialism and capitalism does not reflect abandonment
of the fundamental principle of antagonism toward the capi-
talist system. In each instance in which it is obvious that
state security has been placed above scientific inevitability
(as Khrushchev did frequently in qualifying the policy of
49 ...peaceful coexistence) the operational decision is always





An absolute certitude of self-righteousness is also an
inherent aspect of the ideological influence. Com-
promises and adjustments can never be ends in them-
selves and are only accepted by the Soviet leaders if
they appear to be warranted in terms of their pursuit
of higher ends. While in practice this may appear to
differ little from the attitude of those nations that
view such compromises in a favorable light and are pre-
pared to consider them as ends of policy, the signifi-
cant factor is the built-in element of transiency involved
in any such compromise as far as the Soviet leaders are
concerned. Indeed, Soviet policy-makers face a contin-
uing dilemma of having always to differentiate between
tactical expediency and concession of principle in order
to be able to make such compromises. This difficulty,
however, is minimized by the Soviet conviction that, in
the final analysis, Soviet foreign policy is always
objectively correct since it is geared to history.
That this is an issue to which the Soviet leadership is
sensitive is reflected in the nature of the Sino-Soviet
conflict. According to Donald Zagoria much of the disagree-
ment originated with Chinese criticism of the Soviets for
having abandoned fundamental Marxist-Leninist antagonism
toward the capitalist states. The Soviets, on the other
hand, claim that they have not abandoned the principles
but have exercised good judgement in the face of the reality
of the relative weakness of the socialist bloc vis a vis the
west through 19 73. Thus the Soviet leadership is aware of
the relationship between pragmatic action based on the real-
ities of the moment and the fundamental implications of any
long term reconciliation with the west. As will be demon-
strated in chapter four this issue bears directly on the




The second aspect of foreign policy which is affected by
the fundamental aspects of ideology is relations with the
developing world. As suggested by the theory of imperialism,
though the ex-colonies are not ready for socialism per se,
they are perceived as natural allies of the socialist move-
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ment in the struggle to free the world from imperialism.
This has a two-fold thrust. First, the ex-colonies serve
as natural allies because they are the exploited peoples of
the imperialist world. To the degree that third world
leaders can be made to understand this they can be offered
the socialist mode of development and assistance as an
53 . . ...
alternative. Secondly, it is significant to note here that
from the Soviet point of view this is a zero sum concept.
Regardless if third world nations join the socialist camp,
to the degree that they limit capitalist access to cheap
labor, resources and markets, theoretically they have added
to the difficulties of the imperialist nations and hastened
54their inevitable downfall. Operationally, considerable
flexibility is possible in this realm because all non-socialist
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states represent opportunities. Failures are not directly
attributable to failure of the ideology but to the inability
of relatively backward peoples to understand history and to
the tenacity of the capitalist system in holding on to its
sources of profit. The direction of Soviet foreign policy
actions toward the developing nations is thus encouraged and
affected by two fundamental principles: weakening
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the capitalist system and the humanitarian consideration of
assisting the developing nations to the most rapid path to
socialism. Yet this offer is conducted within the context
of operational reality (i.e., recognition that the developing
nations are not yet ready for socialism, and that the Soviet
Union has only limited capacity to influence these nations
without directly confronting the imperialist nations)
.
D. SUMMARY
It has been the goal of this chapter of the paper to
demonstrate the interrelationship between the fundamental
and operational dimension of Soviet ideology. In capsule
form, it has been suggested that Marxist-Leninist philosophy
claims to be a scientifically founded doctrine based on an
understanding of the nature of change (the dialectic) and
observable phenomena (materialism) . From this foundation
is derived a paradigm of 'scientific socialism' which
suggests that capitalism represents the triumph of man
over the environment. Capitalism also represents the pin-
nacle of man's alienation from his true nature. The paradigm
also suggests a linear view of history in which the next step
in man's progress is the reconciliation of the contradictions
found in capitalism. This has been elevated to a scientific
concept of morality which finds capitalism morally depraved
on the grounds that it stands in the way of historically
inevitable progress and that it is a system which creates
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the misery and suffering of many for the benefit of a few.
The socialist system is moral because it retains the capital-
istic ability to produce abundantly but eliminates exploitive
classes and institutions. The theory of imperialism revital-
ized the doctrine, explaining why the inevitable had not yet
occurred. With the triumph of the Bolshevik revolution in
Russia the attempt was made to implement the philosophy
adding to it an operational dimension affected by the reality
of the personality of leaders, historical experiences, social
and economic circumstances, and the struggle for political
power following the revolution. In addition there existed
an external threat. These factors led to several foreign
policy tenets which may be said to be derived directly from
ideology. First, relations between the Soviet state and the
capitalist nations are an overt expression of the moral con-
frontation between socialism and capitalism. This moral con-
frontation is fundamental to the philosophy and cannot be
negated without questioning the entire doctrine. Second,
practical recognition of the relative weakness of the Soviet
Union initially dictated caution in dealing with the capitalist
states; from this grew the tenet of the protection of 'socialism-
in-one-state 1 while continuing to focus on long range goals.
Third, the developing nations appear to be natural allies of
the socialist movement in the effort to hasten the collapse
of the capitalist system. All activities which disrupt the
capitalist system are legitimate and useful. Finally, relations
S4

between socialist states are potentially damaging to the
coherence of the doctrine due to the claim of scientific,
thus universal, application. The claim of alternate roads
to socialism ultimately questions the reliability of the
ideology as a useful instrument in the preparation of policy
(and thus the legitimacy of the CPSU)
.
There are multiples of other factors which impact on the
preparation of foreign policy on a day-to-day basis in the
operational realm but the fundamental dimension, in essence,
serves as a parameter to action. Though short run decisions
may be made which run counter to fundamental tenets , counter
policies must be justified in terms of necessity and placed




IDEOLOGY IN THE SOVIET SOCIALIZATION PROCESS
To lend credence to the argument of the importance of
ideology as a factor of Soviet foreign policy/ this paper
now turns to the socialization process in the Soviet Union
to consider the probability that those individuals involved
in the foreign policy process are actually committed to
Marxist-Leninist ideology. This process will be considered
in the following manner: first, the general socialization
process affecting the general population of the Soviet
Union will be considered, and then the selection and social-
ization process of the Communist Party and its leadership.
"Political socialization is the gradual learning of the
norms, attitudes and behavior accepted and practiced by the
ongoing political system." "The agents of political
socialization include family, school, church, peer groups,
social class, ethnic group, the work life situation and the
57
mass media." Zbigniew Brzezinski and Samuel Huntington
note that the individual in society receives his first
political orientation from his family and then as his
awareness begins to broaden, he is affected by other agents
of the socialization process. Frequently in other societies
these agents are many and unorganized, often operating at
cross purposes. However, as Zbigniew Brzezinski and Samuel
Huntington observe, in the Soviet Union "all non-family agents
5.6

of socialization are subordinated to the Communist Party and
directed toward a single goal."
Thus the first factor to be considered in the socializa-
tion process which ultimately produces Soviet foreign policy
makers is the family. Whether or not the family is supportive
of the state desired goals of the socialization process, their
impact has been lessened significantly from the impact which
the family had prior to the revolution for several reasons.
First, the family is changing from the extended family of the
traditional Russian peasant to the relatively small urban
nuclear family. According to the Soviet central statistical
administration, by 19 70 urban populations exceeded rural
population. Of a total population of 241.7 million, 136
59
million were classified as urban. Within this family, gen-
erally both parents work (70 percent of mothers in the Soviet
6
Union work according to David Lane) . Of the children of
women who work, 22.9 percent are in collective child care
centers during the day. There are a large number of broken
homes increasing the difficulty of control or impact on the
socialization process by the working parent. Unwed mothers
produced 17 percent of the total births in 1965 and 13 percent
in 196 7. The implication here is that the effective impact
of the family on the socialization process in the Soviet Union
is lessened through the necessity of parental absence during a
large part of the working day.
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This is not to presume that the family would work at
cross purposes to the fundamental thrust of the Party social-
ization process. The recent emphasis of the Party on the
strengthening of the family unit is "an indication of the
Soviet belief that now families are no longer likely to in-
culcate values at variance with the dominant ideology."
Families, now a third generation under the Socialist system,
understand the system, are convinced of its legitimacy and
in a typical parental way push their children toward success
within the 'rules of the game'. For those who are recalci-
trant to an extreme, the 196 8 Principles of Marriage and
Family Law provide that a court may remove a child from
6 3parents "if the child is endangered by remaining" (usually
used to pressure religious believers to refrain from teaching
religious dogma to their children)
.
The real, overt effort to politically socialize Soviet
youth begins with the Soviet youth program. Unlike western
psychologists who stress the overwhelming importance of the
earliest years in personality formation, the Soviets view
the development process as one in which influences during
more advanced stages of maturation are only slightly less
64important in determining adult behavior. The Soviets thus
have created a program which impacts on every aspect of a
youth's life from age seven to twenty-eight. It is a
closely coordinated integration of the education system and
highly organized social groups. Though these two systems
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are closely intertwined, for ease of study they will be
considered separately.
The educational system is subordinated to four general
goals: to build the Communist state in the Soviet Union;
to overtake the U.S.; to extend Communism throughout the
world; and to create the 'new Soviet man'. Teachers are
expected to inculcate in youth Communist morality consisting
of patriotic devotion to the motherland, hatred toward
enemies of the people, and socialist humanism (the Communist
version of brotherly love) . A heavy emphasis is placed on
self discipline, hard work, and emotional self control
the attributes of the new Soviet man. Children are constantly
reminded that they are growing up in the best of all possible
6 5
worlds. They are taught Marxism-Leninism as ultimate truth.
History is seen as a tool for assisting the party to achieve
objectives set forth in the party program and as a result is
changed if necessary. Finally, it is expected that the
educational system will provide the inculcation of loyalty
and support for the government, the party, its leaders and
their policies.
The child frequently begins his education in a preschool
sponsored by a factory, farm trade union or a local Soviet.
The purpose of the school is two fold, first to release the
parents to work and secondly to develop in the child the
ideas of neatness, order and personal relations. His
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political education is initiated through exciting stories
6 7
about the glorious deeds of party and state leaders.
At age seven the youngster enters primary school where
the major goal is general education with emphasis on physical
education; aesthetic education stressing appreciation of the
Soviet school of artistic realism; mental education which
includes the development of a scientific and materialistic
outlook, mastery of dialectical method, orderly and
systematic study and thought habits; polytechnical skills
(required for all students) , and moral education which
attempts to further reinforce self discipline, patriotism
and proletarian internationalism, dedication to the goals
of the state, community and the party, and acceptance of
common rules of conduct and etiquette. Pressure on those
who resist this instruction generally comes in the form of
an oral reprimand or bad marks from the teacher, or peer
pressure from other pupils who are members of the recalci-
trant individual's work group (collective). As a further re-
flection of the role of the family in the socialization
process, a more stringent measure is public criticism of the
parents of the child by the Party, Parent-Teacher Associations
6 8
or Trade Union branches
.
Secondary school includes two formal courses in political
study intended to make every student generally familiar with
the basic tenets of Marxism-Leninism. The subjects taught
in these two courses are: an overview of Marxist-Leninist
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philosophy and the importance of the role of the party, and
a systematic and generalized course designed to form a Com-
69
munist world outlook. Secondary education is usually com-
pleted (the last two years) on a part time basis except for
those who have been selected for higher education. Three
factors are generally involved in gaining acceptance to
institutions of higher education. First and foremost is
academic excellence in secondary school. A character reference
from the Party, the Komsomol, or from a place of employment is
required. A third factor which is gaining in importance is
family influence. It is at this point at which the first real
filter through which future Soviet leaders must pass. Those
who are openly antagonistic toward the system are not likely
to proceed to higher education. This serves also to pressure
youth into patterns of acceptance in order to achieve upward
mobility.
In addition to filtering out those who are antagonistic
to the system a continuing effort is made to imbue higher edu-
cation students with proper ideology. Roughly 10 percent of a
student's time and study are directed toward Marxist-Leninist
ideology covering such topics as the history of the CPSU,
dialectical and historical Marxism, political economy
,
scientific atheism and so on. ° The educational program
takes on added significance when considering that no other
views are tolerated. Even those students who become bored
or disaffected with this overt political indoctrination are
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likely to acquiese in their acceptance of general tenets if
for no other reason than the fact that alternatives may not
be apparent.
The educational system is complimented by a youth pro-
gram designed to serve two distinct purposes. First is to
further the ideological socialization of youth and second to
monopolize the field to prevent the emergence of authentic
youth movements. It is organized on three levels beginning
with the Little Octobrists in the seven to nine year old
bracket through the Young Pioneers (10 to 14 years old) up
to the Komsomol which includes the ages of 14 to 28. It
numbered on the order of 53 million members in 1965. Vir-
tually every primary school student is a member and most
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secondary school students are members. Membership in the
Komsomol is a requirement for attendance at an institution
of higher education.
At the primary school level activities are so closely
tied to the educational system that membership is taken
for granted. All extracurricular activities such as
athletics, hobbies, summer camps and so on are controlled
72
exclusively by the Pioneer organization. Children are
organized in 'links* of five to twelve members. Several
links are joined to form a detachment and all of the detach-
ments of a school are joined in an all-school brigade. The
program of the Pioneers is similar to an elaborate Boy
Scout program with heavy political overtones. The activities
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are attractive and the organization well staffed. Most
members are members by choice and most parents "now regard
the Pioneer Organization with, at worst, indifference . .
.
The current generation of parents is itself a product of the
73Soviet system.
"
Both the Little Octobrists and Pioneers incorporate a
good deal of time presenting attractive Soviet versions of
history, emphasizing comparisons between dark, prerevolution-
ary times and the achievements of the Soviet state and the
Communist Party. An extraordinary amount of time is spent
instilling a negative image of the West (especially the
U.S.). 74
The Komsomol continues the political indoctrination of
youth in a much more overt manner and many writers comment
on the frequently negative results which ensue. Many youths
become bored and apathetic toward the ideology. However, it
is very apparent to Soviet youth that material rewards in
the Soviet Union are generally awarded on the basis of use-
fulness to the state. Absolute differences in material
rewards between ordinary occupations and those demanding
advanced training are great. The opportunities for advance-
ment depend substantially on access to higher education.
The Komsomol has a large say in access to and continuation
in education and also the kinds of career opportunities
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As a doctrinal control on the Komsomol, its officers are
all Communist Party members and its general secretary serves
as a member of Party Central Committee.
Thus the educational system and the youth program serve
as a methodological socialization of the young. It directly
transmits to the young the values and attitudes determined
by the society's political elite. Due to the importance of
education in access to the material rewards of the system
and the close relationship between the Komsomol and access
to higher education there is tremendous pressure to conform.
The adult population is a product of this system and is
generally, at worst, acquiescent to it. For the most part
it, at a minimum, produces adults who are acquiescent to
the authority of the Communist Party and provides an oppor-
tunity for upward mobility to those identified by the
Komsomol and the Party as promising.
As a further indicator of the importance of ideology in
Soviet society it should be noted that the effort to instill
Marxist-Leninist thought patterns into the Soviet populace
does not end with the efforts aimed at Soviet youth. Every
means of information disemination are rigidly controlled.
Newspapers are exclusively controlled and staffed by the
Communist Party. The electronic media are expected to
develop in Soviet people aesthetic appreciation of Soviet
art forms and to present the party view of domestic and world
affairs. Entertainment programs are expected to reflect and
6.4

reinforce appropriate ideological doctrines. A heavy emphasis
is placed on those major efforts of Soviet competition with
the West such as the space program, the Olympics and Soviet
involvements in foreign affairs. Literature is expected to
reflect correct ideological content and will not be published
if it does not. Art which does not conform to the Socialist
Realist school is repressed. Trade Unions (93 million mem-
bers) serve the dual function of stimulation of production
and continued indoctrination through guest speakers from the
Komsomol and the Society for Knowledge (an adult education
organization numbering about 2.3 million and covering topics
7fidealing with ideology and practical subjects) . Leadership
of all organizations are either Party members or closely
monitored by the Party. No formally organized groups exist
which oppose the official state ideology. Membership of most
groups, and especially trade unions, include numerous party
members who are responsible to the Party for setting examples
for the general membership and running talks and seminars on
ideological and other matters during breaks to insure that no
time is wasted.
Existing alongside this effort to inculcate the Soviet
populace with Marxist-Leninist ideology is a corresponding
effort to supress alternative ideas. Though currently not
as ominous as during the Stalin era, the security police
still conduct a pervasive clandestine surveillance of the
Soviet public. Corrective labor facilities still exist for
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77those who do not adjust to the requirements of the system.
Individuals who become openly critical of the party and the
government are pressured through various means such as the
loss of privileges and position, pressure on families and
harrassment by the secret police to conform. Those who are
adamant and become difficult to deal with may be committed
to mental treatment facilities (such as was Major General
78P.G. Grigorenko in December of 1969 ) without any possibility
of appeal to the courts under the charge that the "patient
79
shows poor adaptation to the social environment."
Another aspect of this effort is the attempt to isolate
the Soviet people from corruptive contact with western social
80
systems. Such efforts are characterized by the maintenance
of an informer network among ordinary Soviet citizens who
are involved in "aspects of Soviet society related to foreign
81
affairs." No group of Soviet citizens travelling abroad
travels without a representative of the state security com-
mittee (KGB) . The extent to which the Soviet government
is prepared to go to suppress the threat of the impact of
external ideas on the Soviet Union is apparent in the deci-
sion to invade Czechoslovakia in 196 8 which in large measure
was a response to the destabilizing impact of Czechoslovakian
reforms on the Soviet Ukraine (as well as other areas of the
83Soviet Union and the Warsaw Bloc).
More recently, though repression of dissent continues to
be evident, the Soviets appear willing to continue their
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process of isolating the Soviet people from alternative or
corrupting ideas by expelling dissidents (Solzhenitzyn,
Ginzburg, Grigorenko) or allowing them to emmigrate (par-
ticularly the Jewish populations)
.
Though the end result, in many cases, may be to deaden
political sensitivities, several positive results are achieved.
First, given the lack of alternative ideas being presented,
probably those political ideas which are held by the general
populace are supportive of the government and the party.
Second, those individuals who openly oppose the party are
generally suppressed or isolated from Soviet society. Third,
those individuals within the various organizations such as
the Komsomol and Trade Unions with heightened political
sensitivity are identified and brought into the Party where,
as shall be discussed in the next section, their opportuni-
ties for self improvement are increased and their political
commitment is reinforced and utilized.
Thus far the effort of this chapter has been to demonstrate
the probable general acceptance of acquiescence to Marxist-
Leninist ideology as the official state ideology by the Soviet
people and that the process which produces this consensus
also provides adequate opportunity for identification of
individuals who are committed to the ideology. Those organi-
zations designed to perform these functions are mass organi-
zations affecting every aspect of Soviet society and all
individuals within it. They are the instruments used by the
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Communist Party to inculcate the general population with
socialist ideals and to prevent the formation and spread of
alternative ideals. The party itself differs significantly
from this in its size and orientation.
The party is not a mass party seeking large memberships
per se. It is an elite organization — a vanguard — intended
to protect the ideological purity and orientation of the Soviet
society. It is selective in its membership seeking only
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'outstanding' citizens. Candidates for memberships do not
apply for memberships but must be nominated by three party
members of five years standing. Those members are responsible
for the performance of the candidate they have nominated.
Size of the party in 19 74 stood at approximately 14 million
with roughly 650,000 candidate members (roughly 9 percent of
85the adult population) . The individual who is selected by
the party is already highly politicized. He has been raised
in a series of youth groups and possibly a trade union in
which party representatives have had ample opportunity to ob-
serve him. Those who nominate him are tied to his success or
failure, at least for the period of his candidacy and usually
longer, and therefore have a serious interest in insuring
that he is indeed committed and hard working.
The individual member is expected to perform various
functions which tend to reinforce his initial commitment
such as participation in various party organizations, par-




setting the example in his place of work and encouraging
others in their work output. In addition, he will be
expected to participate either in the Komsomol, Trade Union
or other organizations as a leader in discussion and seminar
groups
.
Various advantages acrue to members but initially there
are, again, those which tend to reinforce commitment to the
party. Generally the initial rewards are simply the oppor-
tunity to participate in party meetings and the opportunity
to address statements and suggestions to decision makers.
This can be termed a sense of satisfaction in participation
in the activities of the state. The opportunity exists to
be elected to party organs and ultimately the possibility of
access to high office — these carrying substantial material
rewards. This opportunity for upward mobility appears to
provide a greater incentive to persons of peasant and labor
backgrounds than to those coming from families of the intel-
ligentsia.
Another indicator of the importance of adherence to ideo-
logical purity is the existance of a number of agencies at
the highest levels of the party established for the purpose
of and charged with the responsibility of "ideological super-
go
vision, indoctrination and 'party discipline *. " That these
agencies (such as the Department of Propaganda, Party Central
Commission, Department of Education and Science, and party
bureaucracies in the Soviet National Republics) take their
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responsibility seriously is demonstrated by the expulsion
89
of nearly 50,000 party members per year. (Not all of these
expulsions relate to ideological problems, some relate to
failures to meet production quotas for which party members
are held responsible) . Those individuals who are expelled
from the Party are treated as societal 'pariahs'. "What is
very clear is that a person who views Party duties as dis-
90tasteful is shrewder if he never becomes a member.
Every party member has the duty to "master Marxist-
Leninist theory, raise his ideological level, and contribute
91
to the molding and rearing of the man of Communist society."
The Party member is expected to continue his education through
correspondence courses and junior Party officials are expected
to attend evening or part time elementary or intermediate po-
litical education consisting of course work such as the study
of Lenin's life, CPSU history, and political and economic
affairs. For higher level officials attendance at a Higher
Party school in Moscow or a Party School in one of the Union
Republics full time for four years may be required. Of the
required 3200 hours of course work, 41.5 percent are devoted to
political and ideological doctrine. Founded in 1946, some
55,000 Party officials attended in the first ten years. This
training is "obviously intended to develop professional
political leaders of society capable of providing expert
social-economic direction within the framework of the ideo-
logical goals and political vested interests of the ruling
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92party. " It is obvious that the ideological indoctrination
of the Party membership and especially the party leadership
is not taken lightly.
Brzezinski and Huntington observe that the more important
a position in the Soviet system, the more likely it will be
93
occupied by a Party professional. The process which pro-
duces these professionals results in such a politically
homogeneous group that organizations such as Pravda, Izvestia,
and the electronic media need not be subjected to constant
censorship but are controlled through the assignment of Party
94professionals to their management and staffs.
This combined selection and continuous education process
leads to a leadership which reflects a general consensus
in terms of ideology. Despite this consensus, power strug-
gles do occur at times of succession and over various issues.
However power struggles usually revolve around domestic
issues which relate to the 'means' of achieving the Communist
state rather than the commonly agreed upon ends. Foreign
policy issues are more directly related to specified 'ends'
of Marxist-Leninist ideology and result in a greater degree
of consensus within the leadership. Those foreign policy
issues which cannot be clearly defined in terms of the
ideological ends could reasonably be expected to result in
procrastination and conflict among the leadership. An
example of this is presented in an article by Jiri Valenta
considering the decision making process which resulted in
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95the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 196 8 in which
both positions (whether to invade or not to invade) were
argued on ideological grounds with the non-interventionists
concerned over the impact of the invasion on the Soviet's
position as leader of the World Socialist movement (as well
as its possible impact on the SALT talks) and the interven-
tionists concerned over their ability to overcome the impact
of Czechoslovakian liberalism on the carefully controlled
indoctrination process being carried out in the Soviet
Union. Obviously this was a foreign policy question whose
relationship toward the ideological goals of Marxism-
Leninism was not clear. However, note that those agencies
most concerned with ideology (the KGB, the Department of
Progapanda, the Department of Education and Science, and the
Party leaders in the affected Union Republics) were those
who favored intervention and who ultimately prevailed. It
is also of interest that throughout the article it is readily
apparent that the Soviet leadership was in total agreement
over the need to change the Czechoslovakian liberalism — the
issue over which differences existed was how this change was
to be achieved.
In other foreign policy decisions relating to the rela-
tionship between the Socialist Bloc and the West the issues
are more clearly related to the "ends" of Marxist-Leninist




This review of the socialization process in the Soviet
Union suggests that the shear size of the effort directed
toward the indoctrination of the Soviet public with Marxist-
Leninist ideals indicates the importance of the doctrine in
the eyes of the CPSU leadership. Lyman Kirkpatrick , in his
study of the Soviet propaganda effort notes that:
The vastness of the Soviet propaganda organization is
hard to grasp. One estimate suggests that "the total of
all types of propaganda, worldwide, involves some half
million personnel and an annual expenditure of approx-
imately two billion dollars." If such estimates of the
resources devoted to Soviet propaganda seem high, there
is one revealing comparison which can be made based on
official Soviet data — the resources devoted to internal
propaganda in the USSR. The latest official data can be
found in a long Pravda editorial of September 11, 1970,
which claims that the propaganda work of the Communist
Party of the Soviet Union is being carried out by 1.1
million party members, that is, by one out of every
thirteen members of the party. °
The effort to imbue the Soviet people with this ideology
beginning at the earliest ages combining education and youth
groups and continuing throughout the life of the individual
through association with trade unions, peasant collectives
and professional organizations and the total subjugation of
the press and electronic media to the will of the Party are
additional evidences. Other evidence of this commitment to
Marxist-Leninist ideology is the extent to which the Soviet
leadership is willing to go to suppress alternative ideas.
The success of this effort is difficult to assess but the
reflection of acceptance of some aspects of the doctrine by
such Soviet dissidents as Roy Medvedev are indicators:
7.3

Solzhenitzyn treats Marxism as though it were a dogma
and imagines that it is enough to point out its inexac-
titudes, errors and inaccurate forecasts in order to
cause its followers to turn away from it. When
Solzhenitzyn and I were at school, Marxism-Leninism was
indeed presented to us as a dogma. But Marxism-Leninism,
scientific socialism, is not a dogma but a science, which
has the same right to be developed like .any other science
and which has the same 'right to err 1 . *'
In addition to this socialization process , the selection
process governing admittance into the political elite which
demands conformity to party ideology and reinforces such
conformity by continuous education and rewards to those
who conform ensures that those who reach the highest levels
of political leadership are relatively homogeneous in their
world views and in their commitment to the system which has
placed them in power. (This aspect will be considered fur-
ther in the following chapter.
)
Though this is not conclusive proof of the importance of
ideology in Soviet foreign policy it supports the simple
argument that this dedication to ideological indoctrination
indicates that the party leadership is in fact committed to
it and concerned that successive generations of Soviet citi-
zens are also committed to it. Carrying it one step further,
given this emphasis on political ideology in Soviet domestic
society, it would be surprising if it did not play a signifi-




IDEOLOGY AS A FACTOR IN THE FOREIGN POLICY PROCESS
OF THE SOVIET UNION
A. IDEOLOGY AND THE BUREAUCRATIC POLITICS PARADIGM
Thus far in this paper it has been argued that Marxist-
Leninist philosophy is a consistent body of thought (given
an acceptance of its primary assumption — dialectical mater-
ialism and that certain aspects of the fundamental dimension
of the philosophy have a direct impact on Soviet foreign
policy. First and foremost, it dictates an antagonistic
stance toward the capitalist nations on the grounds of
scientifically based morality. Second, it suggests a natural
interest in the third world on two grounds: as allies in
opposition to the exploitation of the imperialists and as a
method by which to increase stress on the capitalist system
thereby hastening its downfall. More indirectly derived
from the philosophy is a principle of a natural fraternity
between socialist brothers. The philosophy as an ideology
has a second dimension, the operational dimension, which
takes into account the realities of the moment allowing
deviation from these foreign policy tenets in the short
term based on a pragmatic evaluation of the capability of
the Soviet Union given its internal and external situation.
The operational dimension has yielded one (at least) long
term principle which has been legitimized in ideological
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terms and stands firmly alongside the principles of the
fundamental dimension, that being the decision to preserve
the Soviet Union at all costs to serve as a base from which
socialism could be spread. In addition, the previous
chapter reviewed the Soviet socialization process and the
selection process of the CPSU suggesting that, given the
effort expended on inculcating the Soviet public with the
Marxist-Leninist ideology and the socialization process
within the party itself, the current generation of the Soviet
leadership is a product of the system and probably accepts
and is committed to the ideology.
It is the purpose of this chapter to use the vehicle of
the bureaucratic politics paradigm to demonstrate the prac-
tical implications of ideology in the Soviet foreign policy
process. Essentially, it will be argued that ideology plays
a role in the policy process in several ways: first in
shaping the shared values of those who participate in the
policy process; second as one of the "rules of the game";
third as a source of power in the policy process; and finally
as a factor which enhances or detracts from organizational
perceptions and interests. At this point it would again be
appropriate to reiterate that it is not the position of this
paper that ideology is the most important factor in the
consideration of Soviet bureaucratic politics but that it
is significant and does impact on the policy process.
7<?

A short review of the bureaucratic politics paradigm
applied to foreign policy by Graham Allison in his book
9 8Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis
suggests a framework for analyzing the governmental foreign
policy decision making process which orients on the bureau-
cratic interests of the various agencies involved in that
process. He suggests the consideration of governmental
action as a "political resultant" as the basic unit of
analysis. Study is first directed toward determining who
the actors are in the foreign policy process (both formal
and informal) , what their roles are and what determines
their stands (parochial priorities, organizational goals and
interests, personal perceptions of national interest, domes-
tic considerations, etc.) , and what the stakes are for each
actor in each situation. Effort is then directed toward
ascertaining what determines each actor's impact on the
political resultant — essentially a function of the actor's
'power' or bargaining advantages such as his formal authority
and responsibility, control over resources necessary to carry
out action, expertise, and control of information on which
the decision will be based. Given an understanding of the
actors and their roles, perceptions and capability to in-
fluence the policy process, using the bureaucratic politics
paradigm one then turns to the policy/decision-making process
itself to determine what the 'action-channel' is for a given
issue (how the issue enters the decision-making process, who
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will be included in the policy process, and who will be the
implementor of the action or decision) and what the 'rules
of the game' are (i.e., those factors which constrict the
range of governmental action and decisions , and which deter-
mine what the pertinent positions are, how these positions
are filled and what the relative power of incumbents in
these positions will be) . The output of the process is
viewed as a result of 'pushing and hauling' between varying
interests not reflecting a rational choice per se but a com-
promise of sorts between the varying interests. Rational
choice is limited by the environment in which choices are
made such as uncertainty about what should be done, serious
consequences involved, number of issues competing for the
decision maker's interest, number of players involved, the
99
speed with which a decision may have to be made, and so on.
Though the bureaucratic politics paradigm suggests some
useful generalizations which will be considered in the course
of this paper it should be noted that this paradigm requires
careful qualifications when applied to the study of the
Soviet Union. All studies of Soviet political processes are
limited by the closed nature of the Soviet system which
severely limits access to reliable data and thus places all
conclusions on a conjectural plane. No reliable theory of
politics has yet been proposed which is generally accepted
in the study of our own system of government much less that
of the Soviet Union.
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The real value of a paradigm is in its comparative value.
Thus an assumption (rarely stated but always implicit) is
made, that given certain fundamentals (i.e., the existence
of governmental bureaucracies, governmental processes, inter-
action between domestic agencies and foreign interest and
so on)
,
generalizations found applicable in one system to
which the researcher has relatively greater access will be
in some way applicable to other systems to which the re-
searcher has less access. The value of this assumption
will not be debated here other than to comment that it ap-
pears intuitively to be valuable as long as certain quali-
fications are maintained well in mind. Some of those
qualifications should be mentioned — particularly as they
impact on this paper.
First of all, the major weakness of the bureaucratic
politics paradigm when applied to the foreign policy process
is that, in various ways, through processes of cooptation,
socialization, selection and self-interest those individuals
who stand at the head of various bureaucratic agencies are
perceived to come to identify with the interests of the
agencies which they head. Lower ranking members of the
various agencies also come to identify with the interests
of their own agency with which they come to associate their
own well being. Thus the various agencies are perceived
(within the paradigm) as relatively cohesive bodies of
individuals having similar interests and identifying with
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the major organizational interests of their agency (at
lower levels there may be struggle within the agency between
various sub-groups over sub-group interests, but at the
national level and in struggle with other agencies for budget
allocations and mission enhancing policies, members of the
agency are perceived to coalesce around common interests)
.
Yet the bureaucratic politics paradigm fails to perceive the
international milieu as an arena of competing national
bureaucracies containing multiple actors, having various rules
of the game and so on, competing for resources, markets, al-
locations (of aid from international agencies) and enhancement
of national interest. Probably the most striking feature of
international relations in an arena of competing national
bureaucracies is the cohesiveness of these bureaucracies vis
a vis one another. The national government, in effect, is
another level of bureaucratic competition in which there is
considerable cohesiveness among the actors in pursuit of their
own nation's goals. This is not to suggest that there are
not divisions of opinion, interest and competition at lower
levels but that the lower levels clearly identify with the
interests of the larger bureaucracy when that bureaucracy
competes with outside foreign interests.
In the Soviet Union there exist factors which consider-
ably strengthen the centralizing or unifying forces within
the government which are literally non-existent in western
bureaucracies. The conceDt of democratic centralism is
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rigidly adhered to, at least publicly. Debates occur only
on those issues which are allowed by the party, on issues
which are as yet unsettled and for which policy has not yet
been determined or on issues which have extremely powerful
and diverse factional backing. This principle is reinforced
102by the lack of autonomy in the Soviet bureaucracy. The
Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) is pervasive
throughout all agencies of the bureaucracy — the most im-
portant posts in each being dominated by party members.
Party members owe their first loyalty to the party and
frequently are beholden as much (or even more so) to the party
for their position and promotions within the bureaucracy as to
the agency itself. In addition, the costs to the bureaucrat
for failure or opposition to those who are superior to him are
real costs. Salaries, 'dachas', access to restricted govern-
ment stores, travel abroad and so on, are all dependent upon
position — loss of position means loss of privileges. There
are few alternatives available to the Soviet bureaucrat who
opposes the decision of his superiors or peers -- there are
no congressional investigative committees, no free press
available for 'leaks', no civil service commission to appeal
to, no sympathetic court system, no powerful monied lobbies,
etc. The Soviet bureaucrat who represents an alternative
view without significant, sure backing runs serious risks.
There exists in the Soviet Union no concept of the separation
of powers as exists, particularly, in the United States.
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"The declared opposition of Soviet theorists to the prin-
ciple of separating the powers arises, too, from the theo-
retical consideration that there is no need to protect
different sections of the community against the state, or one
part of the state against another. Such an idea would run
counter to the present-day Soviet notion that Soviet society
contains no internal contradictions." All power is central-
ized in the party. Alternative views outside of the party are
actively suppressed and significant state agencies exist to
conduct that suppression (i.e., the KGB). Power within the
bureaucracy is concentrated at the top — advancement is as
dependent upon loyal associations with superiors as it is to
ability (as evidenced by Khrushchev's 'Stalingrad group 1 and
Brezhnevs 'Dnieper mafia'). Thus, when significant disagree-
ment occurs, it occurs at that level. It is important to
note these factors by which the Soviet Union differs from
the western bureaucracies and which limit comparative under-
standing of the Soviet system generated by various theories
of political science which stress the pluralistic forces of
a society. "It is sometimes assumed that a growing recog-
nition of occupational-functional-group interest in decision
making may eventually lead to the gradual institutionaliza-
tion of pluralism and the evolution of the system away from
the Marxist-Leninist mode. But developments do not seem to
point in this direction. So far interest articulation is
channeled within the Party and there are no signs of the
8,2

formation of independent foci of political influence."
Finally, in a political system which associates position with
privilege (as is the case in the Soviet Union), incumbents,
from low ranking to high, have a vested interest in the
continuation of the system. As Vladimir Petrov observes,
"It would be farfetched to say that the more enlightened
part of the elite is in opposition to the regime: it con-
stitutes an integral part of the regime and has no desire
105to replace it with anything else."
Having qualified the unquestioned application of the
bureaucratic politics paradigm in the study of the particular
situation in the Soviet Union, several aspects of the paradigm
will be used to demonstrate the role of ideology in the Soviet
foreign policy process. It will be argued that ideology
serves as a point of consensus in the 'shared values' of
decision makers in the Soviet Union, it determines some of
the 'rules of the game', and finally, that the most powerful
of the bureaucratic agencies in the Soviet Union have 'stakes'
in the preservation of the ideology.
B. SHARED VALUES
There are a number of shared values within any political
system — this is a fundamental requirement for the cooperation
necessary to form a government and for it to govern. These
may range from consensus on pragmatic matters such as the
provision of domestic tranquility and protection from external
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intervention, to more idealistic concepts such as 'democracy 1 /
"free enterprise 1 or 'socialism. Morton Halperin gives as
examples of such consensus during one era of United States
foreign policy such specific tenets of consensus as "The
preeminent feature of international politics is the conflict
between Communism and the Free World" and "The surest simple
guide to U.S. interests in foreign policy is opposition to
106Communism" which were drawn from the statements of policy
makers in the post World War II era. Nathan Leites suggests
an entire series of formalized guides upon which the Soviet
10 7leadership acts. Graham Allison is more general, merely
stating that "Some national security objectives are widely
10 8
accepted. " It is the position of this writer that the
foundation of the consensus of shared values among Soviet
leaders is a world view shaped by a lifetime experience of
continual exposure to Marxist-Leninist doctrine and adherence
based on a combination of acceptance of the doctrine and the
constant necessity of phrasing arguments which rationalize
their own positions in Marxist-Leninist terms.
As a world view, the ideology provides a conceptual
framework which suggests how information about the world
should be organized and priortizes (or gives value to) that
information. "Ideology gives the Soviet leaders a framework
for organizing their vision of political developments; it
sets limits on the options open to them as policy makers;
109it defines immediate priorities and longer range goals..."
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It serves as "an analytical discipline for viewing inter-
national as well as domestic politics..." In effect, it
serves, as does any paradigm of social science, as a sim-
plifying device which gives weight to some information and
relationships and suggests that other data are not as impor-
tant. It allows the leader to sift through the unmanageable
amount of data reaching him to pick out that which is most
meaningful. It serves as a psychological device "to avoid
the discomfort of information overload, and thereby keep the
range of alternatives to which he responds much narrower. . .
"
Particularly, it simplifies decision making by eliminating
some options and stressing the value of others thus providing
criteria of selection between varying options. The world view
which emerges from the Soviet 'scientific' understanding of
the forces of history is that "conflict between communist and
capitalist states is inevitable, even though wars between them
are no longer 'fatalistically' inevitable. But no real con-
flict can or should exist within a socialist society. Any
conflict which does occur is a holdover from the capitalist
era or the work of capitalist agents. The end of external
conflict will come only with the end of the 'external' capi-
talist world. World peace requires world socialism, and the
,,112
forces of history are inevitably marching in this direction.
This world view has been reinforced historically beginning
with the 1918 intervention of British, French and American
forces at Murmansk and Archangel, the invasion of the Soviet
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Union by Germany in 1941, and the formation of the NATO
alliance following World War II, all described by the Soviets
as directed capitalist attacks on the socialist system. The
ability to stand firm in the face of those powerful opponents
has given credence to Soviet perceptions of the correctness
of their beliefs. This perception has been doubly reinforced
when coupled with a pragmatic assessment of the growth of the
physical size, population, and military power of the Social-
ist bloc compared with the capitalist states in 1917 and today
The historical developments which have reinforced Soviet
perceptions will be considered in detail in chapter five of
this study. As chapter three demonstrated, considerable
effort is expended in the Soviet Union to educate the general
populace to this world view and there exists evidence that
this world view has been internalized, at least in simplified
form, throughout the society as evidenced even in the writ-
113ings of Soviet dissidents. That the Soviet leadership
is committed to the ideology and has internalized it is
suggested by Walter Lippman ' s observations about Khrushchev...
communism is destined to supplant capitalism as
capitalism supplanted feudalism. For him this is
an absolute dogma, and he will tell you that while
he intends to do what he can to assist the in-
evitable, knowing that we will do what we can to
oppose the inevitable, what he does and what we will
do will not be decisive. Destiny will be realized
no matter what men do. Much the same has been said
by Khrushchev, privately and publicly, to many
others. For this reason his prescription for the
West is closely bound up with his long-range per-
spective. As he once put it to Adlai Stevenson,
8,6

"You must understand, Mr. Stevenson, that we live in
an epoch when one system is giving way to another.
When you established your republican system in the
eighteenth century the English did not like it. Now,
too, a process is taking place in which the peoples
want to live under a new system of society; and it
is necessary that one agree and reconcile himself with
this fact. The process should take place without
interference. H4
At the intermediate and lower levels of Soviet leadership:
there are two broad categories: the professional
party bureaucrats, the apparatchiki, from among whom
the top level generalizers eventually emerge, but to
whom, on the whole, the ideology has become inter-
nalized and is not a matter of continuous preoccupation;
and secondly, the large staffs of the agitprop, contain-
ing the often dogmatic, doctrinaire, and conservative
professional ideologues. They are the ones who most
often view any new departure as a betrayal. In the
lower echelons, it is more a matter of simple stereo-
types and formulas than fanatical commitment. . . H5
That there is considerable commitment to Soviet ideology
throughout the Soviet Union is further evidenced by the fact
that the majority of studies of the Soviet Union regardless
of the subject in one form or another address the topic of
ideology as a factor significant enough that it could not be
ignored.
Domestically, the consequences of a shared value revolv-
ing around the Marxist-Leninist doctrine, in constant con-
flict with the pressures of reality, and with the lack of
clarity of the doctrine in the workings of the Socialist
state, there is considerable leeway for differences of
opinion providing that the subject of the private ownership
of capital goods (as the fundamental source of exploitation
in capitalist society) is dealt with tactfully. However, in
87

foreign policy, especially in dealing with the capitalist
states, the ideological character of the policy relationship
gains clarity. As discussed in chapter two of this thesis,
the policy issue is the fundamental concept of the conflict
between socialism and capitalism. This immediately narrows
options. A policy of antagonism on moral grounds (based both
on 'scientific' socialist theory and ethical grounds) must
be maintained. Tension may be relaxed for practical reasons
but the tentative nature of this relaxation must be clearly
specified along with the notation that this in no way alters
the fundamental issue. The simplistic, black and white
nature of the ideology when addressing socialist-capitalist
relations is clearly recognized by the public as well as
the party. With this clarity of the issue involved in the
foreign relations between capitalist and socialist states
comes a degree on consensus within the leadership resulting
not only from the commitment of the leadership to the
ideology but realizing that the ideology is one of the 'rules
of the game' in Soviet politics and must be advocated when
ideological issues are at stake.
C. RULES OF THE GAME
The second implication of ideology in the Soviet foreign
policy process is derived from shared values as they impact
on the political process. As stated by Morton Halperin,
By definition, most participants share the images
dominant within the government at any one time. How-
ever, even those who do not will be constrained by
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their knowledge that the shared images influence others,
and this will affect the kind of arguments which are
put forward.
Participants will have considerable difficulty get-
ting the ordinary administrator or politician to
believe facts that go against the shared images.
Officials react as all individuals do to evidence which
goes against strongly held beliefs. They either ignore
the evidence or reinterpret it so as to change what it
seems to mean. .
.
Participants learn that it is not productive to put
forward a proposal or to take a stand in such a way
that acceptance depends on rejecting shared images...
Participants seem to believe that their influence
and even their continuation in office depends on their
endorsement or seeming endorsement of shared images.
Even men who appear invulnerable to opposition zeal-
ously guard their reputations for accepting shared
images. . . ^^
Thus
:
Participants shape arguments in terms of the shared
images of the society and the government even if they
do not believe that those images are an accurate re-
flection of the world. .
.
If participants believe that taking a certain stand
which they think wise will be interpreted as deviation
from shared images, they will take the opposite stand
for fear of losing influence or indeed their position
in the government. .
.
The shared values then become part of the rules of the
bureaucratic game. They "constrict the range of governmental
decisions and actions that are acceptable.../ they_/
sanction moves of some kinds .. .while making other moves
118illegal, immoral, ungentlemanly , or inappropriate." In
terms of the Soviet experience, though revolutionary zeal
may be gone, "ideology may grow less significant in creating
commitment; it becomes pervasive in supplying the criteria
of administrative choice. . .orthodoxy substitutes for con-
119
viction and produces its own form of rigidity."
&9

Evidence of the impact of the adherence to shared values even
in the face of obvious factual conflict is readily available
in the form of continued Soviet adherence to the farm collec-
tivization principle in the face of obvious superior produc-
tion from private plots — even when forced to import agri-
cultural produce from the capitalist states to make up for
shortages resulting from their own inefficient system.
Another example of this is evidenced by Kosygin's effort to
free the bureaucracy from some party supervision in which
both he and his opponents felt compelled to couch their
arguments in ideological terms, thus tacitly recognizing
the 'rules of the game'.
In his speech of March 19th... /Kosygin_7 clearly indi-
cated that Gosplan, and generally speaking the Govern-
ment as a whole, should thereafter be able to manage
the economy without any outside interference. His
only reference to Lenin was on that very point:
'Lenin cared about Gosplan 's authority, about a
certain autonomy, a certain independence that it
was meant to enjoy. "Gosplan", he wrote, "is
visibly turning into a committee of experts...
A certain independence, a certain autonomy are
necessary if this scientific institution is to
have the necessary authority" ' 2.20
(Planovoye Khozyaystovo , no 4, April 1965)
.
This argument was answered a few days later in Pravda also
12
1
in ideological terms. Such are arguments obviously not
intended for external consumption but reflect bureaucratic
conflict within the soviet Union and particularly the ideo-
logical confines within which the conflict was conducted.
The arguments tacitly reflect the degree of acceptance by
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all parties of the role of ideology and its impact as a 'rule
of the game 1 and particularly that arguments had greater force
or legitimacy if couched in ideological terms. In effect,
ideology becomes a tool of power. "Each ^Ideology and power/
reinforces the other, and the Soviet leader must keep an eye
on both. If, like, Trotsky, he neglects power for ideology
he eventually loses his authority in both realms. If, like
the economic planners Voznesensky and Saburov, he becomes too
concerned with technical matters, he incurres the wrath of
122the Party leader, and is 'faded' from the scene."
In terms of Soviet foreign policy, "orthodoxy requires
the maintenance of a posture of ideological hostility to the
12 3
non-Communist world even during a period of coexistence."
Coexistence is fully acceptable within the rules of the game
provided that the commitment to the ultimate downfall of the
capitalist system is maintained in other forms. (For example
continued struggle in the third world.) This is sanctioned
within the rules of the game because of the focus of scien-
tific socialism on the progressive nature of history and
which addresses means only in terms of the ends. 'Coexistence'
as a method in the pursuit of the ultimate goal is entirely
acceptable. The inability to discern that pragmatism in the
selection of means does not mean alteration or rejection of
ends leads western observers to confuse "the zigzagging of
Soviet policy with alleged ideological cynicism. " What
is sanctioned by the shared values of ideology within the
n

Soviet bureaucratic politics process is the selection of
means which are either in accordance with ideological tenets
or, if antithetical or ideological tenets, clearly identified
as temporary deviations based on expediency. No deviation
from commitment to the ideology can be sanctioned.
Finally, as a rule of the game, the ideology is self
reinforcing:
A leader still has to phrase his policy in ideological
terms; he employs categories of analysis which imper-
ceptibly shape his thoughts; he acts as if committed
to it. His operational language and concepts in their
turn affect the process of communication and informa-
tion. His lieutenants respond likewise, emphasizing
to the lower echelons the desirability of observing
ideological niceties. They, conscious of their
careers, accordingly strive to demonstrate their
ideological fidelity, and their orthodoxy then filters
back to the top, making it difficult for the leaders
to act in open disregard of the ideology. There is
thus an ideological feedback with in the political
elite,. . . 125
D. BUREAUCRATIC "STAKES" AND IDEOLOGY: THE PARTY
Stakes are the interests of the various bureaucracies
12 6
and the individuals within them. They are the benefits
or concerns which bureaucracies seek to protect or enhance;
when threatened they become the costs associated with a
particular decision or policy. Each bureaucratic agency
within the government has stakes in various governmental
decisions, sometimes significant and sometimes minor. Several
of the bureaucracies have stakes associated within Soviet
ideology both as benefits and as costs and the following
section will deal with a number of these. However, the CPSU
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must be dealt with separately when considering the bureau-
cratic stakes associated with Soviet ideology because the
party's stakes are extremely high in terms of both benefits
and costs. The Party and its membership benefit directly
from the impact of ideology in that ideology legitimizes
the party's claim to the right to rule the Soviet Union.
Thus a distinction is made here between the legitimacy
of the state as an institution which performs various func-
tions within society and that minority of society which rules
the state and society. The party is dependent upon ideology
for legitimacy — not the state. In all nations certain
functions are performed by various institutions of society —
frequently by the state — such as the protection of public
safety, the construction and control of communications net-
works, monitoring and protection of public health, and so on.
In a highly interdependent, complex, modern society those
institutions which perform these various functions, by and
large, legitimize themselves if the functions are performed
satisfactorily.
Ideology, however, serves to legitimize the right of one
group in society (always a minority in comparison to the
size of the group governed) to rule or direct the government
and the people of the state. In the past, such concepts as
the 'divine right of kings' served to legitimize the right
of a king and his entourage to govern society (along with a
considerable amount of physical force) . In modern western
9.3

democracies, the concept of the 'general will' voiced through
some form of general election serves to legitimize the right
of one group in society (usually a political party) to con-
trol the functions of government and to establish the rules
which govern society. In all societies, however, the ruling
minority, though possibly in power only through the use of
physical violence, postulates a principle or idea which
legitimizes its claim to rule. In the Soviet Union that
principle is the moral issue of moving Soviet society to a
higher order of human life, a process which is only fully
understood by those who have studied and are qualified to
practically apply Marxist-Leninist doctrine. "Throughout
history, regimes (or if you prefer, the ruling class) —
sovereigns and privileged persons — have tended to justify
themselves by invoking a legitimizing principle. Obviously,
Marxism-Leninism is the legitimizing principle of the Soviet
regime. It transfigures the regime of the party, or of an
oligarchy within the party, or of a man within the oligarchy,
into a step toward human salvation. If the party ceased
viewing itself as the vanguard of the proletariat, it would
become the collective tyrant, the Prince who governs accord-
127ing to his mood and his own personal advantage." The
Communist Party has found its right to rule Soviet society
on a claim to superior understanding of the scientific move-




The genesis of the right of the party to rule based on
ideology rather than the 'general will 1 was Lenin's skepti-
cism concerning the revolutionary consciousness of the pro-
letariat. He felt that though the capitalist system did
carry within it the seeds of its own destruction in that the
frustration of the masses would lead to spontaneous uprising,
the proletariat as a group was so repressed that it required
direction in order to hasten the movement toward establish-
ment of the new socialist order. He conceived of the party
as the source of this direction. "The party is conceived
as the organization, incarnation, or institutionalization of
class consciousness. In it, historical will and purposive-
ness are to acquire domination over unguided and irrational
12 8instinct and drift. " This was particularly important in
Russia which, at the time of the revolution, had little
'proletarian' consciousness at all:
Too impatient to allow the Russian working class
movement to develop gradually on the basis of
economic pressure, he /Lenin/ was concerned to imbue
it with revolutionary class-consciousness. This, he
argued, could be brought to the working class only
'from outside' — that is, by non-proletarian intellec-
tuals. 'Socialism is introduced by ideologists into
the proletariat's class struggle which develops spon-
taneously on the basis of capitalist relationships.
'
Lenin firmly rejected democratic principles. The Marxist-
Leninist future was not founded on 'the will of the people'
but on historical inevitability. The future socialist
society represented the general good and the sooner it
arrived the better. The fastest way to move social development
95

toward the Utopian goal was for those who understood the
scientific nature of human development to control that
development. Democratic institutions which allowed those
who had not yet developed their understanding or 'conscious-
ness' to have a say in the development process would only
hinder the historical process. "Lenin. .. firmly refused to
be guided by grass roots public opinion among the working
class and denounced the Menshiviks for making a fetish out
of democratic rules. Disdainful of majority opinions, he
wrote that 'the important thing is not the number, but the
correct expression of the ideas and policies of the really
revolutionary proletariat. '
"
This concept, then, serves as the basis for excluding
those who are not acceptable to the party from participation
in the governing of Soviet society. The right of the party
to govern exclusively is based on its superior understanding
of the scientific development of history toward a higher
plane and the need to guide the Soviet people to early
attainment of that level of development.
'The socialist consciousness of the Soviet people',
Konstantinov informs us, is not spontaneous, but is
molded under the guidance of the Communist Party on
the basis of its scientific world outlook. ' The
relationship between the party and the masses is one
not of rule, but of leadership; as the advanced
detachment of the masses, the party, because of its
scientific competence, manifests the will of the




The political and ideological inspirer, the
organizer and leader of the conscious building of
the new society is the Communist Party, which _is
armed with the theory of Marxism-Leninism.
This legitimizing principle is formalized under Article 6
of the new Soviet Constitution which reads:
The leading and guiding force of Soviet society and the
nucleus of its political system, of all state organiza-
tions and public organizations, is the Communist Party
of the Soviet Union. The CPSU exists for the people
and serves the people.
The Communist Party, armed with Marxism-Leninism,
determines the general perspectives of the development
of society and the course of the home and foreign policy
of the USSR, directs the great constructive work of the
Soviet people, and imparts a planned, systematic and
theoretically substantiated character to their struggle
for the victory of communism. ^2
The position of the absolute authority of the party is
reinforced by the concept of the 'dictatorship of the prole-
tariat' which represents an intermediate stage between the
demise of the capitalist system and attainment of the com-
munist society. The state, dominated by the party, becomes
the tool by which the vestiges of bourgeois exploitation are
rooted out of socialist society so that the state may
ultimately begin to wither away. However as long as vestiges
of the bourgeois system of exploitation exist and as long as
there continues to exist an external capitalist threat to
133the socialist system, the state must continue.
The role of the state becomes two-fold. First to suppress
the remnants of the old system, "old social ideas which hamper
the development and the progress of society" and all
97

remnants of the capitalist system of 'wage slavery' . "We
must suppress them in order to free humanity from wage slavery:
their resistance must be crushed by force; it is clear that
there is no freedom and no democracy where there is suppression
135
and where there is violence." (Thus the 'dictatorship of
the proletariat' is viewed as a stage in which repression and
violence is accepted as a tool for wiping out the remnants of
capitalist society.) And second, to protect the new socialist
state from the threat of intervention by capitalist states —
a common expression of Stalin who explained that "the state
was a necessary institution because of 'capitalist encircle-
ment' and that it would persist in socialist and communist
society until this encirclement was finally liquidated.
"
13 °
In both cases, however, the state is viewed as a tool of the
party for the protection and building of a communist society.
The legitimacy of the party as the ruler of the Soviet
state does not lie solely in the ideology. It is reinforced
by its successes. In 60 years, under the guidance of the
communist party, the Soviet Union has moved from a society
only in the early stages of industrial development to the
second most powerful state in the world. It leads the world
in the production of wheat, barley, iron ore, chrome, manganese,
coal and platinum, and is second only to the United States in
137
many other areas of production. It has defeated a major
foreign threat (which at one point reached the gates of
Moscow and actually penetrated Stalingrad) emerging from
9.8

World War II as one of the two most powerful states in the
world. It has placed men in space and has developed one of
the two most technically advanced military forces which have
ever existed. Under Communist Party leadership the Soviet
Union has become a state whose interest must be considered
by all other governments as a factor in their own foreign
policy making. But all of the efforts expended, sacrifices
demanded and goals achieved have been accomplished in the
name of the ideological goal of moving the Soviet state (and
the world) toward a higher level of human development. The
right of the party to demand sacrifices and select goals and
to determine the allocation of resources within society
has been based entirely on its claim to superior understand-
ing of the scientific course of history. Successes have only
served to further legitimize this claim. It has served
further to justify the exclusion of other groups from the
process of determining goals and establishing policy.
For the party, thus, the stake in ideology is high.
Continued adherence to the ideology justifies the continued
privileged position of the Communist party and its member-
ship in the determination of the goals and rewards of Soviet
society. Abandonment of ideology as a shared value, as a
rule of the game, and as a source of legitimacy would under-
mine the right of the party to exclude others from the policy
process. The continued privileged position of the party
depends on maintaining the cohesiveness and comprehensiveness
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of the ideology. As Adam Ulam observes, "probably in their
most cynical moments they adhere to a domino theory of their
own: acknowledge that one vital element of the ideology
is obsolete, and the whole structure, not only that of the
138 "ideology but of Soviet power, may collapse." Several
examples of this exist domestically as well as in foreign
policy. As has been mentioned earlier, the party leadership
has continued to adhere to the socialist principle of non-
private ownership of the means of production and continued
to press for the collectivization of farms even in the face
of obvious evidence of superior production from private
plots. The E. Lieberman proposals stressing the introduction
of the capitalist concepts of profit earning into the eco-
nomic sector was another example (introduced by Khrushchev
and opposed adamantly by those in the party fearful of losing
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control of the Soviet managerial class) . De-Stalinization
had a similar impact by tacitly implicating the party with
Stalin ' s ' crimes '
.
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However, in foreign policy there continues to exist the
major moral confrontation which legitimizes the party rule.
The fundamental legitimizing principle of the party is the
promise to raise Soviet society and ultimately the world to
a Utopian plane of existence. This promise is the offer
of a dramatic change from a world dominated by the immoral,
exploitative, misery filled capitalist system to a system
fully meeting the physical needs of man and free from
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exploitation. It is the capitalist states which most clearly
stand in the way of the fulfillment of that goal. This
struggle with the capitalist cannot be abandoned without
conceding that the Marxist-Leninist philosophy is wrong, that
the capitalist system is not as bad as the ideology says it
is, that there are alternative methods to achieving socialism,
To concede this would undermine the right of the party to
dominate Soviet society in the pursuit of the communist goal.
Thus, the abandonment of an antagonistic stance in the long
run is a threat (or cost) to the party in terms of loss of
legitimacy.
However, this same issue may be translated into a benefit
for the party if the antagonistic stance is rigidly adhered
to. Domestically, the longer the Soviet state exists, the
more difficult it becomes to generate enthusiasm within or
without the party in searching out remnants of bourgeois
exploitation, blame for failures must increasingly be laid
at the doorstep of inefficiency and incompetence from within
the socialist system itself. However, within the relation-
ship between the socialist bloc and the capitalist states,
the confrontation on the basis of principle is more readily
apparent and the ability to generate moral fervor within the
party ranks on the pretext is on firmer ground. As Ulam
observes
:
...to the Soviet leaders, the field of foreign relations
offers the best opportunity to attempt to demonstrate the
viability of Marxism, conscious as they are of the
101

necessity of preserving and developing the ideological
elan of the Communist Party and of the regime. Marxism
may be irrelevant to the problems of the Soviet Union
now that its industrialization is accomplished and the
state has shown no signs of withering away or becoming,
in essence, less authoritarian. . .The battle to pre-
serve Soviet ideology in the USSR and with it the ration-
ale of the totalitarian system is thus being fought in
a world context, and the spread of Soviet ideology,
influence, and prestige throughout the world becomes
increasingly crucial to the preservation of the Soviet
system as we know it. **1
The foreign policy arena becomes a field in which party
dynamism and zeal is demonstrated to both its own membership
and to its critics. Brzezinski notes that:
To the Party membership, Soviet international achieve-
ments are increasingly becoming the 'ersatz 1 method
of establishing the correctness of the ideology, there-
by preserving the inner sense of ideological purpose
without which the Party could decay 14^
Because of the pragmatic nature of the Marxist-Leninist
focus on ends rather than means it is possible for the party
to demonstrate its vitality in arenas outside direct con-
frontation with the west and, resulting from the theory of
imperialism, the shift of emphasis to the third world is
natural (see chapters two and five) . The degree of Soviet
sensitivity to criticism over abandonment of the principle
of fundamental antagonism toward the capitalists and willing-
ness to exploit western weaknesses is adequately demonstrated
143by vehement Soviet rejection of Chinese Communist criticism.
The point is that the stakes associated with ideology
for the party in foreign policy are extremely high. Aban-
donment of ideological rigidity toward the west strikes at
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the right of the party to rule the Soviet Union. It also
poses benefits for the party by demonstrating the correctness
of its understanding of the world demonstrated by its successes,
and by revitalizing the moral enthusiasm of the party member-
ship by directly confronting the most fundamental element of
Marxist-Leninist philosophy, the struggle of the proletariat
(and its representative in the world — the Soviet Union) to
destroy the capitalist system.
E. BUREAUCRATIC "STAKES" IN IDEOLOGY: OTHER ACTORS
Several other actors have stakes in the adherence to
ideological tenets both as costs and as benefits. The ones
which will be considered here are those which appear to have
some direct impact on the foreign policy process either as
a source of information, as a decision-maker and/or as an actor
in the implementation of policy. First will be considered
parts of the bureaucracy which appear to benefit from a rigid
application of ideology and would appear to reinforce the
party interest in maintaining ideological orthodoxy; next
those who have an input but do not appear to have direct
stakes in ideology; and, finally, those parts of the bureau-
cracy to which ideology appears to represent a cost. A
qualification here must refer back to an earlier argument
which stressed that no bureaucracy in the Soviet Union is
clearly autonomous from the influence of the party. All
top positions in the bureaucracy are held by party members,
10 3

and most others throughout the bureaucracy are also party
members. Many of these party members may have mixed opinions
or clearly side with the party on an issue in which there is
conflict between their agency and the party.
That bureaucracy which most clearly benefits from the
ideological impact on foreign policy is the Soviet military
industrial complex or, as Khrushchev referred to them, the
'metal eaters'. As Sidney Ploss observes, "It cannot be
stressed too heavily that the traditional (Soviet) patterns
of investment and resource allocation which greatly favor
the interest of industrial-military power over the interest
of popular consumption are essentially legitimized in terms
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of international imperatives." Without a perceived
significant threat there is no need for a large, standing
military force. The capitalist-socialist ideological con-
flict assures the military-industrial managers of a long
term antagonism which legitimizes continued heavy budget
allocations and manpower commitments in their field. It
further enhances the relative importance of members of those
bureaucracies in the Soviet political system. In addition,
promotions and appointments within the highest levels of
these bureaucracies is tightly controlled by the party and
failure to cooperate with the party can threaten advancement
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opportunities of individuals within the bureaucracy.
Khrushchev's efforts to allocate resources away from this
bureaucratic complex by downgrading the imminence of a
10 4

foreign threat and by shifting resources to less costly
strategic forces were largely unsuccessful, being opposed
by both the military industrial complex and party ideolo-
gues-"- 46 and probably contributed to his ultimate downfall.
The rising antagonism between the Soviet Union and China
provides an alternative justification for use by the military
and, given an interest in acquiring increasing technology
from the west, could lessen usefulness of the ideological
antagonism between east and west to this group.
The second group within the bureaucracy which benefits
from ideology as a stake in the policy process is the
Committee for State Security, the KGB. Having both a
domestic and foreign mission of protecting the Soviet Union
from subversion, it is totally legitimized by Soviet
ideology. Though, as some authors suggest, the KGB may
profit from short term lessening of tensions between east
and west, ^° a long term rapprochement would undermine the
rational for the inclusion of an extremely high number of KGB
representatives in all official Soviet foreign delegations y
and would be a definite threat to the overall mission of the
organization.
Other agencies of the Soviet government appear to have
no cost or only indirect costs associated with ideology as
a stake in the policy process. The indirect costs are
largely that these agencies are not autonomous from the
party and that the senior cadres are party members, thus
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having close ties to the party, and benefitting from its
continued privileged position in Soviet society as well as
from their own position of responsibility within a partic-
ular bureaucracy.
The foreign affairs ministry is involved in and respon-
sible for programs which are frequently hindered by ideolog-
ical clashes between the Soviet Union and the west. Those
members of the ministry charged with achieving a SALT agree-
ment with the United States or with gaining increasingly
advanced technology and trade credits from the western states
in particular are hampered. However, to the degree that
these members of the ministry make the Politburo aware of
the costs associated with a particular antagonistic policy
toward the west (i.e., the Cuban-Soviet action in Angola,
military aid to Ethiopia and South Yemen, etc.), the costs
are not to the ministry. No jobs, prestige, or budget
allocations are on the line, and programs continue despite
momentary setbacks. The most significant evidence of this
is the remarkable continuity of Foreign Minister Gromyko in
his position since 1957 and elevation to Politburo member-
ship in April 19 73, despite the ups and downs of Soviet
foreign relations over the past twenty-two years. A sig-
nificant example of this point occurred during the 196 8
Soviet occupation of Czechoslovakia in which the foreign
ministry repeatedly warned the Politburo membership of the
possible consequences of the intervention on the expected
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initiation of the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks with the
Johnson Administration later that year. ^0
Two other agencies which have a limited impact on the
policy process but which have minimal interests in ideology
as a stake in the bureaucratic politics process are the
Academy of Science on which the Party relies heavily for
expertise and TASS which serves not only as a source of
information but assists in the implementation of policy
through the publication of speeches and official pronounce-
ments which serve as foreign policy 'signals' to the west.
However, similar to the foreign ministry, neither have costs
or benefits in terms of jobs, prestige or budget allocations
directly associated with ideology.
Those elements of the bureaucracy which do have a stake
in ideology in terms of costs appear to be in the field of
the light or consumer goods industries and those charged with
agricultural production. Both would be more capable of
achieving their goals if tensions between east and west were
relaxed. Some resources allocated to defense industries
could be redirected to these consumer oriented agencies and
greater access to western technology and resources would be
enhanced. However, as mentioned earlier, two examples tend
to indicate a reluctance of the party to introduce such
changes. First, it is evidenced by the refusal to abandon
or modify the farm collectivization versus private plot
production program based on a refusal to abandon the Marxist
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principle of collective or state ownership of the means of
production. A second example is the effort of Khrushchev to




Though revolutionary fervor may have been significantly
reduced in the USSR, Marxist-Leninist ideology continues to
play a role in the conduct of Soviet foreign policy in three
ways suggested by the bureaucratic politics paradigm.
First, as a widely held common value, it impacts as a
world view or conceptual framework through which the Soviet
leadership views and evaluates the world. It suggests that
this world view is one which accepts as inevitable, and thus
anticipates and prepares for, long term antagonism between
the socialist and capitalist states. This is a view which
has been historically reinforced.
Second, it has become a 'rule of the game 1 in Soviet
politics. It constricts the range of actions or decisions
which may be considered; it becomes a tool of power for those
who can couch their arguments in ideological terms and a
liability to those who cannot; it sanctions some moves while
disallowing others.
Third, the most powerful of the bureaucracies in the
Soviet Union have a stake in the continued consideration of
ideology in the foreign policy process. The Communist Party,
10 8

the most powerful bureaucracy in the Soviet Union, gains
the most from continued emphasis on ideology due to its
reliance on ideology as the legitimizer of party rule to
the exclusion of all others. Questioning the ideology is
a threat to the legitimacy of the party. Since the antagon-
ism toward capitalism is a fundamental part of the ideology,
the long term antagonism toward the west cannot be dismissed
or altered without also ultimately threatening the legitimacy
of the party. The military-industrial complex also benefits
from this ideological antagonism toward the west which pro-
vides it with a significant enemy through which to rationalize
significant budget allocations, manpower commitments and en-
hances the relative prestige of its leadership. The KGB also
benefits indirectly from the ideological orientation of the
state since it serves the party primarily as an instrument
for the protection of the Soviet state from both internal and
external subversion — meaning, to a significant degree,
ideological subversion. These agencies, all represented at
the highest level of Soviet policy making — the politburo --
are capable of impacting directly on the foreign policy
process. The foreign ministry, Academy of Sciences and TASS
have only minimal organizational costs or benefits associated
with ideology. Those agencies having the greatest costs
associated with the impact of ideology on foreign policy are
the light or consumer industries and the agricultural produc-
tion agencies — those which have the least direct impact on
the foreign policy process. ,.
q

The Implication of this evidence of the continuing impact
of ideology in the bureaucratic politics process, especially
as the fundamental element of legitimizing the dominant role
of the CPSU and as a useful tool for other powerful bureau-
cratic agencies, is that continued antagonism toward the
west is likely despite efforts to come to terms with the
Soviets through SALT negotiations, cultural exchanges and so
on. Soviet efforts will merely shift into other areas of
conflict — particularly in the third world. Only those
actions by the west which confront the Soviet Union in the
operational dimension on a significant scale will result in
a temporary overriding of the foreign policy tenets gener-





So far, previous chapters of this thesis have suggested
that Marxist-Leninist doctrine impacts on the Soviet foreign
policy process by dictating, as a concept integral to the
doctrine, a foreign policy posture antagonistic toward the
capitalist West. Further, the doctrine suggests that the weak
link in the capitalist system is its dependence on the third
world for markets, cheap resources and cheap labor. An oper-
ational concern, the security of the state, has been doctrin-
ally approved and justified as a moderating factor on the
conduct of this antagonistic policy toward the west. It has
also been suggested that the Soviet leadership is generally
committed to the doctrine; that the Soviet people are at least
acquiescent to it. The Soviet bureaucratic politics process
reinforces, at a minimum, outward conformance to the doctrine
on the part of those Soviet leaders who are not totally com-
mitted to it. Further, several parts of the bureaucracy have
a stake in continued adherence to the ideology.
As has been noted throughout this paper, the arguments
presented here do not infer that ideology is the most import-
ant determinant in the Soviet foreign policy making process
— only that it is a significant factor. This chapter will
explore the impact of ideology on Soviet foreign policy as
an historical phenomenon focusing on historical evidences of
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continuing ideological impact on the Soviet foreign policy
process in the form of antagonism toward the West.
At this point, it would be appropriate to define the term
'antagonism 1 as it is used in conjunction with foreign policy
throughout this chapter. All states pursue security and other
interests which enhance the well-being of their citizens and
of the state — interests generally termed 'national interests.'
To the degree that these interests overlap from state to state
the possibility of conflict between states exists. However,
in the context of this paper, the foreign policy of a state
is not considered antagonistic to that of another state unless
the policy of one of the states is such that the only reso-
lution of the conflict between them is the destruction or
fundamental alteration of the nature of the opposing state (s).
Illustrations of this concept would include, as examples of
antagonistic policies, some wars (i.e., World Wars I and II)
and such policy conflicts as exist between the majority of the
Arab states and Israel in which the policy of the former is
to seek the destruction of the latter (ultimately seeking the
return of the lands of Israel to the Palestinians) . The
relations between the United States and Mexico, on the other
hand, while reflecting considerable conflict of interest at
the time of President Carter's visit to Mexico City in 19 79,
are not (within the limits of this definition) antagonistic
relations because neither seeks the destruction or fundamental
alteration of the nature of the other state. In application to
L12

the relations of the USSR toward the western world, it is the
argument of this paper that the foreign policy of the Soviet
Union, throughout its history, has been not only theoretically
antagonistic but in fact antagonistic toward the west. The
Soviets have actively pursued a policy which sought to alter
the fundamental nature of the capitalist states.
Given this definition of antagonism, this chapter suggests
that the commitment to an antagonistic policy toward the West
is fundamental to Marxist-Leninist doctrine and to Soviet
foreign policy. However, refering back to the nature of
ideology (as a two dimensional concept as presented in chapter
two: fundamental versus operational dimensions), the pursuit
of this fundamentally antagonistic goal has been moderated by
an operational concern for the security of the USSR. The
variable within international relations which most directly
affects Soviet security concerns is the relative strategic
strength of the USSR in relation to the capitalist states.
It is the argument of this chapter that Soviet security con-
cerns have not altered their commitment to the fundamental
alteration of the capitalist system but merely the aggress-
iveness with which the Soviet leadership has sought to attain
this goal. In the attempt to support this position, several
forms of Soviet foreign policy actions will be considered.
First will be considered Soviet rhetorical commitment to the
goal (i.e., what they say). This will be considered as a
form of low risk activity which should be apparent throughout
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Soviet history even in periods of relative Soviet weakness.
Also to be considered are those periods in which the Soviets
have sought to cooperate with various capitalist states (to
determine if such cooperation has signaled an alteration of
Soviet commitment to the overthrow of capitalism) . Those
evidences which are stronger than rhetoric up to and including
the use of military forces will also be considered. It would
be expected that, within the framework of this analysis, as
Soviet capability to economically and politically support
such efforts, more aggressive activity would increase.
For convenience of presentation, this analysis will divide
the history of Soviet foreign policy into two phases in which
each form of evidence will be considered. The first phase is
the period from 1917 to 194 3 in which the Soviet Union was, in
fact, strategically inferior to the capitalist states. This
was discovered by the Bolsheviks early in their historical
experience at the hands of the Germans leading to the signing
of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk 151 and later, in 1920, at the
152hands of the Poles. The period following those events
clearly reflect the awareness by the Soviet leadership of the
relative weakness of the USSR. The overwhelming success of
the invasion of Russia by Germany in June of 1941 which reached
Smolensk in only four weeks and was on the outskirts of Moscow
by November suggests that the Soviet leadership was correct in
their understanding of the Soviet situation. However, as the
impact of aid and assistance from the United States and Great
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Britain following the invasion by the Germans began to take
15 3 .
effect, the situation began to change. Phase two in this
analysis begins in 1942-3 with the defeat of the German army
at Stalingrad and Kursk. These battles marked the beginning
of a Soviet military drive which terminated only at the fall
of Berlin and the surrender of Germany. This marked a change
in the perception, by both the Soviet and Western leadership,
of the Soviet Union as one of the two most powerful states
in the post-World War II world. The evidence which will be
sought is that the commitment to the fundamental alteration
of the capitalist West has remained constant throughout both
phases and as Soviet relative power has increased (as it has
in the second period) the aggressiveness with which the
Soviets have actively pursued this goal has increased as well.
A. PHASE ONE: 1917-1943
The first phase of the conduct of Soviet foreign policy
was characterized by (as has been mentioned previously) the
strategic weakness of the Soviet Union vis a vis the capitalist
states. This weakness was the result of several factors prob-
ably the most readily apparent of which was the weakness of
the Russian army. Poorly equipped and underfed, frequently
affected by mass desertions and the rebellion of whole regi-
ments when ordered into combat, defeated repeatedly by the
Germans, 54 Austrians, Rumanians, 55 Poles, 156 and others,
it was evident that the army was in no condition to conduct
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successful warfare against foreign powers. As Lenin himself
stated as he argued for the immediate signing of the Treaty
of Brest-Litovsk regardless of the conditions set by the
Germans
:
There can be no doubt but that our army is absolutely
in no condition at the present moment, and will not
be for the next few weeks (and probably for the next
few months) , to resist a German offensive successfully;
firstly owing to the extreme fatigue and exhaustion of
the majority of the soldiers, coupled with the in-
credible chaos in the matter of victualling, replacement
of the overfatigued, etc.; secondly, owing to the utter
unfitness of our horses, which would doom our artillery
to inevitable destruction; and thirdly, owing to the
utter impossibility of defending the coast of Riga to
Revel, which affords the enemy a certain chance of
conquering the rest of Livonia, and then Esthonia and
of outflanking a large part of our forces, and lastly
of capturing Petrograd.
"
The Russian economy was not the strongest of the European
states' prior to the beginning of the war. In the prewar
years the other major European powers had been developing
industrially quite rapidly while Tsarist Russia had lagged
behind. At the time of the outbreak of the war, though
Russia was the largest state in the world and had nearly
twice the population of the second largest state in Europe —
Germany — the Russians only produced 20 percent more food
crops than Germany. Germany outproduced Russia in such in-
15 8dustrial products as pig iron by over 400 percent. Initial
Bolshevik efforts to introduce socialist production methods
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met with utter failure. Compounding the economic difficul-
ties of the new Soviet state was a civil war which continued




war with Germany. Thus the immediate strategic foreign
policy problem confronting the Soviet Union during the inter-
war period was the rebuilding and modernization of the
Soviet economy and the development and equipping of a credible,
stable military organization.
The date of 1943 has been selected as the termination of
the period of Soviet weakness for two reasons. First, in
1941 the German army nearly succeeded in its attempt to destroy
the Soviet state. In a period of roughly four weeks the German
army crossed the Soviet borders and reached the city of Smolensk.
By November of the same year, they had reached the outskirts
of Moscow. Thus it is fairly obvious that the Soviet Union
was in fact strategically inferior to at least one of the capi-
talist states in 1941. Other factors which will be considered
later will demonstrate that the Soviets were fully aware of
this weakness. However, by 1943, with the aid of the United
States and Great Britain, the Soviet Union began to overcome
the German armies with significant defeats at Stalingrad and
Kursk and initiating a campaign which did not terminate until
Germany had fallen thus marking an apparent change in the
strategic situation of the Soviet Union vis a vis the capitalist
states and, in particular, Germany.
This apparent weakness of the Soviet Union between 1917
and 19 4 3 was not absolute however. Strategic capability is a
relative concept. The evaluation of the strategic capability
of a state is only meaningful when compared to the capability
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of that state (or those states) against which the potential
for conflict exists. During the same time frame (1917-1943)
the capitalist west was not at all times (or possibly at any
time) resolute and unified in its opposition to the foreign
policy interests of the Soviet Union. Considerable animosity
developed during the Versailles Peace Conference between the
allies themselves and, following the conference, between the
victors and the vanquished parties. Economic instability
leading to chaos (political as well as economic) in Germany,
France and Great Britian immediately following the war and
during the Great Depression of 1929 contributed significantly
to continued political conflict among the capitalist states.
The rise of facism and Nazism (both considered as forms of
capitalism by Soviets ) served to further cause division
in the capitalist camp. The exploitation of these divisions
as an opportunity for a relatively weak state to act
aggressively will be considered shortly. However, in this
period of Soviet weakness, it would be expected that the
pursuit of foreign policy goals associated with ideological
antagonism to the capitalist world would be conducted with
caution.
The least expensive or risky means of demonstrating con-
tinued adherence to an ideologically based antagonistic foreign
policy is rhetoric. Beginning with the first Soviet state
paper — the Decree of Peace — which contained an outright
plea for an immediate peace and a unilateral declaration of
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the cessation of hostilities with Germany, the new Soviet
state initiated its official propaganda campaign against the
West laying the blame for the war at the feet of the imperial-
ists. "The Soviet government considers it the greatest crime
against humanity to continue this war for the sake of dividing
among the powerful and wealthy nations the weaker national-
162ities which they have conquered..." At the same time it
initiated a new era of diplomacy with an appeal over the head
of the governments of the three major powers involved in the
war direct to the people of those states to support Soviet
efforts to end the war:
While addressing this proposal of peace to the Govern-
ments and peoples of all the belligerent countries, the
Provisional Workers' and Peasants' Government of Russia
appeals also in particular to the class-conscious
workers of the three most advanced nations of the world
and the three mightiest States taking part in the
present war — England, France and Germany. ^ 6 3
Other appeals to the European proletariat to revolt against
the capitalist states were issued in the name of the new
Soviet state on 19 December 1917:
. . .We do not attempt to conceal the fact that we do
not consider the existing capitalist Governments
capable of making a democratic peace. The revolutionary
struggle of the toiling masses against the existing
Governments can alone bring Europe nearer to such a
peace. Its full realization can only be guaranteed by




The treaty with the Germans itself became a bone of con-
tention within the Bolshevik party — the primary issue being
the question of how to justify any form of cooperation or
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peace with a capitalist state. The treaty was treated by the
Soviets not as an abandonment of ideological hostility toward
the capitalist states but as a respite necessary as a matter
of expediency. The peace treaty was signed only after con-
siderable ideological debate within the Bolshevik leadership
concerning whether or not the war should be continued in
expectation of a sympathetic revolution by the proletariat
in Germany. It should be noted here that the Bolsheviks
initially felt that the revolution in Russia was not an iso-
lated event but a spark which would ignite a revolution of
the proletariat throughout Europe. However with the failure
of the revolution to materialize in Germany and the renewed
offensive of the German army in February of 1918 which began
1 c c
to threaten Petrograd, Lenin argued that peace was
necessary not because it was desirable but because there was
no alternative
:
The Socialist government of Russia is faced with the
question —a question which brooks no postponement --
of whether to accept this annexationist peace now, or
at once to wage a revolutionary war. Actually speaking,
no middle course is possible. No further postponement
is now feasible, for we have already done everything
possible and impossible artificially to protract the
negotiations. /Lenin's emphasis^/
The Soviets made every attempt to make it perfectly clear that
the treaty was, in effect, an ultimatum given under circum-
16 8
stances leaving no alternative. The point here is not that
ideological commitment played a significant role in the de-
cision to sign a peace treaty with the Central Powers but that
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the Soviet leadership felt the necessity to place such
cooperation into ideological perspective when justifying such
a document to the party membership. The party leadership was
apparently sensitive enough to this issue that a formal reso-
lution was passed at the Seventh Party Congress in 1918
specifically declaring that the sole reason for acceptance of
169
such a treaty was expediency.
By 1921 the most pressing problem facing the Soviet govern-
ment was economic reconstruction and modernization. Complicated
by the refusal of the allied powers to recognize the Soviet
government (because of its repudiation of foreign debts and the
radical nature of the propaganda and policies flowing from
revolutionary Russia) and the economic boycott imposed by the
allies, the Soviet leadership was faced with growing unrest.
"Peasant mutinies, disaffection of the workers, and the consid-
erable dissidence within the Communist Party in 1921-2 3 were
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all by-products of the lag in recovery." The option avail-
able to the Soviets was along the Leninist lines of dividing
the capitalists and thereby weakening their united front
17] .
against Russia. The direction of this divisive effort was
directed toward the vanquished of World War I as obvious po-
tential allies. Thus the Bolsheviks "branded the Versailles
Peace treaty as unjust, vindictive and imperialistic. .. the
Bolsheviks established not merely this sentimental link, whose
significance must not be underestimated, but also an economic
172
and political bond between Russia and Germany." The
121

conditions which demanded this form of cooperation were ex-
pressed clearly in the Resolution of the Ninth All-Russian
Soviet Congress on the International Position of the RSFSR
which noted that:
...the most essential prerequisites for the restoration
and rehabilitation of the national economy are the
quickest and widest possible development of trade with
other countries, the attraction of foreign capital and
technical personnel to exploit the natural wealth of
Russia, and the receipt from other States of co-oper-
ation in the form of loans... 173
Soviet fears concerning the ideological dangers of economic
cooperation with capitalist states were expressed by George
Chicherin when he noted that such assistance, though needed
would be a "new and serious danger of an attempt to unite all
economic interests for the purpose of turning economic colla-
boration with us the Soviets into our economic enslavement."
Protection against such danger was only possible through the
conclusion of such agreements as the Treaty of Rapallo and
even this cooperation was qualified in Marxist-Leninist
terms. 7 ^ The treaty of Rapallo was represented as a demon-
stration of Soviet support for oppressed peoples.
Early evidences of Soviet commitment to ideological tenets
and the impact of such tenets on Soviet foreign policy are not
limited to rhetoric. During the early years of existence
of the Soviet state more direct actions intended to place stress
on the capitalist system were taken as well. The theory of
imperialism suggested several inherent weaknesses of the im-
perialist system which were available for exploitation by the
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Soviet leadership. As G.A. Morgan puts it:
The primary contradiction, both chronically and in its
acute manifestation as economic crisis, impels the bour-
geoisie to increase pressure against the proletariat,
against colonial peoples, against each other (in rivalry
for spheres of influence) and against the Soviet Union.
The culmination of these trends is war of one kind or
another: the colonies fight for liberation, the capital-
ist nations who demand greater spheres of influence
fight to get them. .
.
War between capitalist countries further intensifies
the resentment of the masses and at the same time both
exhausts the strength of the bourgeoisie at home and




Thus three particular areas of possible exploitation by the
Soviet Union were: one, division among the capitalist states
(already discussed to some degree) ; two, appeals to, and
support for struggles against the imperialist powers by the
oppressed peoples of the various colonies; and third, appeals
to the increasingly oppressed proletariat of the imperialist
nations.
It is striking to note that several of the intial actions
of the new Soviet state expressly aimed at exploiting these
contradictions. On 26 December 1917, with the revolution only
seven weeks old the Council of People's Commissars appropriated
two million rubles to support the revolutionary activities of
"the left internationalist wing of the labour movement of all
countries, regardless of whether these countries were at
I 70
war with Russia, in alliance with Russia, or neutral. "^ '
°
Even earlier than this had come an appeal to the "Moslems of
Russia and the East" in which the Council of People's
12 3

commissars had appealed to the colonies of the Middle and Far
East to follow the lead of the Russian revolution and revolt
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against the imperialist states.
The efforts of the Bolsheviks were not limited to appeals
to the colonies, nor were they limited by any agreement which
they had signed. Under the terms of the Treaty of Brest-
Litovsk (Article II) both the German and Soviet governments
had agreed to "refrain from any agitation or propaganda against
the government or the public and military institutions of the
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other party." Yet only four days after the signing, Lenin
noted, "Yes, of course we have broken the treaty, we have
181broken it thirty or forty times..." probably referring,
at least, to those activities of Adolf A. Joffe, the Russian
ambassador to Berlin who was working:
...assiduously against the Imperial Government. More
than ten Left Social Democratic newspapers were directed
and supported by the Soviet Embassy in the German capital.
The embassy bought information from officials in various
German ministries and passed it on to radical leaders for
use in Reichstag speeches, in workers' meetings and in
the Press. Anti-war and anti-government literature was
sent to all parts of the country and to the front.
Tons of literature were printed and clandestinely dis-
tributed by Joffe's office. 'It is necessary to em-
phasize most categorically,' Joffe wrote in an almost
unknown memorandum, 'that in the preparation of the
German revolution, the Russian Embassy worked all the
time in close contact with the German Socialists.'
Leaders of the German Independents discussed most matters
of revolutionary tactics with Joffe, who was an experi-
enced conspirator. In a radio message, dated December 15,
1918, broadcast by Joffe to the revolutionary Soviets of
Germany, he admitted having paid 100,000 marks for the
purchase of arms for the revolutionists and announced
that he had established in Germany a 10,000,000 rouble
fund for the support of the revolution, which was en-
trusted to Oskar Kohn, a Socialist deputy. 82
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The efforts of the Bolsheviks became even more obvious
with the formation of the Third International on 2 March 1919.
The purpose of the organization was clearly one which was
antagonistic to the capitalist states being intended to
"recruit party members in other countries, consult on revo-
lutionary and political tactics and strategy, try to suborn
government or military officials in capitalist countries, and
infiltrate business, labor unions, the media, universities,
the League of Nations, and even religious organizations. OJ
The effort to create a separate organization to pursue the
internationalist aims of the Communist party while separating
from those activities the state functions of the Soviet Union
(which needed the economic assistance of the very states the
Third International sought to undermine) was a relatively
ineffective subterfuge due to (at various times) the serving
of individuals such as Lenin, Trotsky, Radek, Bukharin, and
Stalin on both the Central Executive Committee of the Third
International and in positions of responsibility in the
184Soviet government simultaneously.
The first instance of an overt military action by the
Soviets occurred in 1920 with the initially successful attack
of the Red Army into Poland. Several factors contributed to
Soviet optimism concerning the likelihood of the success of
such a venture. The majority of the 'White 1 armies had been
defeated and the intervention of the allies had proved unsuc-
cessful. The new Soviet state had apparently successfully
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withstood the initial reaction of the imperialist world to the
first socialist state. The capitalist themselves were clearly
divided into two camps — the victors and the vanquished with
considerable animosity remaining from the conduct and outcome
185
of the Versailles Peace Conference. Even among the allies
existed a considerable amount of conflict concerning the
treatment of the Central Powers -- ultimately resulting in
the refusal of the United States to ratify the treaty and,
186
subsequently refusing to participate in the League of Nations.
The heavy burden of reparitions had led to economic chaos in
Germany and conflict between France and Britain over what to do
187
about the situation. Thus despite the apparent weakness of
the Soviet Union in 'real 1 terms, the weakness and division of
the capitalist states made Soviet weakness relatively less.
In addition, the action in Poland was actually initiated by the
Poles, who, under Pilsudski, sought to expand Polish territory
at the expense of apparent Soviet weakness. Initial Polish
expectations appeared to be well founded as the opening thrust
18 8
of the Polish army carried it forward to the capture of Kiev.
However, the attack by Polish forces generated a general arousal
of the European proletariat in support of the Soviet Union much
as the Bolsheviks had expected it to occur during the World War.
As Louis Fischer records it:
Everywhere in Europe the proletariat was aroused.
'Hands off Russia' became a universal slogan. The
sentiment for Russia, both in the days when Pilsudski 's
legions penetrated victoriously into the Ukraine,
reached an even higher pitch when the Polish offensive
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had given place to a Red advance, and fiery appeals
from Moscow to 'The Workers of the World 1 supplied
Labour opposition with material for protest.
Campaigns to prevent the forwarding of war materials
to Poland developed in all transit countries. Working
men in Czecho-Slovakia stopped and searched trains
moving in the direction of the Polish frontier and re-
fused to pass them when munitions were discovered. .
.
Opposition to Allied intervention against Russia grew
stronger in England. . .Lloyd George. .. contemplated mili-
tary assistance for Pilsudski and Wrangel. The British
trade unions, then very Radical and pro-Russian, objected
strenuously to such measures. They wanted no war on the
Soviet Republic. Not only did they obstruct the shipment
of munitions to Poland: they organized a serious move-
ment to paralyze any effort the Government might under-
take on behalf of the Warsaw regime...
...for a moment it seemed as if England were on the
verge of revolution. ^89
These conditions led to over confidence on the part of the
Bolsheviks (to include Lenin himself) particularly with the
successes of the Red Army beginning in June leading to the
rout of the Polish army and the march to the outskirts of
Warsaw. Though this effort failed in the long run, it was
clearly perceived by the Bolshevik leadership as an attempt
to attain their ideological goals "on the bayonets of the
190Red Army. " The expectations of the outcome of the attack
on Poland were expressed clearly by the Soviet commander of
the expedition, Marshal Mikhail Tukhachevsky in an order which
proclaimed that the "destinies of world revolution will be
settled ultimately in the West. Our route toward the world
191
wide conflagration passes over the corpse of Poland."
12 7

It might be argued that previously described statements
and actions were only those of a newly formed government led
by an as yet still idealistic leadership to the external
meddling of foreign powers and the opportunity presented by
the Polish invasion. However as the allied armies withdrew
and the Polish expedition terminated, the rhetoric continued.
At the 14th Party Congress in 1925 the report of the Central
Committee expressed serious concerns about the capitalist
192
world and its relations with the Soviet Union. In the same
year Stalin listed as the first two tasks of all communist
parties
:
1. To exploit to the utmost each and every contra-
diction in the bourgeois camp with the object of
disintegrating and weakening its forces, with the
object of strengthening the position of the pro-
letariat.
2. To mark out concrete ways and means of bringing
the working class of the leading countries into
close contact with the national revolutionary
movement in the colonies and dependent countries
with the object of the widest support of that
movement against the common enemy, against
imperialism.
Given the relative weakness of the Soviet Union (as
clearly demonstrated by the failure of the Red Army's excur-
sion into Poland) the Soviet leadership sought alternative
methods of placing pressure on the capitalists. The colonies
of the imperial powers appeared to be a lucrative target for
Soviet efforts at disruption of the capitalist system for two
particular reasons. First, due to the fact that the Soviet
Union represented one group — the workers — oppressed by
12 8

the imperialists and the colonies represented a second group
also being exploited by the imperialists, they were natural
allies. This is a direct outgrowth of the theory of im-
194penalism. Second, again according to the theory of
imperialism, the colonies served as a large market and source
of raw materials and cheap labor for the imperialists by which
the capitalists had temporarily averted the collapse of the
capitalist system. As the Central Committee report of
7 December 1927 notes, the Soviet Union already represented a
large market lost to capitalist exploitation which placed
stress on the capitalist system. The loss of the colonies
195
would add further stress. The dependence of the imperial-
ist states on external sources for markets, raw materials and
cheap labor were identified as the weak link in the imperialist
19 6
system. As Stalin put it in 1921:
If Europe and America may be called the frontline, the
stage of principal battles between socialism and imper-
ialism, the semi-independent nations and colonies, with
their raw materials, agricultural products and immense
manpower, should be acknowledged as a hinterland, the
reserves of imperialism. In order to win a war, it is
necessary not only to win victories on the front, but
also to revolutionize the hinterland and the reserves
of the enemy. This is why the victory of the world pro-
letarian revolution may be assured only where the pro-
letariat knows how to combine its own revolutionary
struggle with the liberating movement of the toiling
masses in the semi-independent nations and the colonies,
against imperialists and for the dictatorship of the
proletariat. 197
Early efforts by the Soviet leadership to exploit this depen-
dence of the capitalists on their colonial possessions (such
as the earlier mentioned appeal to the Moslems of the Far
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Eastern colonies to revolt^ 8) were not particularly
successful the reasons probably being three fold: first,
the relative inability of the Soviets to logistically support
independence movements in any area except those contiguous
with the Soviet Union (as evidenced by their tenuous efforts
19 9in Iran, Turkey, China and Afghanistan ) ; second, the
relative weakness of the colonial independence movements in
the interwar period; and third, the relatively tenacious hold
which the imperial powers had on the colonies.
By 1934, with the rise of Hitler in Germany, the Soviet
leaders became increasingly concerned with the likelihood (or
inevitability as Stalin put it) of another major European war.
This concern was complicated for the Soviets by the increas-
ingly aggressive activities of the Japanese in the far east.
As Molotov observed in his report to the Seventh Soviet Congress
in 1935, "We must bear in mind that the direct danger of war
against the USSR has increased, certain influential circles in
Japan have long been openly talking of a war on the Soviet
Union. " In the same speech, Molotov mentioned several omi-
nous developments in the international situation:
Not only Japan, but Germany also has withdrawn from the
League of Nations, and the meaning of this policy is
patent to all. They did so in order to leave their
hands free in the matter of armaments and preparations
for war... The diplomacy and foreign policy of the
bourgeois countries are more and more becoming the
servants of those who are already seeking allies for
a war for a new redivision of the world among the im-
perialist powers at the expense of the weaker countries. 201
The following year, in an address to the Central Executive
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Committee, Molotov again reviewed the situation noting that
aggression by Japan and Germany was becoming more and more
likely and that the USSR had concluded mutual aid treaties
with both France and Czechs lovakia designed as a "partial
202
step towards ensuring peace in Eastern Europe" which
appeared to be the direction of Hitler's greatest interest.
The usefulness of the agreements with France and Czech-
oslovakia came into question very quickly when, within the
next three years, Hitler remilitarized the Rhineland and
then seized Austria and Czechoslovakia with no response from
France in any way other than diplomatic protest. This caused
the Soviet leadership to question the value of a mutual
assistance pact with France. As the opportunity presented
itself, the Soviets signed the 19 39 Nazi-Soviet Non-Aggression
Pact. Given the nature of previous criticism of Germany by
the Soviet leadership and the anti-Communist propaganda cam-
paign carried out by Hitler throughout his rise to power, such
an agreement required immediate qualification within the party
as a political expedient. The treaty was presented as such by
Molotov to the Fourth (Special) Session of the Supreme Soviet
in which he stated:
Since the third session of the Supreme Soivet the
international situation has shown no change for the
better. On the contrary it has become even more
tense. .
.
In view of this state of affairs the conclusion of a
pact of non-aggression between the USSR and Germany is
of tremendous positive value, eliminating the danger
of war between Germany and the Soviet Union...
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During the opening days of World War II the Soviets con-
ducted two military actions which in some ways reflected
ideological overtones. Though the Soviet leadership was con-
cerned about the growing unrest in Europe several circumstances
combined to suggest that the relative position of the Soviet
Union to the capitalist world had improved considerably —
setting the background for these two military operations.
Consider the strategic situation which confronted the Soviet
Union. Communist control of the Soviet Union had been con-
solidated under Stalin and was undisputed by the capitalist
states. The Soviet state modernization program, though
brutally implemented, had been relatively successful (an an
example, having quadrupled the production of pig iron in a
204twelve year period between 192 8 and 1940 ) . The development
of the Soviet military had been emphasized as well — by 19 38
the Soviet armed forces numbered 1,513,000 and had at its
disposal nearly 7,000 aircraft, 13,837 guns (of a caliber in
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excess of 76mm), and 10,180 tanks. The capitalist world,
in contrast, was viewed by the Soviets as fraught with division
and weakness. First of all was the failure of the League of
Nations to respond forcefully to the aggression of Mussolini in
the seizure of Abysinnia. Closely following this was Hitler's
remilitarization of the Rhineland, and the seizure of Austria
and Czechoslovakia. In each case, though protesting, the
traditional major powers of Europe acquiesced to the actions
of the aggressors. ° Shortly after these actions, the Soviets
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dropped their previous reliance on their French allies as
useless in opposition to Germany and, when it was offered by
Ribbentrop in 1939, accepted a treaty of non-aggression with
Germany. This treaty had hidden clauses which provided for
the division of Poland and the recognition of spheres of in-
207 . .fluence in Eastern Europe. The division of Poland served
as a tentative test of the usefulness of military action to
attain political goals. It is significant to note that though
the German army invaded Poland on 1 September 19 39 and the
French and British declared war on 3 September, the Soviets
waited two full weeks to see what actions the British and
French really intended to take. With the failure of these
states to respond forcefully to the German actions (and
coupled with the growing concern as to where the German ad-
vance would halt) the Soviet army crossed the Polish border on
17 September. Although there were obvious other reasons for
the conduct of this operation it was justified by Molotov in
the following terms in an address to the Fifth (Extraordinary)
Session of the Supreme Soviet (31 October 1939):
When the Red Army marched into these regions it was
greeted with general sympathy by the Ukrainian and
White Russian population who welcomed our troops as
liberators from the yoke of the gentry, from -/the yoke
of the Polish landlords and capitalists...
It is interesting to note that in the interim period be-
tween the partition of Poland and the Soviet attack on Finland
(the next overt military effort of the Soviets) that no sig-
nificant effort was made by any of the capitalist nations to
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take action on the declarations of war exchanged early in
the fall. Again, though the effort against the Finns ob-
viously had other motivations, the Soivets couched their
justifications in ideological terms, equating the Finnish
government with imperialism and the imperialist threat
against the Soviet Union:
All this has definitely shown that the present Finnish
Government, embarrassed by its anti-Soviet connections
with the imperialists, is unwilling to maintain normal
relations with the USSR. It continues to adopt a
hostile position towards our country and will take no
heed of the stipulations of the Treaty of Non-
Aggression concluded between the two countries, being
anxious to keep our glorious Leningrad under a mili-
tary menace. ^9
The invasion by the German army of the Soviet Union with
its overwhelming initial successes halted these Soviet ad-
venturist exercises and compelled another Soviet period of
cooperation with imperialist states: the United States and
Great Britain. The magnitude of the assistance received by
the Soviet Union from the United States alone was publicly
acknowledged by the Soviets in June of 1944 to be"6,340
aircraft, and in addition 2,442 aircraft received from the
USA on account of British obligations ... 3 , 734 tanks. .. 206 , 771
210lorries. .. food deliveries amounted to 2,199,000 tons."
Soviet history books refer to the period of 19 41 to 19 45 as
the "period of 'coalition' (koalitsiya) , or loose ties with
the Western Allies for the purpose of 'repulsing the fascist
211
enemies' (emphasis added)." This period of cooperation with
Great Britain and the United States led to a softening of the
;34

Soviet rhetoric toward their two allies, however, even this
relationship was colored by a continuing suspicion of the
motives of the capitalist powers. This became particularly
evident in the delay of the opening of the 'second front' in
western Europe so desperately desired by the Soviets with
Stalin remarking at one point to American officials, "The
paucity of your offers shows that you want the Soviet Union
212defeated." However for the most part, ideological attacks
on the capitalist system were muted during the period from
19 41 to 1942 and did not begin to reappear until the "Red
Army victories in 194 3 and /subsequent/ arguments among the
213Allies regarding the second front and post war boundaries."
The point that has been made in this summary of Soviet
foreign policy in the period from 1917 to 194 3 is that,
though the Soviet Union was strategically weaker than the cap-
italist states, there is ample evidence in their rhetoric of
a continuing hostility to the capitalist system and that
periods of cooperation with capitalist states were viewed by
them as matters of expediency and not as affecting their long
term ideological goals. To the extent that it was possible,
they continued to place stress on the capitalist system in
the form of support for revolution in Europe and early appeals
to the stirrings of national liberation movements in the im-
perial colonies. Finally, as the capitalist states appeared
divided and unwilling to take action to halt aggresssion in
the pursuit of foreign policy objectives, the Soviets attempted
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in three instances to achieve foreign policy objectives through
military action — one of those instances (Poland, 1920) being
directly linked to the pursuit of ideological goals, the other
two indirectly linked to ideological goals but being justified
in ideological terms.
B. PHASE TWO: 1943 TO THE PRESENT
As has been previously mentioned, the distinciton between
the pre- and post-1943 eras of Soviet foreign policy conduct
being drawn in this chapter is based on the relative strategic
strength of the Soviet Union vis a vis the capitalist states.
Prior to 194 3 both the capitalist states and the Soviets them-
selves saw the USSR as, at best, one of several world powers
among which the Soviet Union was not sufficiently powerful to
actively pursue an independent and aggressively antagonistic
foreign policy. It was a multipolar world with no single
state being perceived as significantly more powerful than any
of several other states. However beginning with the turning
of the tides of war against Germany on the eastern front in
19 43, this situation began to change. For a number of reasons,
the Soviets emerged from the war as a state perceived by both
the western and Soviet leadership as one of the two most power-
ful states in the world. First, they and they alone had been
in constant combat with the German army since 1941 on their
own territory and had succeeded in defeating that army cul-
minating their efforts with the seizure of Berlin in 19 44.
1-3 6

At the end of the war with Germany, the Soviets controlled
all of Eastern Europe and had the largest standing army in
215the world. United States military forces were rapidly
demobilized under domestic pressure. As Walter LaFeber puts
it:
Pressured by the public demand to "bring the boys back
home," determined to use peaceful economic pressures
instead of military force to reorder the world, and
disturbed by the long string of wartime unbalanced
budgets, the President Truman reduced a 3.5 million-
man army in Europe to 5000,000 men in less than ten
months. ^^
Neither France nor Britain was in any condition to place
pressure on the Soviets and the Germans were still the re-
cently defeated enemy. The United States had exploded nuclear
weapons in Japan but their value in threatening the Soviet Union
was limited for several reasons. For one thing, Stalin refused
to recognize the atom bomb as a weapon which significantly
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altered the nature of warfare. For another, the only exist-
ing bombs at the end of the war had been used on Japan —
though this was known only to the US — production was limited
pip
,
and took considerable time for each device. Sophisticated
delivery systems did not exist -- targets in Russia, unlike
Japan, would have to be attacked after crossing large areas
of Russian territory in B-29 bombers. By 19 49, the Soviets
themselves had the bomb and, although US delivery systems had
been modernized to jet engined aircraft, the Soviets soon
generated the 'missile gap 1 crisis by launching the first
intercontinental ballistic missile in 1957. Another factor
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which discredited the usefulness of nuclear weapons as a
decisive element giving the capitalist states advantages in
dealing with the Soviet Union was the hesitancy of the
United States to use those weapons in the Korean War even in
those stages of that conflict in which United Nations forces
suffered serious setbacks. Further enhancing perceptions of
Soviet power were successful revolutions in China and Cuba
which identified themselves with communism and developed close
ties with the Soviet Union. Soviet perception of their own
power relative to the west was encouraged by the failure of the
capitalist states to support anti-communist uprisings in
Eastern Europe. Finally, the attainment of independence by a
majority of the colonies in the 1950' s and 60* s was perceived
by the Soviets as initiating the final stage in the collapse
219
of capitalist system.
These developments clearly depicted the Soviets as one of
the two major powers in the world following World War II but
within this same period several events occurred which made it
apparent that, prior to 19 73, they were second in relation to
the United States. The most obvious event was the Cuban
Missile crisis which represented a head on clash between the
Soviet Union and the United States. Whatever the motivations
of each side, the outcome was clear — the Soviet Union had
backed down. The resolve with which the west initially re-
sponded to Soviet strategic development and aggressive pursuit
of their foreign policy goals during the 'Cold War' era also
1.38

reflected the intention of the capitalist to limit Soviet ef-
forts. The formation of such alliances as NATO, SEATO, CENTO,
and ANZUS, and bilateral agreements between the United States
and Japan, the Phillipines, South Korea, and South Vietnam rep-
resented a unity and resolve in opposition to the Soviet Union
and served notice that the west would not stand idly by while
the Soviets attempted to alter the world. Less obvious but just
as important in the demonstration of the relative inferiority of
the Soviets to the United States was their inability to prevent
the US from bombing a fraternal socialist state—North Vietnam
—
thus dispelling the myth of the protectiveness of the Soviet
strategic umbrella over the socialist world. This was also the
period in which the animosity between the People's Republic of
China and the Soviet Union broke into the open particularly
following the invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 thus demolish-
ing the western fears of a monolithic communist bloc.
However, this was not a period of idleness for the Soviets
as will be demonstrated later. It should be also noted that
the world situation has again changed since the Cuban missile
crisis. Prior to that event, it was apparent that the Soviet
Union was a significant power to be reckoned with. The Cuban
missile crisis and other subsequent events did not denigrate
the power of the USSR but placed it into perspective in com-
parison to the strategic power of the United States. Develop-
ments which have occurred since 19 62 (specifically the continuing
development of the Soviet economy and Soviet military forces)
and particularly since 19 73 have again demanded a reevaluation
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of the strategic relationship of the Soviet Union to the capi-
talist world and specifically to the United States. The Soviet
economy, though currently exhibiting growth difficulties, has
become the number one producer of iron ore, chromium, manganese,
uranium and potash in the world. It is second only to the
United States in the production of coal, petroleum, natural
220gas and steel. Its technology is sufficient to support an
ongoing space program and to support the development of in-
creasingly sophisticated military hardware. Militarily the
Soviets have created and maintained the largest conventional
army, navy and airforce in the world and (by some calculations)
221
the largest nuclear force in the world. In the mean time,
the ring of alliances which once surrounded the Soviet Union
has weakened considerably with only NATO retaining serious
credibility. France has all but withdrawn from NATO and the
remaining nations are enmeshed in economic difficulties. The
United States has undergone the trauma of a serious failure
in a major test of its foreign policy in the loss of the
Vietnam War resulting in an ongoing reevaluation of the purpose
and goals of US policy. The domestic struggle introduced into
the US by the Vietnam War, racial conflict, and the Watergate
episode have cast doubt on the resolve and unity of the
American government in its ability to pursue or even identify
its own foreign policy interests. The formation of the OPEC
cartel and the subsequent introduction of a degree of insta-
bility into the capitalist economic system has also served
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to weaken the Western alliance. Events since 19 73 (as will be
discussed shortly) indicate an awareness on the part of the
Soviets that the strategic relationship has again shifted. As
the argument being presented in this chapter is that the
active pursuit of Soviet ideological goals has been limited by
the strategic inferiority of the USSR this section will review
that period of the history of the conduct of Soviet foreign
policy in which Soviet strategic capabilities vis a vis the
west have increased. It should be expected that under cir-
cumstances of increasing Soviet strategic strength and capa-
bility that the historical evidence of continuing Soviet foreign
policy antagonism toward the west should take on increasingly
aggressive characteristics.
During the war, the propaganda attacks against the allies
of the USSR were muted. The target of their propaganda was
the Axis alliance. However, in April of 19 45, Stalin reaffirmed
his pre-war analysis of the post-war international situation
when he observed: "This war is not as in the past; whoever
occupies a territory imposes on it his own social system.
Everyone imposes his own system as far as his army can reach.
222
It cannot be otherwise." This is also evidenced by:
Stalin's quiet advise to Communist leaders in France and
Italy to refrain from trying to seize power immediately
after the war, though his caution in this regard may
have stemmed no less from wanting to lull US apprehensions
than from his appreciation, as expressed later to the
Belgrade Politburo, that the way the war ended — i.e.
,
without Soviet forces reaching France and Italy — had
"unfortunately made it impossible for the Soviet Union to
establish 'people's democracies' in those countries." 223
\A1

The Moscow Higher Party School textbook notes that the only
factor which has prevented the establishment of Soviet Social-
ist regimes in the rest of Europe was the intervention of the
"Anglo-American armed forces, who... helped to install into
224
power a bourgeoisie government. . . " It is significant that
a month prior to Churchill's 'Iron Curtain' speech in Fulton,
Missouri, "Stalin had delivered his celebrated February 9 /19 467
election speech in Moscow, which. . .publicly reintroduced the
assumption of deep-rooted conflict with the West and fore-
shadowed a return to the doctrine of a world divided into two
225hostile camps." The success of the expansion of Soviet
control into Eastern Europe was facilitated by the exhaustion
of the European nations in 19 45 and the recognition that to dis-
lodge the Soviets would require a continuation of the war
not only against the previous enemy but against a former ally.
In addition there was a tremendous amount of public pressure
22 6
to demobilize the military forces (in the democracies)
.
In response to such pressures, the western states had
"largely demobilized their own wartime forces within a year
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or so after the end of the war." As a result, within the
three years immediately following the end of the war, the
Soviets had, in effect without opposition and through the overt
use of their military forces, consolidated their control over
Eastern Europe and established socialist regimes in power. By
Soviet estimates, the 'overthrow of capitalism in Eastern
Europe with the formation of the first World Socialist System'
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The western response to the economic chaos in Europe
following the war and the apparent aggressiveness of Soviet
foreign policy (coupled with the acquisition of the Atom bomb
by the Soviets in 19 49) was the initiation of the Marshall
plan to economically rebuild Europe and the formation of a
series of treaties (NATO, SEATO, CENTO, ANZUS, etc.) in an
attempt to 'contain' Soviet aggression. But this did not
overtly demonstrate the willingness of the west to oppose the
use of military force in the conduct of foreign policy. This
became a particularly important question as the preparations
for the North Korean invasion of South Korea, sponsored and
directed by the Soviet Union, were prepared. Key considerations
by the Soviets were the withdrawal of U.S. forces from Korea
in 1949, the significant degree of congressional opposition to
the commitment of economic or military assistance to Korea (due
to increasingly costly commitments to Western Europe) , and
statements by key American officials such as General Douglas
MacArthur and Secretary of State Dean Acheson specifically
229
excluding South Korea from the American defense perimeter.
These factors, coupled with a low opinion of the readiness and
quality of the South Korean defense forces (and an underesti-
mation of the usefulness of the U.N. in the absence of the
Soviet veto due to the Soviet boycott of the Security Council
in protest against the seating of the Nationalist Chinese
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delegate) led to a Soviet calculation of a "relatively quick
230
and easy North Korean victory."
The Korean conflict failed to accomplish significant
gains for the Soviets but served to strengthen the resolve
of the West resulting in the activiation of SHAPE under
General Eisenhower, the admission of Greece and Turkey to
NATO, the strengthening of the U.S. Strategic Air Command,
and the formation of the European Defense Community which
. .
231included a provision for the ultimate rearmament of Germany.
These events, compounded by the death of Stalin and the ensuing
succession struggle in the Soviet Union and associated dis-
turbances in East Germany served to momentarily temper Soviet
willingness to utilize military power to expand the power of
the Socialist system.
Following the death of Stalin and the relaxation of in-
ternal controls in the Soviet Union, there was hope in the
west that this also signalled the introduction of moderation
in the conduct of Soviet foreign policy. During the period
of • the succession struggle, although the Soviet leadership
did not abandon its rhetorical support for third world
liberation movements, they did moderate their open hostility
232toward the capitalist states. Even with the rise of
Khrushchev, the leadership continued to exhibit a specific
concern for the avoidance of direct confrontation with the
west. However, this did not signal a departure from the
struggle against capitalism. With the succession crisis
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settled it was made clear by Khrushchev that two factors
had made open war between the capitalist and socialist systems
less likely: first, the strength of the socialist system
which insured that an attack, by the capitalist on the social-
233ists would be extremely costly and ultimately unsuccessful;
and second, with the advent of nuclear weapons, war had be-
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come too destructive to be a practical alternative. How-
ever, this avoidance of war only caused the struggle against
the capitalists to shift to other arenas. As stated by Dimitri
Shepilov (Minister of Foreign Affairs, 1957):
Peaceful coexistence is not a conflictless life. As
long as different social-political systems continue to
exist, the antagonisms between them are unavoidable.
Peaceful coexistence is a struggle, political, economic
and ideological. .. coexistence means that one does not
fight the other, does not attempt to solve international
disputes by arms... ^ 35
Khrushchev made similar observations in an article published
in Foreign Affairs (October, 1959)
:
The principle of peaceful competition does not at
all demand that one or another state abandon the
system and ideology adopted by it. .
.
...The main thing is to keep to the positions of
ideological struggle, without resorting to arms in
order to prove that one is right.
At the 81st Communist and Workers Parties Meeting in Moscow
(1960) the nature of the struggle against capitalism was
described in this manner:
The policy of peaceful coexistence is a policy of
mobilizing the masses and launching vigorous action
against the enemies of peace. Peaceful coexistence
of states does not imply renunciation of the class
struggle. . .The coexistence of states with different
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social systems is a form of class struggle between
socialism and capitalism. .. The communists .. .will
do their utmost for the people to weaken imperialism
and limit its sphere of action by the active struggle
for peace, democracy, and national liberation.
In clarifying to party members what 'peaceful coexistence'
with the capitalists was not , the theoretical journal
Kommunist stated in 1962:
First, peaceful coexistence does not weaken, but
contributes to an intensification of the class
struggle of the proletariat,; second, peaceful co-
existence does not weaken' but strengthens the po-
sition of fighters for national independence; third,
peaceful coexistence does not mean refusal to fight
imperialism — on the contrary, it champions and
permits an intensification of the ideological,
political and economic struggle against imperialism;
fourth, under conditions of peaceful coexistence,
there are real possibilities for the development of
socialist revolution and all forms of revolutionary
movement. ^38
It is interesting to note that Mikhail Suslov noted that
whether or not the policy of peaceful coexistence was
successful in avoiding war was dependent upon the capital-
ists and how violently they resist being deposed by alter-
native methods
:
Communists and the working class, of course, prefer
the most painless forms of transition from the one
social system to the other. . .Whether the means used
are more peaceful or more violent depends not so
much on the working class as on the extent and the
forms of resistance used by the exploiting classes
which are being overthrown and which do not wish to
part voluntarily with the vast property, political
power, and privileges which they possess. 2 39
Regardless of the form which the struggle against capitalism
takes, under Khrushchev the goal remained an antagonistic one
— the demise of the capitalist system and its replacement
with socialism. 146

The vigorousness with which the goal has been sought by
the Soviets has increased as they have become stronger. As
A. Sovetov commented in an article published in the Soviet
journal International Affairs (1960) the pressure against
the capitalists is no longer limited to verbal criticism:
"This moral condemnation is now supplemented by material and
241technical resources of the world Socialist system..."
The most obvious evidence of this effort is found at that
point which the Soviets believe the capitalist system to be the
weakest -- the dependence on the imperialist states on the
colonies. As has been mentioned, this dependency was clearly
identified by Lenin in his theory of imperialism and had
been stressed by Stalin as an arena likely to prove decisive
243following World War II. The significance of Soviet efforts
to exacerbate the conflict between the imperialist states and
their colonies and ex-colonies is two-fold, first in the effort
expanded by the Soviets in support of the struggle of the
colonies against the imperial powers and, secondly, in the
motivations to which the Soviets attribute their efforts.
Prior to World War II and in the immediate post-war period
(particularly prior to the death of Stalin) the strength
with which the colonies were held by the imperial states was
essentially acquiesced to by the Soviets. Though consider-
able lip service was paid to support of the exploited colonial
peoples, support in real terms was limited to those states
244 245in close proximity to the USSR (Turkey, Central Asia,
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246China ) . Even the organization of the effort directed
toward these areas reflected this recognition, with the
Comintern oriented primarily on Europe and with the dele-
gation of responsibility for efforts directed at the colonies
to the Communist parties of the various imperial states.
However, the weakened condition of these states following the
war, coupled with a growing movement for independence through-
out the colonies and the resultant higher costs of administer-
ing and controlling colonies led to the breaking up of the
colonial empires was expected by the Soviets to initiate the
final stage of capitalism. As has been mentioned earlier,
Stalin had predicted that the pressures of another world war
would result in a radical reordering of the world system and
248particularly the collapse of the colonial system. It is
important to reiterate that, from the theoretical point of
view, the significance of the collapse of the colonial system
was not particularly important for the development of social-
ism in the colonial areas but because it denied to the cap-
italists cheap labor and resources and free access to foreign
markets, and thus signalled the initiation of the final stage
249
of the collapse of the capitalist system. The value of
the colonial independence movement was not as an enhancement
of socialism but as a major tool in the attack on the
250
capitalist system. The support for 'wars of national
liberation 1 and other third world movements is an inherently
antagonistic policy from the Soviets' point of view. Though
14 8

they offer to the third world an alternative method of
modernization, social development, and political organi-
zation, the Soviets openly stress that this effort is a
tactic designed to damage the capitalist system by denying
251to it access to cheap resources and labor. The Soviets
expect that the result of this loss of resources and cheap
labor will result in friction between the capitalist states, ^
economic destabilization due to inflation and uncertainty in
253
access to raw materials, and ultimately, to final contradic-
tion between the capitalists and the proletariat in the in-
dustrialized states in fulfillment of the predictions of Lenin's
theory of imperialism.
The Soviets have gone to great lengths to establish rapport
with the emerging third world since the mid 1950' s. The effort
in the Middle East was established in a grand manner with the
conclusion in 1956 of an agreement between Egypt and the Soviet
Union for the construction of the Aswan Dam — which the United
States had refused to provide assistance for. In the following
year, I.M. Maisky, head of a commission which supervised the
Academy of Sciences of the USSR observed that "in the countries
of Asia and Africa truly grandiose events are now taking place.
The collapse of the colonial system is going on at such a speed
that the greatest possible effort must be made not to lag be-
254hind life." On February 26, the same year, the Soviet
Africanist Co-ordinating Conference was held at the Ethno-
graphical Institute of the Soviet Academy of Sciences and
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coordinated research and language training programs were
255developed. In 195 8 a special African department was
created in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and later an
African Commission formed to deal specifically with sub-
Saharan Africa head by Ivan Potekhin (who later came to
head the African Studies Department of the Soviet Academy
of Sciences). ~ The recognition of the growing possibility
of influence in the third world particularly in Africa, and
the reorganization to take advantage of this opportunity,
was accompanied by a growing commitment by the Soviet leader-
ship toward active involvement in the efforts of the third
world to free themselves from dependence on their previous
colonial masters (and thus, from the Soviet point of view,
exacerbate the internal contradictions of the industrialized
capitalist nations) . Initial Soviet expectations were high.
The decolonization process was yielding governments which
were hostile to the west (Nasser, Sekou Toure, Patrice
Lumumba, etc.) supporting Soviet initiatives in the United
Nations and actively seeking alternatives to the west. As
Robert Legvold observes, the Soviet leadership believed that
the decolonization process heralded the "early arrival of
the Socialist revolution. .. and interpreted the anti-Western
fulminations of Africa's angry young leaders... as reliable
257
evidence that those leaders had fully rejected capitalism."
The Soviets presented themselves as an alternative to the
Western mode of modernization. They had attained modernization
15

largely without the assistance of the West (to include
recovery following World War II) and had rejected the social
25 8
and economic structure of the west. In addition to pre-
senting themselves as an alternative to the West, the Soviets
were committed to active pursuit of relations which would
lessen the dependence of the third world on the west. For
example, in 1955, Soviet imports from Africa totalled $31
million and exports to Africa totalled $13 million. But by
19 71, Soviet imports totalled $5 84 million and exports to
259Africa totalled $601 million. Soviet aid to African states
prior to 195 8 was non-existent but by 19 72 the Soviets had pro-
vided economic assistance to over 19 African states totalling
over $837 million (not counting the Aswan Dam project in Egypt.)
Egypt). 260
Several events occurred in the late 1950 's and early
1960's which encouraged the Soviet leadership to develop an
enhanced opinion of their own strength and to underestimate
the resolve and determination of the west to oppose antagonis-
tic Soviet foreign policy moves. The inaction of the West in
response to the Hungarian revolution (especially in light of
previous statements by the Eisenhower administration suggest-
ing an intent to 'rollback' communism in Eastern Europe)
joined with several other factors to enhance Soviet perceptions
of their own strength and led them to question the resolve of
the West to oppose their initiatives. First was the uni-
lateral decision of the United States government not to use
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nuclear weapons in military conflicts subsequent to World
War II (the Korean War) establishing a precendent by which
the Soviets could determine, to some degree, that the U.S.
would not use nuclear weapons in a conflict which did not
261directly impact on U.S. interests. Another factor which
enhanced Soviet power was the launching of Sputnik I and II
in 1957 — missile systems clearly capable of delivering
nuclear weapons of considerable size to the continental
United States in a very short period of time — and generating
the 'missile gap' crisis of the late fifties. In early 1961,
another event which possibly generated a misreading of the
credibility of United States foreign policy was the bungled
Bay of Pigs invasion which cast doubt and criticism on the
26 2
newly elected Kennedy administration. In addition, in
June of 1961 President Kennedy met with Khrushchev at Vienna,
a meeting at which the two leaders disagreed sharply and from
which "Kennedy returned visibly shaken by the belligerent
7 6 3
steeliness of his opponent." Though Kennedy's response to
this confrontation and subsequent Khrushchev demands concern-
ing Berlin and East Germany was to call up 250,000 reservists,
the response proved to be ineffective in detering the Soviets
from constructing the Berlin wall in August. Even American
critics "demanded to know why American tanks had not pushed
264
over the wall before it could be so solidly build. " How-
ever, the only western response was the reinforcement of the
small U.S. garrison in Berlin by 1500 men.
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Such actions probably led to a misperception of the will-
ingness of the western nations, and the United States in
particular, to take concerted, forceful action in response
to Soviet actions which did not directly threaten their
security. These factors, coupled with other considerations
(as discussed in Graham Allison's Essence of Decision:
265Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis ) , contributed to the
Soviet willingness to introduce nuclear weapons into Cuba
while assuring President Kennedy that no such action would
take place. The Cuban missile crisis itself probably has very
little relationship to ideological considerations with two
exceptions. First it was an action which was clearly antagon-
istic to the West and sure to be perceived as such in the West,
Those arguments which suggest that the action was taken due
to Soviet fears of the growing strategic military strength
of the United States are difficult to substantiate due to
the demonstrated unwillingness of the U.S. to use such power
following the World War II in any manner which directly con-
fronted the Soviet Union. In addition, the Soviets were
under considerable pressure from the Chinese to take advantage
of the Soviet possession of ICBMs to actively pursue the
socialist revolution under the protective deterrent umbrella
of Soviet nuclear weapons. As Donald Zagoria prophetically
observed in a Rand Corporation report published in July 1962
(two months prior to the October missile crisis) : "Our /the
United State's/ dangers may increase if Peking's charges that
15 3

Moscow is soft towards the West goad the Russians to pursue
266the offensive more vigorously." A second effect of the
Cuban missile crisis for the purpose of this research is that
it generated a major reassessment of the strategic strength
of the USSR vis a vis, in particular, the growing nuclear
might of the United States and the willingness of the United
States to use that might if necessary.
In terms of the willingness of the Soviets to aggressively
pursue a foreign policy openly antagonistic to the west, the
Cuban missile crisis and resulting reevaluation served as a
major inhibitor to Soviet military action. As Thomas W. Wolfe
notes, aside from the essentially deterrent functions of Soviet
military power, the usefulness of "military power as a politi-
cal instrument was less than clear under the constraints of the
2 6 7
nuclear age." The net result was a period of intensive
building of Soviet armaments across the board including con-
ventional ground, air and naval forces and stragetic nuclear
forces. It is interesting to note that in the period between
1962 and 19 74 Soviet annual production of major conventional
weapons systems has been greater than that of the United
States with the exception of tactical aircraft (which, during
the peak years of the Vietnam war, the United States slightly
outproduced the Soviets) and helicopters (which, during the
2 6 8
war the U.S. significantly outproduced the Soviets) in
all years. In addition, Soviet strategic nuclear forces have
expanded from their clearly inferior position at the time of
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confrontation in October, 1962, to a position of superiority
269(at least in delivery systems) by 19 76. This trend is
also evident in the development of strictly defensive weapons
systems as well.
Overt Soviet actions were characterized by considerable
caution and coupled with efforts to support diplomatic
policies which lessened tensions in the world which were dan-
gerous to the Soviet Union as well. This was particularly
important as the Soviet leadership maneuvered for position
during the period of uncertainty immediately following the re-
moval of Khrushchev in 19 64.
However during this period of building and reconsolidation
within the USSR a number of events occurred on the international
scene which suggested to the Soviets that the unity and resolve
of the west was again weakening. As previously discussed, the
Soviets viewed the collapse of the colonial system as having a
major destabilizing effect on the capitalist states and began
emphasizing their effort at separating these sources of raw
material, cheap labor and ready markets from the capitalists.
This was a low risk and potentially a high return operation at
a time in which high risk options had been reevaluated. Other
events occurred in this era which exacerbated divisions be-
tween the capitalist states and dampened their ability to con-
cert efforts to oppose Soviet foreign policy actions. Between
1963 and 1967 France separated itself from the rest of the
western alliance by withdrawing from active participation in
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NATO and by expelling non-French forces from France. In
addition, twice during this period France vetoed the entrance
of Great Britain into the European Common Market. In 196 6
President DeGaulle conducted an extended visit to the Soviet
Union demonstrating his willingness to follow a policy in-
dependent of the remainder of the Western alliance. ™ In
1964 and again in 196 7 two NATO allies, Greece and Turkey,
came to blows over Cyprus, generating tension throughout the
alliance. The United States was confronted by internal strife
due to racial tensions (riots in Harlem and Jersey City in
1964; Selma in 1965; Chicago, Brooklyn, Cleveland and Watts
in 1966; Newark and Detroit in 1967; Cleveland in 1968;
271Augusta and Jackson State College in 19 70) and opposition
to the Vietnam war (demonstrations involving literally hun-
dreds of thousands of participants in New York City and San
Francisco in 1967; in Chicago at the Democratic National Con-
vention in 1968; nationwide moratoriums in October and
November of 1969; again nationwide demonstrations following
the invasion of Cambodia and the subsequent deaths of several
students at Kent State University at the hands of National
272
Guardsmen in 1970; etc.) These problems were conpounded
by double digit inflation beginning in the" late 1960s in much
of Europe and particularly in Great Britain. Other evidences
of confusion and wavering resolve on the part of the west were
the lack of response by the western states to the invasion of
Czechoslovakia in 1968273 and the admission of the People's
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Republic of China to the United Nations in 19 73. Pos-
sibly more important than any other single factor was the
destabilizing impact of the Watergate investigation on the
effectiveness of the Nixon administration between 19 72 and
August of 19 74. Finally the effectiveness of the 19 73 oil
embargo particularly as it impacted on Europe was fully in
accord with Soviet expectations.
Each of these events was readily observable by the
Soviets as evidence of the deterioration of the post World
War II unity of the western alliance which had developed in
response to Soviet over-aggressiveness which had occurred
between 1944 and 1951. Initial Soviet success in the expansion
of the socialist system through the use of military forces re-
sulted from their relative strength at the end of the war and
considerable weakness and disunity among the European nations
and the United States. As recovery proceeded in Europe and
as tensions grew between the Soviets and the West, the for-
mation of NATO (and other alliances) and strategic rearmament
of the United States the West again attained superiority over
the Soviets as was demonstrated rather conclusively during
the Cuban Missile Crisis. The following era, from 1962 to
19 73, was a period in which the USSR devoted considerable
effort toward attaining strategic parity (or superiority?)
with the west. During the same period the west suffered a
number of reverses which noticably weakened and divided the
post war alliance system. Thus in the period following 19 73
X57

the Soviets were confronted with an opportunity to again
utilize their military forces to achieve foreign policy
objectives which they consider to hasten the collapse of
capitalism.
Whether or not the Soviets encouraged or even favored
the Arab attack on Israel in October, 1973, is a question
the answer to which is unclear. For the purpose of this
study, however, the implications are clear. The Soviets
were aware that the action was going to take place some days
in advance, and support for such an action was in contra-
diction to the declaration of "Basic Principles" of detente
signed in May of 19 72 between the United States and the
Soviet Union which stated that:
the two countries "attach major importance to preventing
the developments of situations capable of causing a
dangerous exacerbation of their relations." The Basic
Principles also said the two superpowers would "do their
utmost to avoid military confrontations..." and that
they had a special responsibility to prevent from
arising situations which would increase international
tensions. 275
The failure to coordinate with the United States over such
an impending development which was bound to stir international
tensions was also in violation of the formal obligation under-
taken by both U.S. and the Soviets in the agreement of 2 4 June
7fi
19 73 (only four months prior to the outbreak of the war)
.
The second importance of the Soviet involvement in the October
War is that not only were they aware of the imminence of war
but that the Soviet military actively supported the Arab
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armies. A week prior to the outbreak of hostilities the
Soviets launched Cosmos satellites to observe the Israeli
forces on both fronts. Soviet ships departed from Egyptian
ports, and the families of Soviet advisors in both Egypt and
Syria were evacuated. In Chaim Herzog's angry account of
the Soviet involvement, he notes that only:
A few days after the outbreak of war a major Soviet air-
lift was under way as giant Antonov 22 cargo carriers
landed at short intervals in Damascus and Cairo. They
flew from the Soviet Union, staged in Budapest and thence
across Yugoslavia to Cairo and Damascus. Soviet ships
loaded with thousands of tons of equipment passed through
the Bosphorus Straits on their way to Latakia and
Alexandria. 2 '
'
By the 5th of November the Soviets had fully reequiped Egypt
2 78
and Syria with Sagger, RPG and SAM-6 missiles and within
months the destroyed armored vehicles of the Arab armies had
279been replaced and supplemented with additional equipment.
This is in marked contrast to the ability of the Soviet Union
to respond to the Arab losses in 1967. Following that war it
took the Soviets nearly two years to refit the Arab armies.
Thus the Soviets demonstrated two characteristics which had
not been readily apparent prior to 1973. First, 'detente' as
a concept was not clearly linked to Soviet support for actions
not related to direct east-west confrontations. Second, the
Soviet economy and military were clearly capable of rapid
and efficient logistical support for military operations not
contiguous to Soviet borders.
At this same time, the Soviets stepped up their efforts
to exploit western dependence on the third world for resources
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by actively encouraging the formation of raw material cartels
such as the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries
(OPEC). 280
As a Soviet expert on developing nations argued: "The
success of the oil producing countries serves as a
good example for other developing countries producing
mineral raw materials and agricultural export crops."
Soviet spokesmen have called, in particular, for devel-
oping countries generally to resort to nationalization
of their resources and creation of cartels to control
prices. The Soviets have noted with approval that
"nations are following OPEC's example, raising the
prices on their exports of minerals and agricultural
raw materials and food items." 8 -*-
Not only have the Soviets encouraged the formation of such
cartels but they have also encouraged the specific application
of this tool against the West. Robert Conquest states that
the Soviets, at the time of the 19 73 oil embargo against the
Western nations, "had been encouraging them /0PEC7 to apply
the 'oil weapon' against the West (later it urged them to
continue the oil embargo against the United States until the
2 82
moment it had been lifted.
This focus on the dependence of the capitalist states on
former colonies for resources is not limited to a wishful
desire based on a theoretical concept developed by Lenin
before the revolution. It is also based on current Soviet
assessments of western dependency on the third world. An
article in Pravda in 1974 observed:
In U.S. imports, the share of strategic raw materials
imported from Africa amounts to 100 percent of the in-
dustrial diamonds, 5 8 percent of the uranium, 44 per-
cent of the manganese, which is used in the steel
smelting industry, 36 percent of the cobalt, essential
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for aircraft engines and high-strength alloys, 33 per-
cent of its oil and 2 3 percent of its chromium, used
in the manufacture of armor, aircraft engines and gun
barrels. 274
Soviet African specialist E.A. Tarabrin notes that:
The USA imports from Africa nearly 100 percent of her
imported diamonds, lithium derivative, beryllium,
columbite, cobalt and palm oil; over 50 percent of her
cocoa, vanilla, long-staple cotton and mahogany, 25 per-
cent of her antimony, chrome, graphite, manganese and
tantalum; and significant quantities of rubber, gold,
uranium, and oil. 2 ** 4
Tarabrin also notes that in the 19 80 *s the West's dependence,
particularly on Africa, will increase. 285 G. Skorov, a member
of the Institute of World Economy and International Relations
(IMEMO) of the Soviet Academy of Sciences further stressed
this point:
Having strengthened their political independence in the
protracted struggle against imperialism, the developing
countries launched a powerful offensive against the
entire system of their exploitation in the world capital-
ist economy under conditions of growing raw materials and
fuel shortage at the beginning of the seventies. They
are making use of the enormous dependence of the indus-
trial centers of capitalism on reserves and supplies
from the developing countries of such important types
of mineral raw materials as oil, tin, manganese, bauxite,
cobalt, diamonds, and rare elements. Many developing
countries are taking energetic steps to liquidate the
domination of foreign capital in their economy...
Supplies of mineral raw materials on the world market
are now shifting into the hands of the countries of
Asia, Africa, and Latin America. 28 ^
Recent party congresses (since the demise of Khrushchev)
have continued to stress adherence to ideological hostility
toward the capitalist system and have placed the concept of
"peaceful coexistence" into the proper persepective. At the




. . .Brezhnev made no mention of the principle of
peaceful coexistence. He said only that the re-
lations between capitalist nations, not to mention
those between Russia and the West, were being in-
creasingly governed by "contradictions" which were
deepening. 2S '
At the 2 4th Party Congress (19 71) three topics of priority
were listed by Brezhnev in the opening remarks of his report
on international affairs:
1. For the Further Development of Friendship and
Cooperation by the Socialist Countries.
2. Imperialism — Enemy of the Peoples and Social
Progress. The Peoples Against Imperialism.
3. The Struggle by the Soviet Union for Peace and
the Peoples Security. Opposition to the
Imperialist Policy of Aggression. 2 ^8
The 25th Party Congress followed this vein specifically
stating its continuing support "for anti-Western forces in
the emerging nations of the Third World..." 289 In other
addresses Brezhnev has stated that:
Naturally there can be no peaceful coexistence when it
comes to internal processes of the class and national
liberation struggle in the capitalist countries between
oppressors and the oppressed, between colonialists and
the victims of colonial oppression? 9 ^
More recently (1975) Pravda quoted Brezhnev as stating that
the current period of 'detente' renounces:
...the form and the methods of the Cold War era and
not the ideological struggle ... During the transition
from cold war toward detente and the development of
cooperation between East and West, the ideological
struggle, far from subsiding, has gained in scope...
Detente in no way annuls the battle of ideas. ^ 1
As Gerhard Niemeyer observes
:
Brezhnev said recently: "Detente does not in the
slightest way abolish, and cannot abolish or change,
162

the laws of class struggle." Other Soviet leaders
have emphasized that the "Spirit of Helsinki" does
not apply to ideological struggle. For twenty years
the Soviets have insisted that "peaceful co-existence"
is a form of class struggle, and that the ideological
struggle must be intensified in the presence of peace-
ful external co-existence [emphasis added) .292
Further indications of the growing Soviet capability to
support a foreign policy antagonistic to the west distant
from Soviet borders and reflecting an increasing willingness
to use that capability to achieve their foreign policy goals
occurred in 19 75. The operation conducted by the Soviet
military in Angola is similar to that in the Middle East with
the addition of one new factor — the introduction of well
trained military forces from a Socialist state, Cuba. Whether
or not the Cubans became involved in Angola of their own accord
and for what reason is not at issue here. The important factor
is that Cuban forces could not have been introduced into
Angola in the numbers involved without active Soviet support.
As Jiri Valenta observes about the relationship between Cuba
and the Soviet Union in Angola:
To the extent that the Cuban intervention depended upon
logistic support by the Soviet Navy and Air Force and
upon Soviet military aid, the intervention can be seen
as a result of the Soviet rather than the Cuban de-
cision-making process. 9 ^
The increase in the Soviets ability to logistically support
a military operation distant from Soviet borders was made
readily apparent by contrasting the Soviet effort at support
for Patrice Lumumba in the Belgian Congo in 1960 which was
largely ineffective due to "poor coordination and shortages
16,3

of air lift capabilities and experienced personnel which
had led to serious difficulties and the ultimate failure of
29 4Soviet operations..." when compared with the efficiency
and effectiveness of the Soviet logistical support of the
MPLA in 19 75:
This time the operation was executed perfectly with
substantial airlift and naval covering operations in
adjacent waters. The Soviet Air Force and the Soviet
Navy carried military equipment from the USSR through
Algeria and the Congo-Brazzaville to Angola, while
Soviet and Cuban airlift operations brought Cuban
combat troops and Soviet and East German advisors to
assist the MPLA. Soviet arms included surface-to-
surface missiles, the hand-held SAM-7 anti-aircraft
missile, Datyushka rockets, T-34 and T-5 4 tanks, new
PT-76 amphibious tanks, armored reconnaissance
vehicles (BRDM-2) , helicopters, gunships , heavy
artillery, and light aircraft, and in January, 19 76
even MIG-21 aircraft. The operations were protected
by a Soviet naval squadron, based in Conarky in Guinea,
which had operated in West African waters for several
weeks. . .Overall, in 1975 the USSR supplied $300
million worth of arms to the MPLA. .. "
Thus the operation in Angola reflected the increased Soviet
ability and willingness to logistically support a military
operation distant from the USSR and additionally introduced
the new factor of the use of military units provided by a
Soviet ally and Soviet assistance in the transportation and
support of that ally during the operation in a third world
state.
Another instance of Soviet willingness to use its
growing military capability to support actions viewed in
Marxist-Leninist terms as damaging to the West took place
in Ethiopia following the pattern established in the Middle
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East and Angola with the massive infusion of military supplies
for the Ethiopian army (then in combat with Somalia and
Eritrean rebels) , the transportation and support of Cuban
2 9 6
military units and advisors to participate in combat, but
adding a new factor — the active participation of Soviet
commanders in the direction of the operations of the Ethiopean
army. At least one of these leaders appears to have been
General Vasily Ivanovich Petrov, a member of the Party Central
Committee and the first deputy commander of all Soviet ground
297forces.
A recent effort which apparently combined increasing
Soviet willingness to use military support to achieve foreign
policy goals and to exploit western economic vulnerability to
disruption of western access to third world raw materials was
the disruption of the production of cobalt as a result of the
invasion of Shaba province in Zaire by guerilla forces "trained
in neighboring Angola by Cuban military advisors with Soviet
support.
"
29 ° The Soviets, in apparent anticipation of global
shortage, bought up a major share of the available world supply
of cobalt in the months immediately preceding the Shaba prov-
ince invasion. The invasion shut off 65 percent of the world's
cobalt production for roughly nine months and drove the price
of cobalt from the pre-invasion price of seven to eight dollars
299per pound to thirty dollars afterwards. This event takes
on more significance when considering Colin Legum's accusation




In 19 76, at the 25th Party Congress, Brezhnev pledged
that the Soviet Union was in full support of the efforts
of the third world nations "to shake off all imperialist
exploitation, and to take full charge of their own national
wealth. " In the same speech he noted the impact of the
struggle on the West:
Imperialist rivalry and dissention in the Common Market
and within NATO have grown. The increased might of in-
ternational monopolies has made the competitive struggle
even more merciless. But such is the nature of imper-
ialism that each is striving to gain advantage at the
cost of others, and to impose his own will. All this
goes to show that the present crisis is unusual and
everyone can see that... the myth that present day
capitalism is capable of overcoming the crisis has been
dispelled. 302
The significance of these observations take on greater mean-
ing when considering that the bulk of recent Soviet support
for governments hostile to the West and for national liberation
movements has been in those areas upon which the industrial
nations are most dependent for raw materials: the Middle East
and southern Africa.
Soviet efforts have included activities other than those
conducted in the third world as well. Soviet links to terror-
ist organizations are readily apparent. As Samuel T. Francis,
an analyst for the Heritage Foundation observes:
International ^terrorist/7 operations have been an
effective instrument of political warfare by which
the Soviets have contributed to international in-
stability, maintained an armed underground apparatus
in the Western states, and exerted an influence on the
Palestinian movement, Arab states, and Middle Eastern




While there is no evidence that the Soviets directly control
such terrorist organizations as the Baader-Meinhof gang, the
Red Brigades, or the Palestinian Liberation Organization,
support of such organizations is compatible with "a discreet
policy of letting the other fellow do it when and if the
other fellow could do a little here and there to destabilize
304Western democratic society." Considerable evidence does
exist that the Soviets have in fact supported such destabil-
. . . . 305izing activities — even as far back as 1918 but continuing
well into the present. In 19 71 a four ton Czech arms shipment
bound for the IRA in Northern Ireland was seized by Dutch
"30 6
authorities in the Netherlands. Eastern Europe has
served as a sanctuary, escape route and as a rest and relax-
307 . .
ation center for Western Europe terrorists. Training
camps for terrorists exist in Eastern Europe, Moscow, Cuba,
and North Korea. For example:
The camps inside Cuba are nothing new. They were
opened in 1966 by the DGI, under the Soviet KGB's
close supervision, directly after the first Tricon-
tinental Conference in Havana to "organize the world's
antiimperialist forces." Similar training has long
been available elsewhere under the KGB's eye as well:
North Korea alone has turned out 2500 guerrilla
fighters so far, says the London base Institute for
the Study of Conflict, a good share of them coming
from Latin American countries. What is new is Cuba's
redirection of these professional talents toward Europe.
...Fifty-four such courses were held throughout
Eastern Europe this past year: thirty-five inside
Russia, eight in East Germany, four apiece in Bulgaria
and Czechoslovakia, three in Poland. 308
The Patrice Lumumba University in Moscow also serves as a
16 7

training ground having trained such urban guerrillas as
I.R. Sanchez (better known as the Venezuelan born terrorist
'Carlos 1 ) and Mohammed Boudia of the Popular Front for the
Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) the most active of the inter-
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national terrorist groups. In addition, the Soviets have




310Czechoslovakia, Hungary, South Yemen and Iraq.
The Soviets have also been helpful in supplying arms to
terrorist organizations:
...very large consignments of Soviet weapons shipped
originally to the Middle East — explosives, rifles,
pistols, bazookas, SA-7 shoulder-fired missiles —
are reshipped once a week from Palestinian bases in
Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, and Lybia westward to be stored
away for future use.
The stopovers may be in Bulgaria, Poland, Romania,
Czechoslovakia, or, most important, East Germany.
Stolen cars from Western Europe are driven in freely,
refitted in East European garages to conceal weapons,
then driven out again after loading, with advance
notice to Communist border guards. Three such car-
loads were intercepted in West Germany not long ago. . . LX
Only as the European states began to react with a unified
front to terrorism with the formation of a "formidable
counter terrorist network of police and security services
. . . including not only the nine Common Market states but
also Austria and Switzerland" did the Soviet Union and its
allies begin to cooperate in the control of terrorists (with






This chapter has attempted to demonstrate, via a his-
torical review of Soviet foreign policy from 1917 to the
present, that Soviet commitment to an antagonistic policy
toward the capitalist system has been continuous and that
it has not been limited to rhetoric but has included actions
clearly intended to disrupt the western economic and political
system. The aggressiveness with which the Soviets have
carried out such actions appears to have been tempered by
their own capabilities vis a vis the capitalist states and
the determination and unity with which the west resisted such
actions. The argument can be made (and it must be accepted
as a valid argument) that other factors may have been as
important or more important than Soviet commitment to Marxist-
Leninist ideology but the fact remains that the Soviets con-
tinue to attack the capitalist states in ideological terms,
justify those actions which are hostile to the west in
ideological terms, and to explain cooperation with the
western states not as a modification of the inherent Marxist-
Leninist antagonism to capitalism but as a matter of expediency
not affecting the long term ideological struggle.
As Soviet strategic strength has increased so has their
willingness to expand their activities to hasten the collapse
of the capitalist system. This is particularly evident in
the post-World War II era in which the Soviets have emerged
as one of the two most powerful nations in the world.
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Particularly, the Soviets have sought in the post-war
era to exploit the Achilles 1 heel of the capitalist system --
the western dependence on third world resources and markets.
Also, with the continuing increase in Soviet strategic power,
they have used the Soviet military to expand Soviet influence
into Eastern Europe, the Middle East, and most recently,
Africa. This willingness to use their enhanced position of
power has only been limited by the willingness of the west
to respond forcefully to Soviet actions as evidenced by Soviet
concerns over the formation of NATO, the rearmament of Germany,
and the nuclear confrontation over Cuba.
There is no evidence of a modification of Soviet commit-
ment to the Marxist-Leninist antagonism toward the capitalist
system. Periods of cooperation with the west have always been
explained by the Soviets as expedients. Thus considerable
evidence exists that the Soviets have continued to adhere to
Marxist-Leninist antagonism to the capitalist system in fact
as well as in theory throughout Soviet history. The signifi-
cance of such evidence is that it suggests that statements
made by Soviet spokesmen concerning the relationship between
• , ,
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'detente 1 and the continuation of the 'ideological struggle'
are not merely rhetoric but reflect an active Soviet commitment
to foreign policy goals which are fundamentally antagonistic





The thesis of this research has been that Marxist-Leninist
doctrine continues to play a significant role in the conduct
of Soviet foreign policy. Four questions have been addressed,
the answers to which have attempted to demonstrate this role.
The first question, addressed in chapter two, was: does
Marxist-Leninist doctrine have foreign policy implications
which are fundamental to the doctrine and which, if ignored,
would undermine its coherence? The answer to the question is:
Yes. The relations between the Soviet Union and the capitalist
nations relate directly to the moral aspect of •scientific'
socialism. According to the doctrine, the capitalist states
are characterized by internal and external exploitation of
peoples, unstable relations with each other, and hostility
toward the socialist states. They also stand as an obstacle
to the natural (scientific) progress of history to its final
and highest stage: communism. The socialist claim of being
more in tune with the scientific understanding of historical
progress and with the attempt to elevate man to the higher
stage of human progress places the relations between the
socialist and capitalist states on a moral plane rather than
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a strictly pragmatic state to state relationship. This
moral confrontation developed as a part of the fundamental (or
philosophical) dimension of the Marxist-Leninist ideology. A
1.71

second aspect of Marxist-Leninist ideology (as distinct from
philosophy) is the operational dimension which adds to the
fundamental dimension an awareness and responsiveness to real
world circumstances. The foreign policy result of this
awareness has been Soviet concern for the security of the USSR.
Thus the fundamentally antagonistic foreign policy of the
Soviet Union toward the capitalist states has been tempered
by realistic evaluations of the world situation. As a third
foreign policy implication of the ideology, the colonial
system was identified by the Marxist-Leninist ideologues as
the weak, link of the imperialist system for two reasons:
first the oppressed colonial peoples and the proletariat were
natural allies in the struggle against the common enemy —
imperialism; second, the capitalist economies were (and are)
totally dependent upon the colonies for cheap labor and
resources, and for new markets. The collapse of the colonial
system in the 1950* s and the 1960's was viewed by the Soviets
as the event which signalled the beginning of the final stage
in the collapse of the capitalist system. Thus it has been
determined that the ideology does contain two fundamental
foreign policy tenets: first, it dictates a fundamentally
antagonistic foreign policy toward the capitalist system; and
second it suggests to the Soviets that efforts to disrupt
the capitalist system will be most effective if directed




The second question, addressed in chapter three, was:
even if the ideology does have foreign policy implications
does it continue to affect those who lead the Soviet Union?
The answer to this question cannot be absolutely ascertained
but the evidence considered suggests that the likely answer
is: Yes, at least to a significant degree. One form of
evidence considered was the tremendous effort expended by the
Soviet government to inculcate the people of the Soviet Union
with Marxist-Leninist world views including massive efforts
directed at youth through the educational system and youth
groups such as the Little Octobrists, Young Pioneers, and the
Komsomol, and extending (on a slightly less extensive scale)
throughout the life span of the average adult by efforts
directed through trade unions, professional organizations and
farm collectives. Another aspect of the effort to inculcate
the Soviet public with these ideals is the total control of
the mass media and the existence (and effective functioning)
of organizations designed to suppress alternative ideals.
The selection process for entry into the •communist party and
the rigorous organizational socialization process within the
party rewarding those who conform to party ideals and punish-
ing or expelling those who do not, and the vigorous ideolog-
ical education programs conducted within the party member-




The third question, addressed in chapter four, was:
does the commitment to Marxist-Leninist ideology have an
impact on the foreign policy process? The answer to this
question is: Yes, in three particular areas. First, as a
widely held common value, it impacts as a world view or
conceptual framework through which the Soviet leadership
views and evaluates the world. Second, it has become a
'rule of the game 1 in Soviet politics. It constricts the
range of actions or decisions which may be considered; it
becomes a tool of power for those who can couch their argu-
ments in ideological terms and a liability to those who
cannot; it sanctions some moves while disallowing others.
Finally, the most powerful bureaucracies in the Soviet Union
have a stake in the continued adherence to ideology. The right
of the Communist party to rule exclusively in the Soviet Union
is totally legitimized by reference to the ideology. Attempts
to alter or abandon the ideology threaten this legitimacy.
Since antagonism toward capitalism is a fundamental part of
the ideology, it cannot be dismissed or altered without
threatening the legitimacy of the party. Two other powerful
bureaucracies — the KGB and the military — industrial com-
plex — also have significant long term stakes in continued
adherence to the ideology because it enhances their mission
and justifies budgets and personnel requirements, and en-
hances the prestige of their organizations and leadership.
Those agencies whose organizational interests are damaged or
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hampered by the ideology (the light and consumer industries
and agriculture) are those which have the least impact on
or input to the foreign policy process.
The final question, addressed in chapter five, was:
have the Soviets acted, historically, in a manner which is
in accordance with the foreign policy tenets suggested as
fundamental to the ideology in chapter two? Again, the
answer is: Yes. By considering two variables which would
fall within the operational dimension (and thus impact on
Soviet concerns for the security of the USSR) as they affect
the ability of the Soviet Union to pursue a foreign policy
antagonistic toward the west, it is readily apparent that the
Soviets have, in fact, maintained a foreign policy antagonis-
tic toward the west throughout their history. As Soviet
strategic strength has increased vis a vis the capitalist
states, and particularly in moments at which western resolve
was low, they have conducted increasingly aggressive activi-
ties which they clearly perceive and declare to be damaging
to the capitalist system. The effort which they have conducted
is multifaceted including much more than the obvious military
actions they have taken and include subversion, terrorism,
diplomatic initiatives, efforts designed at denying resources
to the west, support for wars of national liberation, espionage,
and a continuous rhetorical attack on the capitalist system.
One of the most important historical evidences of the con-
tinuing importance of ideology in the Soviet Union is the
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concern exhibited by the Soviet leadership, throughout its
history, to justify periods of cooperation with the west as
short term expedients which actually hasten the downfall of
capitalism by strengthening the Socialist system. These are
arguments obviously intended for domestic consumption and are
evidence of the existence of a powerful constituency which
must be satisfied in ideological terms.
Thus, the thesis that Marxist-Leninist ideology continues
to play a role in the Soviet foreign policy process is sup-
ported. As a final reminder, this thesis has not suggested
that ideology is the only determinant in the Soviet foreign
policy process but tht it is a factor which is significant
and which, if not considered, can lead to a serious misunder-
standing of Soviet foreign policy motivators.
Two factors which may in the future impact on the con-
tinuing role of ideology in Soviet foreign policy but which
have only been considered in a minor way within this thesis
are the Sino-Soviet confluct and Eurocommunism. The Sino-
Soviet conflict, as has been mentioned periodically in this
paper, has definite ideological effects in two particular
areas. The mere existence of opposing Marxist-Leninist based
ideologies undermines the fundamental philosophical claim of
the scientific, thus universal, nature of the ideology. As
has been mentioned in chapter four of this thesis, this doc-
trine is the basis of the legitimacy of the CPSU's exclusion
of other parties and ideas from participation in the political
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process of the Soviet Union. To admit that alternative
roads to socialism exist undermines this legitimacy by allow-
ing the theoretical possibility that there might exist another
group within the Soviet Union which could claim to have a
better understanding of the path to socialism and thus chal-
lenge the right of the party to its privileged position. The
spread of Eurocommunism as a concept also poses this threat —
particularly as the members of the Warsaw pact seek to follow
this trend and to generate policies separate from the Soviet
Union. A second aspect of the Sino-Soviet conflict is that,
in terms of bureaucratic politics, the Chinese may serve as
an alternative to the west as a threat justifying budget and
personnel allocations in the military-industrial complex and
thus lessen the reliance of this bureaucracy on the ideolog-
ical conflict between socialism and capitalism.
The most important implication of this thesis is in terms
of the western response to Soviet foreign policy efforts. If,
in fact, the Soviets are continuing to pursue a multi faceted,
antagonistic foreign policy toward the west as this thesis
suggests, then the two variables which impact on Soviet
security concerns become the keys to containing such Soviet
efforts. In 1971, Thomas Wolfe, in a report written for the
Rand corporation, asked the key question:
Now that the Soviet Union has achieved strategic parity
with the United States, how will this affect Soviet be-
havior? Can we expect more assertive and bolder Soviet
policies, or will the Soviet Union now settle down into




J.I. Coffey writing in Orbis gave the answer which does not
take into account a fundamental ideological antagonism to the
capitalist system:
So far, Soviet leaders have given little indication
that the erosion of U.S. strategic superiority might
"make the world safe for aggression" .. .Although
Khrushchev endorsed and promised to support "wars of
national liberation" by oppressed peoples, he stopped
short (both then and later) of committing Soviet
forces to participation in such wars... The Soviets have
continued to regard even armed intervention in "wars of
liberation" as potentially dangerous. .. -*16
This opinion was rendered in 19 70 prior to Soviet support for
the Arab invasion of Israel in 19 73, the MPLA in Angola in
19 75, the Ethiopian struggle against Somalia and the Eritrean
rebels, the Marxist coup in Afghanistan and the Vietnamese
invasion of Cambodia, all in 19 78.
A consideration of the fundamental ideological content
of Soviet foreign policy with its inherently antagonistic
aspects coupled with the attainment of nuclear parity and low
resolve and division in the capitalist camp would have sup-
ported Thomas Wolfe's answer to his own question: "My own
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